

Greece, Cyprus, Turkey, 1973–1976

Greece

1. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, March 30, 1973.

SUBJECT

Letter to Prime Minister Papadopoulos

As US assistance recipients improve their economic condition, it has been our practice to shift them gradually from grant military assistance to foreign military sales credits. You may recall that Iran took this step shortly after your visit in May last year. Several other countries were considered to make this transition in FY 1974. Greece was one of them. When the Greek government learned of this, they decided to do the same thing that Iran did last spring—take themselves off the grant list. They judged that the amount of money had become quite small and that their being on the recipient list subjected them to continued Congressional criticism. They preferred to initiate the termination of grant military assistance. Greece will receive \$65 million in military sales credits in FY 1974.

Prime Minister Papadopoulos wrote you a letter [Tab B]² explaining Greece's step. There was some misunderstanding at the Greek end of what was involved, so there has had to be continuing technical discussion over the practical elements of terminating grant assistance so that the Greeks would not do themselves out of some aid that was in the pipeline. However, those discussions need not affect your reply.

At Tab A is a suggested reply to the Prime Minister treating this transition in a low key way and expressing appreciation for Greece's contribution to NATO.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 754, Presidential Correspondence File, Greece (Papadopoulos). Secret. Sent for action.

² Dated January 11; attached but not printed. All brackets are in the original.

Recommendation: That you sign the letter to Prime Minister Papadopoulos at Tab A. [Text cleared with Mr. Gergen.]³

³ Nixon signed the letter on April 26; attached but not printed.

2. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State¹

Athens, April 21, 1973, 1115Z.

2400. Subj: Greek Prime Minister Confronts Serious Problems.

Summary: Greek regime in recent months has been unable to deal decisively and in timely fashion with variety serious problems, e.g., universities and student unrest, detention of seven lawyers without charges, arrest of Professor Tsatsos of Bonn University, etc. At same time while Admiral Norton, Chief of British Defense Staff's visit was exploited for needed positive publicity, escalation of violence in Cyprus and squabbling within Greek Orthodox Church have cast additional doubts on competence of GOG leadership. Rising level of internal public criticism of GOG coupled with heightened complaints from Greek military rounds out dreary picture for Prime Minister Papadopoulos. Question arises as to viability of Prime Minister vis-à-vis his colleagues within regime. Remains to be seen whether PM can or will exert strong leadership based on full implementation of 1968 Constitution. End summary.

1. Prime Minister must be increasingly aware he faces problem of developing sufficient forward progress on the political side to eliminate charges of stagnation and lack of direction. Early concrete steps to implement the 1968 Constitution could get him off the hook. For example, such concrete steps would involve the establishment of constitutional court and putting into effect draft electoral law allowing for organization of political parties, as well as fixing of a date for elections, at some distance in the future, however. Recent developments in internal situation are putting him under greater pressure for action.

2. Events in recent months have not improved image of GOG. Number of unresolved problems has increased, causing embarrass-

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 15–1 GREECE. Secret; Exdis.

ment and highlighting regime inability to take decisions in timely fashion. For example, despite fact it has been clear for some time that archaic university administration and growing student dissatisfaction were likely to present problem, regime failed to come to grips with issues posed. When recent student difficulties erupted into confrontation that required resort to drastic measures to bring situation under control GOG reacted rashly, particularly in its resort to draft and in means police used in restoring order. Criticism produced by this affair in Greece and abroad added new element of uneasiness and tension in political environment.

3. Difficulties arising from GOG fumbling on student problem were compounded by untimely arrest of seven lawyers who were publicly identified as legitimate defense counselors for detained students, even though there is little doubt they engaged in other activities considered subversive. GOG refusal to receive representatives of International Commission of Jurists and American Bar Association, while it may have been justified on narrow legal basis considered from internal standpoint, was poor public relations abroad since it lost GOG opportunity to put its version of facts on record.

4. Similarly inept move was GOG arrest of Greek Professor Tsatsos of Bonn University. His arrest, for which no reason yet given publicly but Embassy understands involves his extensive contacts with opposition elements here and abroad, came just at time that GOG discussing and arranging date for visit of German Foreign Minister Scheel to Athens, as well as shortly before SPD Party Congress at which GOG must have been aware FRG Chancellor Brandt would face hostile critics of regime. As result product of SPD Congress was perhaps sharper in its anti-regime focus than might otherwise have been the case, and a considerable cloud has been cast upon prospective Scheel visit this calendar year.

5. On other hand Prime Minister was able to extract maximum publicity value from visit of Admiral Norton, Chief of British Defense Staff by insuring Norton received red carpet treatment and providing full press and TV coverage, including prominent front page pictures of Norton, British Ambassador and himself. To some extent, however, question in House of Commons on desirability of such visits inasmuch as they implied support for GOG, undercut PM, particularly after HMG response made plain visit was military in character and not intended to have political implications.

6. To add to PM's woes, public image of Greek Orthodox Church under GOG-chosen head Archbishop Ieronymos is in deplorable state. Continuing ecclesiastical problems, including proffered resignation of Archbishop, must have produced considerable uneasiness among Greek public generally.

7. Escalating violence in Cyprus, most of which turns upon differences between pro-Makarios and pro-Grivas Greek Cypriots, also casts unfavorable light upon GOG leadership. Here again image of regime and govt have seriously depreciated. Greek inability to unify Greek Cypriot elements, given its announced claim to lead the Hellenistic world, could adversely affect overriding objective of maintaining strong and friendly Greek-Turkish relationship. Athens regime seems to realize critical character of problem it faces in Cyprus but has so far demonstrated inability to master developments on island rather than be mastered by them.

8. While grounds of revival of Vice President Agnew's Drake University statement over past weekend remains somewhat obscure, it seems clear that it was surfaced for government's purposes. It balanced critical resolutions of SPD Congress, and it also served to remind Greek public that GOG has important friends in U.S., irrespective of hostility shown by certain European political leaders.

9. On economic side, GOG has also demonstrated considerable ineptitude in face of inflation, meat shortage problem, pressure for increased wages, and inability to initiate key economic development projects involving foreign investments.

10. Government has either deliberately or by inadvertence permitted development of considerably higher level of direct criticisms within country as evidenced by such publications as "political the-mata" and regular Greek press which have taxed GOG for its failure to cope with wide variety of current problems. Coupled with publicity regarding seven detained lawyers and university problems, these criticisms take on added psychological significance since they contribute to creation of atmosphere in which opposition groups within Greek society are feeling somewhat freer about revealing their own opinion about current situation. Rising level of such critical comment could compel PM to face choice between new and genuine clamp-down and present "shadow of martial law" posture that permits "tolerable" level of dissent, reviving this area of intra-regime friction.

11. The problems above have not been lost on the military who individually have increased their complaint level. This apparently has allowed Chief of Military Police, Col. Dimitrios Ioannidis, who often opts for a much harder line, an increased voice in governmental matters through adroit exploitation of officer complaints. It is difficult to come to grips with the existence or exact size of dissident conspiratorial groups in the Army who may have plans to seize upon this opportunity to move against the Prime Minister. Such a move if carried out by the military with a view toward extricating the Army from government would probably receive a large majority of support both in the military and the population. However, prospects for such a move

to succeed would have to be evaluated in context of PM's demonstrated ability to ferret out and neutralize Army dissidence. Any new group would also have to take into account the views of those junior revolutionary officers who control the key military units in Athens and appear to command the loyalty of Ioannidis.

12. Foregoing adds up to dreary picture for Papadopoulos and his government. It seems to bear out analysis that weakened position of PM vis-à-vis his colleagues within regime may be coming close to point where he has only slim chance to lead government constructively. Various aspects of these developments have been reported on separately [*less than 1 line not declassified*]. Added together, I believe evidence is mounting that the Prime Minister's problems are substantial and that he must move decisively and constructively if he is to retain the balance in his favor within the military establishment necessary for survival. It remains to be seen whether Prime Minister will in light of above circumstances ultimately grasp point that only by a strong demonstration of leadership based upon the full implementation of the 1968 Constitution does he continue to have real chance to save himself as leader of the government and prevent disgrace and disintegration of his "revolution."

Tasca

3. Memorandum From Acting Secretary of State Rush to President Nixon¹

Washington, June 12, 1973.

SUBJECT

Reappraisal of our Greek Policy

Events over the past two weeks have presented us with a changed situation in Greece which will affect our interests in ways that cannot yet be fully assessed.

a. The Navy mutiny on May 22–23² brought an aftermath of arrests of royalist officers in all services. This development has raised a

¹ Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Scowcroft Daily Work Files, Chronological File A, Box 3. Secret.

² Tasca sent an analysis of the mutiny to the Department in telegram 3206, May 24. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 23–9 GREECE)

question as to whether the Greek armed forces can now be considered fully effective as a NATO force.

b. King Constantine appealed to you on May 30³ to forestall an impending move against the monarchy and to press the Papadopoulos government for evolution toward parliamentary rule. Our reply to Constantine, and the way we handle the monarchy issue, will have an impact on other monarchs in the area, especially the Shah of Iran, who has already expressed his concern, and King Hussein of Jordan.

c. Papadopoulos announced on June 1 that the monarchy was abolished and that a prompt plebiscite on constitutional changes would be held with general elections to follow before the end of 1974.⁴ In a shrewd move, Papadopoulos has destroyed an institution that offered continuity and an option for evolution back to democracy while at the same time pledging that he will promptly return the country to representative rule within a republican form of government. Our reaction to this development should reflect our assessment of Papadopoulos' actual intentions and capabilities. Papadopoulos' announcement also faces us with an immediate question of recognition, since Ambassador Tasca is accredited to King Constantine.

Our approach to the various issues that have been raised over the past two weeks should be carefully coordinated, in the context of a review of all our policy options on Greece. While our preliminary assessment indicates that the Papadopoulos regime may not be viable over the long run and may indeed not be able to meet other challenges in the short term, we may also have to face the possibility that there is little we can effectively do to move events in the direction we wish. I recommend that you issue a NSSM along the lines of the attached draft as soon as possible,⁵ looking toward an early meeting of the Senior Review Group on the Greek issue. I will be sending you our views on the situation in the aftermath of the regime's momentous decision.

Attached is a very preliminary tentative analysis.

Kenneth Rush

³ King Constantine had requested a meeting with Ambassador Volpe in Rome to discuss his concerns about the political situation in Greece. (Memorandum from Eliot to Kissinger, May 29; *ibid.*, POL 30 GREECE) The Department decided that it would be better for a subordinate Embassy officer to meet with the King. (Telegram 103077, May 30; *ibid.*) Consequently, the DCM met with Constantine on May 30. (Telegram 4621, May 30; *ibid.*, POL GREECE-US)

⁴ The Embassy in Athens reported the announcement in telegram 3496, June 1. (*Ibid.*, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 594, Country Files, Middle East, Greece, Vol. IV)

⁵ Attached but not printed. The NSSM was finally issued on January 16, 1975, as NSSM 215. See Document 33.

Attachment

Paper Prepared in the Department of State⁶

ABOLITION OF GREEK MONARCHY: A PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT

Prime Minister Papadopoulos has abolished the monarchy and established a "presidential parliamentary democracy." He announced on June 1 that he would assume the duties of Provisional President, that revisions of the constitution would be prepared within two months, and that general elections would be held before the end of 1974. This is a substantial change which will undoubtedly affect our interests in Greece in ways that are not yet entirely clear.

Background

In recent months it has become evident that Prime Minister Papadopoulos' control over Greek internal events has become increasingly tenuous. The stalemate in Greek political life, combined with inflation, student riots, and charges of corruption in high places have raised the level of dissent particularly within the armed forces which represent the key to power. We have been concerned for some time about the possibility of an abrupt change of leadership, most likely in the form of a "palace coup."

Against this backdrop, the Government of Greece announced on May 23 that it had thwarted a Navy insurrection and had arrested a number of active officers and two retired Admirals. Two days later, the Captain of the destroyer "Velos" took his vessel out of NATO maneuvers, declared himself and his crew against the regime, and sailed for Italy. In its public statement the Greek regime tied in the mutiny with "self-exiled" Greeks, and in subsequent remarks various Greek officials took the position that King Constantine was involved in the plot. They took the King's failure to issue a public statement denouncing the mutiny as evidence of his complicity. The King has categorically denied his involvement. We have no hard evidence either way.

The wave of arrests in the wake of the Navy mutiny appears to have involved 60 or more Navy officers and the round-up of royalists is spilling over into the Air Force and Army. Therefore, the mutiny, while not successful, is not as limited as the Greek Government maintains.

⁶ Secret.

On June 1, Papadopoulos announced that the monarchy was abolished by a constituent act voted by the Cabinet. He assumed the duties of Provisional President. He said that revisions to the 1968 Constitution will be prepared within one month and put to a plebiscite within two months. According to the announcement, general elections will be held before the end of 1974.

Preliminary Assessment

Papadopoulos has used the Navy mutiny as a pretext to free his regime from the structure of the 1968 Constitution and the monarchy. We assume Papadopoulos' action is designed to buy time for his regime while throwing the opposition off balance, and that he hoped his solemn pledge of a firm timetable for general elections would forestall objections from abroad. In view of Papadopoulos' failure to carry out his past categorical commitment to President Nixon regarding elections, and the fact that conditions for free elections do not and are not likely to prevail, we are skeptical regarding this shrewd, tactical announcement.

There is a mutual U.S.-Greek interest in maintaining Greek effectiveness in NATO. The latest move by Papadopoulos, in view of the fact that it involves military elements, raises questions as to future Greek effectiveness in NATO. It introduces a divisive issue in NATO, after a period when the "Greek question" has eased off.

While we have no direct stake in the monarchy as such, this institution represented continuity and one option for a peaceful re-establishment of parliamentary rule which has been a second objective of our policy. Our view of the impact of this development on our national interests must depend on an assessment as to whether Papadopoulos intends to, and is able to, honor his pledge to hold elections in 1974. As indicated above, we doubt this.

The conduct of the plebiscite, and of the general elections if they do occur, will have a bearing on Greece's political future and the fate of our interests there. Papadopoulos did not say specifically in his announcement that the "old political world" will be excluded from elections, but one of the strongest policies of the regime from its inception has been to bar this group from political activity. Whether former politicians and royalists will be permitted political activity remains to be seen. The handling of the referendum and actual moves toward bringing into force those articles of the constitution providing for organization of political parties and elections may provide a reasonably satisfactory solution to Greece's political problem with hope of future improvement, or alternatively might prove so distasteful to important segments of the Greek people that the situation would deteriorate even further. We will not have a clear picture of the way this move will affect our interests until this particular scenario is worked out through the election period.

4. **Memorandum From the Chief of the Near East and South Asia Division, Central Intelligence Agency (Waller) to Director of Central Intelligence Schlesinger**

Washington, June 26, 1973.

[Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry, Job 80-M01066A, Box 12, Folder 21. Secret. 2 pages not declassified.]

5. **National Intelligence Estimate¹**

NIE 29.1-73

Washington, July 19, 1973.

[Omitted here is a table of contents.]

SHORT-TERM PROSPECTS IN GREECE

Note

This Estimate assesses the present state of the Greek regime, the issues facing it, its longevity, and the likely nature of a successor. It also addresses Greek relations with the US and Western Europe, either under a continuation of the Papadopoulos regime or under a successor. The focus is on the next year or so.

Précis

A. The present regime in Greece is showing signs of wear and tear after six years in office, but it still commands the essential elements of power. The odds favor Papadopoulos' survival over the next year or so, but this is by no means assured. If he should go, the replacement would most likely be another member of the junta, and neither governmental policies nor attitudes toward the US would greatly change.

B. It is even possible that Papadopoulos might be ousted before the 29 July plebiscite or that other junta members, resentful of his

¹ Source: Central Intelligence Agency, NIC Files, Job 79-R01012A. Secret; Controlled Dissem. The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and Defense, the National Security Agency, and the Department of the Treasury participated in the preparation of this estimate. The Director of Central Intelligence submitted this estimate with the concurrence of all members of the United States Intelligence Board with the exception of the representatives of the Federal Bureau of Investigation who abstained on the grounds that it was outside his jurisdiction.

efforts to institutionalize his control, might seek to delay the vote. We believe, however, that the voting will take place as scheduled and that Greece will become a republic headed by Papadopoulos with an extensive range of authority.

C. Once past this vote, Papadopoulos' position will be strengthened. Yet the odds on his continued rule will diminish with the passage of time, the accumulation of grievances against him in various quarters, and Greek weariness with any regime too long in power. Three categories of opposition will remain sources of concern to him:

1. *Papadopoulos' senior colleagues within the regime* have the potential to oust him, but probably will not unless and until he makes serious blunders—mishandling major issues or alienating key military elements.

2. *Army officers who feel the regime has failed* to carry out the goals of the "Revolution," has grown corrupt, and is insufficiently nationalist. Some zealots of this type exist, but the regime, through its security services, keeps close tabs on such persons; a successful move by them is very unlikely in the near term at least.

3. *Traditional political forces which want a return to elective government*, but are virtually without power to force change on the junta so long as it remains cohesive.

D. The attitudes of the Greek people, in favor of ties with Europe and the US, will continue largely independent of whatever government rules in Athens. Most Greeks credit the US with great potential influence over Greek affairs and believe it backs the junta. But the regime is highly resistant to suggestions from outside on what it regards as domestic Greek affairs.

1. Papadopoulos would be annoyed by public US disapproval of his political plans. Such US action probably would not result *either* in modification of those plans *or* in drastic changes of policy toward the US. However, he probably would somewhat reduce cooperation on those bilateral arrangements which serve primarily US interests.

2. Whatever Washington's policy on Greek domestic politics, the junta will be less easy to deal with than in earlier years, when it felt a more urgent need for strong US support.

E. The regime will continue to be an irritant in Greek-European relations. Athens will not enjoy smooth political relations within NATO; continued criticism of the junta, especially by smaller states, could lead to Greece's pulling out of some NATO committees, but not from NATO itself.

F. The Papadopoulos regime has, on balance, helped to keep the Cyprus situation from breaking into flame, even though some of Papadopoulos' colleagues incline toward drastic initiatives. No Greek government is likely to be more moderate over Cyprus than the present one.

The Estimate

I. The Regime and Its Current Position

1. Six years ago a junta led by Greek army officers seized power with the declared goals of halting a leftist takeover, purifying Greek society, and giving it honest and efficient government. The junta was convinced that democratic government had proved unworkable in Greece and that a strong administration was needed. It proclaimed a revolution, but it had no clear notion as to how to achieve its goals. The principal change that has occurred since the coup has been the gradual emergence of Papadopoulos as the dominant leader. However, the collegiate character of the regime, though weakened, has continued to be a restraint on his activities. The regime has ruled with the acceptance of the populace, partly because the people were weary of the political tumult of the early 1960s and partly because of favorable economic developments; per capita gross national product grew 40 percent in real terms in the 1967–1971 period. Unemployment is low thanks to modest industrial expansion and migration of workers to Western Europe.

2. The regime is beginning to experience wear and tear after six years in power; some corruption has come to light; Greece is no better administered than under the old system; and many Greeks feel the regime has lost its sense of purpose. Inflation has cropped up in the past year and is a source of concern to Greeks. There have been several developments which indicate a growth in political stirrings after several years of passivity. Papadopoulos discovered and circumvented a plot directed against him within the army in September 1972. The regime has had to contend with student strikes, demonstrations, and boycotts over a two-month period in the spring of 1973. And in late May 1973 there was an abortive challenge to the regime from within the navy.

3. The regime seized on this episode to buttress its position. The government accused the mutineers of being in collaboration with the exiled King Constantine; since the Greek Navy has been generally royalist in its loyalty, this provided a pretext to abolish the monarchy. A plebiscite is scheduled for 29 July to approve changes in the Constitution which will make Greece a republic for the second time in 50 years.² The regime has also linked the naval movement with former political leaders who had also become more actively outspoken about affairs in

² Greeks will vote on 34 changes in the 1968 Constitution which eliminate all vestiges of the monarchy and give wide powers to the presidency. A yes vote will also put Papadopoulos in office as President for a term which expires on 1 June 1981. [Footnote is in the original.]

Greece recently. The government has arrested about 60 naval officers, including a substantial number of those qualified to command ships. This purge also served as a warning to officers in other services who might entertain similar ideas.

4. The ambitious Papadopoulos saw the plebiscite as a way to put himself in office for the rest of the 1970s. Abolition of the monarchy has appeal for many in the regime, especially those of second rank. Indeed, only a minority in Greece supports Constantine and the monarchy today. (At some future time, it may serve the purpose of some factions to work for reinstating it.) But the plebiscite offers no real choice since there is no alternative to the constitutional changes or to the candidacies of Papadopoulos and Armed Forces Chief Angelis for President and Vice President.

5. There are few tools available with which to measure public opinion in Greece or the extent of popular support for the Papadopoulos regime; the press is controlled, public opinion polls do not exist, and observers' reports by and large reflect specific topics rather than the overall situation. Such information as is available indicates that the acceptance the regime had enjoyed has lately begun to erode, even in rural areas. Large business interests have made their peace with the Papadopoulos government. As for labor, some factions have been restive, others have courted the regime's favor; no clear pattern has emerged. The urban professional classes, with hopes of playing political roles again, are a source of antagonism. So is a sizeable portion of the university student body, with student complaints over academic issues beginning to take on a political flavor.

6. Within the regime itself, the strengths of various factions and persons is far from clear. Some members are apprehensive over the way Papadopoulos is using the monarchy/plebiscite issue to strengthen his position. He is planning to reduce selectively the military component of the government later this year, and this would affect a number of former officers who were members of the original coup group. (He evidently intends to retain officers who have strong military backing.) Other members of the regime are concerned that even a carefully rigged vote will open the door for a return to parliamentary elective government, which few in the regime want. Still others believe that the plebiscite cannot be successfully managed, despite the regime's control of the administration, the police and security services and its domination of the news media. They fear that the regime's claim to legitimacy could be damaged by a too transparent rigging of the vote.

II. Near-Term Prospects

7. The next few weeks could produce a challenge to Papadopoulos. There is an outside chance of a move against Papadopoulos and

the regime by former junta member Stamatelopoulos; he would need the active support of a key figure such as military security chief Ioannides to have any hope of success. Another possibility is that junta members who want to stop Papadopoulos from getting more power might decide to move before he is publicly chosen as President for eight years. Such persons might seek ways of postponing or cancelling the plebiscite. Regime leaders probably wish to avoid this, fearing it would weaken their claim to govern. All things considered, we estimate that the plebiscite will take place on schedule, that there will be a certain amount of rigging to ensure that Papadopoulos gets the substantial majority he thinks he needs, and that Greece will become a republic.

8. Although the name will change, the system will not. The political attitudes of the regime leaders vary on certain issues, but they are united by the imperatives of survival and by the belief that a continuation of their government is best for Greece. Although the regime coupled its announcement abolishing the monarchy and proclaiming the plebiscite with indications that some freeing up of the political process was in prospect, the evidence since then indicates that moves in the direction of elective politics are not likely. After first implying that elections would be held in 1974, Papadopoulos has backtracked and now promises only that a date for elections to the Parliament will be announced during 1974.

III. Once Past the Plebiscite

9. If Papadopoulos secures the expected majority in the 29 July voting, he will have achieved a certain legitimacy and his position will be strengthened at least for a time. Yet there will continue to be three broad categories of opposition forces about which he must remain concerned.

10. *Traditional Political Forces.* Certain of the pre-junta political leaders are showing signs of activity, but neither individually or collectively are they very strong. Many are in exile; those representing the extremes of right and left are fairly well discredited within Greece. Karamanlis and other centrist leaders have begun to cooperate, but they can do little to affect the junta's control as long as it remains cohesive and as long as there is no crying domestic issue around which Greeks can rally in opposition to the regime. Hence they are not likely to force change on the regime in the near term.

11. *There is also the possibility of a coup against the junta from within the Greek armed forces.* There are some officers, mostly under the rank of lieutenant colonel, who feel that the regime has failed to carry out the goals of the "Revolution," has grown corrupt, and is insufficiently nationalist. These officers display signs of zealotry and hyper-nationalism. Such elements reportedly participated in abortive coups

of 1970 and 1972, but we have no indications that a coup by such elements is now in the works. In general, our information on political factions within the Greek Army is spotty. The regime itself is aware of such attitudes. It takes pains to keep officers who hold them under surveillance and away from sensitive command positions. We think it capable of detecting a move and neutralizing it.

12. *A falling-out within the regime is the most likely way in which Papadopoulos would be replaced.* His senior colleagues—Pattakos, Makarezos, Angelis, and Ioannides—or a faction of them, acting in association with the second rank members, have the potential to oust Papadopoulos. They and their subordinates control the armed forces in Greece. Ioannides is a key figure, since he controls the domestic military intelligence apparatus and has the personal loyalty of some of the second rank officers. Most of the regime's leaders still prefer to have Papadopoulos in office, if only because he is reasonably adroit and is bearing the brunt of criticism. Yet all of them know that Papadopoulos is personally ambitious and would like to cut some of them down to size if not remove them from power entirely.

13. On the whole, however, unless Papadopoulos gets into grave trouble by clearly mishandling major issues or alienates key military elements, the other junta members would probably not move against him. Although the troubles of the past 12 months have been significantly larger than in previous years, they have not reached critical proportions. But as time passes, the odds on Papadopoulos' continued rule will go down; growing public demand for participation in rule will require moves on his part which will increase the chances of a misstep. And the desire for a new face in charge will grow; many Greeks are tired of the present one. Other members of the junta could seek his removal as the way to preserve their own position.

IV. Implications for the United States and Europe of Greek Developments

14. The attitudes of the Greek people toward Europe and the US are largely independent of whatever government rules in Athens. Greece considers itself part of Europe and its orientation is westward—culturally, economically, and politically. Moreover, Greek military leaders, in particular, are of a conservative bent, dislike communism, and look to the West for arms. Hence, the broad framework of Greek policies would be similar, whether under Papadopoulos or under the junta if it ousted him. On any given issue, the personal convictions of those in charge of Greece would make the government easier or more difficult to deal with. But differences would be largely of degree. The observations below apply to a situation in which the regime persists in office, with or without Papadopoulos at its head. (Paragraphs 26 and 27 address contingencies which would involve a sharp break with the policies of recent years.)

The United States

15. Of all Greece's Western associates, the US is the most important. Bilateral ties are strong, and there is a very substantial interaction between the US and Greece. The US is a factor in the political process in Greece, since Greek public opinion credits the US with the power to shape developments within the country. Most Greeks think that Washington is thoroughly behind Papadopoulos and his regime, and he exploits this belief to strengthen his personal position. Papadopoulos, for his part, is committed to cooperation with the US on matters of mutual benefit, but he is not responsive to the US in matters which he considers touch the durability of his control. He, and the regime, have been highly resistant over the years to suggestions from any outsiders on such matters as restoration of elective government.

16. Papadopoulos has told the US that he will brook no interference in his current plans to reshape the Greek Government. He would be annoyed by any public expression of US disapproval of his plans. But he probably would not go so far as to *either* modify his political plans *or* make drastic changes in Greek policy toward the US. Rather, Papadopoulos probably would complain aloud of interference in Greek politics and somewhat reduce cooperation on those bilateral arrangements which primarily serve US interests.

17. Whatever Washington's policy on Greek domestic policies in the months ahead, the US has probably already experienced the best years of its relationship with the Greek junta. In this regime's early years in power, the appearance of US support was more important to Papadopoulos than it is today. The regime no longer sees such a compelling need to accommodate US desires. There will be frictions arising from the proposed major expansion of US military facilities in Greece. A carrier task force is due to be homeported near Athens beginning in February 1974. Consideration is being given to building a large pier to berth the carrier. This would bring the American naval contingent in that area to some 7,500 service men and 4,000 dependents. (There are also some 2,500 air force personnel and dependents.) The US presence will be a very visible one in the Athens area.

18. This is not to say that the second phase of the homeporting program will not go through on schedule, nor that the Greeks necessarily will want to halt or cut down on other US military facilities or programs under way. Most of these are related to the NATO alliance and, in addition, are of benefit to Greece. But the regime is likely to be fussier on details, less willing to agree to some project on short notice, and more disposed to exercise supervision to see that the facilities are not used in a way the Greeks regard as derogating from their sovereignty. (When a Greek opposition figure left Greece illegally from a US military installation in 1972, the government was affronted and moved

to restore a measure of Greek control over it.) In addition, the junta will probably, in certain circumstances, seek domestic political advantage through criticism of the US presence.

Western Europe and NATO

19. The junta's relations in this theatre are likely to be more troubled than they are with the US. Many Europeans labor under the impression that only the ambitions of a few colonels prevent Greece from being a classic democracy. The regime resents the actions and words of some European states as intervention in Greek domestic affairs. Greece withdrew from the Council of Europe when it seemed about to be expelled for its lack of democracy.

20. Although Greece is a conscientious member of NATO, Athens will not enjoy smooth political relations within that organization. Various West European governments will keep calling attention to the incompatibility of the non-democratic character of the regime with the preamble to the treaty establishing NATO. Domestic political parties that would like to make Greece's position in NATO intolerable are especially strong in Belgium, Holland, Denmark, and Norway. But no West European government wants a major quarrel with Washington over Greece, regardless of the character of Athens' regime, and all recognize Greece's strategic importance to NATO. Nonetheless, the possibility that a damaging confrontation within NATO might take place is real. Greece could, say, respond to continued criticism by ceasing to participate in one or more NATO committees. But even if gestures of this sort were made, Greece is not likely to diminish its military cooperation with NATO, and a complete Greek withdrawal from that organization is highly unlikely.

21. In other aspects of European, or indeed Atlantic, relationships, Greece is a factor of limited importance. Although trade and international finance are major concerns to Greece, Greece is of little consequence in either regard. Its total trade in 1972 amounted to some \$3 billion, less than one percent of total European trade. Its reserves are similarly small in relation to all Europe's. Greece simply is not in a position to influence European financial or trade matters to any great extent.

22. Greece signed an association agreement with the Common Market in 1961, which calls for the establishment, over a period of years, of a full customs union and the harmonizing of Greek social and economic policies with the Market. Currently half of Greece's international trade is with the Nine. Over the long term, relations between Greece and the European Community will be difficult, since acceptance of full Greek membership, scheduled for the early 1980s, will ultimately be decided more on political than on economic grounds. Barring unexpectedly rapid movement toward liberalization, Greece will remain outside the Community.

23. In other European groups, Greece stands to play a small role. Greek representatives will probably be active in various committees of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe working on declarations of purpose. But in this as in many other European matters, they will be chiefly concerned to defend Greece from others' meddling and are unlikely to take the lead in any serious way.

Cyprus

24. The Papadopoulos regime has, on balance, helped to keep the Cyprus situation from breaking into flame. Under the rigidly controlled political conditions in Athens, political figures cannot make headlines by inflammatory declarations on Cyprus. Papadopoulos has made it perfectly clear that Greek-Turkish hostilities over Cyprus would be in the interests of neither country. Both Athens and Ankara have in recent months urged their respective clients on the island to try to compose their deep differences sufficiently so as to restore some normalcy after a dozen years of tension and division. Some members of the junta are more inclined than Papadopoulos toward drastic initiatives on the Cyprus problem. But these tendencies are likely to be restrained by the collegiate character of the junta. It would be unlikely, however, that any Greek government would be more moderate than the present one.

25. But it must also be noted that the ability of the junta—or of any Greek regime—to be conciliatory on this issue is closely related to its own sense of security and self-confidence. Should the government feel weakened politically in coming months, it might yield to demagogic and nationalistic urges on the Cyprus issue.

A Totally New Military Junta

26. Speculating on the probable policies of an unknown group of military officers is seldom fruitful. In this case the question is addressed, since, although not likely, a radical new military junta is probably the only realistic contingency which would entail a sharp break with Greek policies of the past half-dozen years. It is possible that a new, more nationalistic leadership would decide that Greece had become too closely associated with the US and while maintaining its NATO ties, would reduce the bilateral relationship with the US. But even in this case, there are distinct limits on how far any such government could go. We would be quite confident in ruling out the takeover by an ultranationalist, anti-Western leader on the Nasser pattern. Such an orientation would be contradictory to deeply-held values in Greek society and hardly feasible for Greece's material or security interests.

A Further Contingency

27. If Papadopoulos were replaced or the junta itself ousted, a principal effect would be to call into question the legitimacy of government

in Athens. That is to say, the 1967 military coup which aimed at “purifying” Greece had a certain amount of justification, since many in Greece felt that Greek society could stand a little purifying. A second military move would look more like a power-grab by self-seeking military officers. If one colonel felt called upon to seize power, then a second could feel equally justified. And if the regime in Athens were to change frequently through the agency of military force, the resulting loss of legitimacy would provide a target against which conventional forces could rally. At such a future time, the civilian side of the Greek political scene would heat up fairly quickly, throwing open the whole future of Greek politics.

6. Intelligence Note Prepared in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research¹

RNAN-35

Washington, August 1, 1973.

GREEK PLEBISCITE: THE REPUBLIC'S INAUSPICIOUS BEGINNING

The Greek Government has announced an overwhelming victory in the July 29 plebiscite. According to the Ministry of Interior, virtually complete results as of July 31 show a “yes” vote of 78.4 per cent, thus confirming the constitutional changes decreed by President-elect George Papadopoulos following his abolition of the monarchy and proclamation of the Republic on June 1.

In the days following his dramatic move, Papadopoulos hurriedly rewrote the 1968 constitution, which was never fully implemented, to give Greece a presidency that would control all the levers of power, and promised elections for a constricted parliament in 1974. The electorate was asked to vote “yes” or “no” on July 29 on these changes and on the unopposed candidacies of Papadopoulos as President and armed forces commander General Angelis as Vice President. Their term is to run through June 1, 1981.

Victory Guaranteed. The outcome of the voting was never in doubt. By employing the usual techniques of authoritarian regimes, the junta

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 14 GREECE. Confidential; No Foreign Dissem. Drafted by Bernard Rotklein and cleared by David Mark and Philip Stoddard (INR/Near East and South Asia).

fostered an atmosphere of fear and intimidation in the weeks prior to the referendum and variously conjured up the spectre of chaos, on the one hand, and fascist repression, on the other, as direct consequences of a majority "no" vote. Voting procedures also were rigged to insure the right outcome. Moreover, by making clear that he would not step down irrespective of the plebiscite's result, Papadopoulos encouraged an attitude of apathy and resignation that was already feeding on the widespread belief that the vote count would be falsified by the junta to record a predetermined total. In fact, extensive upward doctoring of the tally by authorities in Athens appears to have been unnecessary. On the contrary, the "yes" vote may have been so overwhelming, thanks to the efforts of overzealous local officials who seem to have reported near or total unanimity in their villages, that the regime was embarrassed. This in turn, may even have led to efforts to reduce the "yes" vote to more credible proportions.

Opposition Unites. The heavily handicapped effort of many precoup political leaders to mount an opposition campaign was unable to cope with the resources of the state arrayed against it. Although the former politicians may have indirectly enhanced Papadopoulos' victory by urging a "no" vote and thereby recognizing and legitimizing the referendum, their success in closing ranks, from the communist left to the monarchist right, in opposing the plebiscite was especially noteworthy.

Papadopoulos' Position Improved. In the short term, at least, Papadopoulos has bolstered his position by his success in staging the plebiscite. His victory at the polls will temporarily check the disaffection among the military that had surfaced in the abortive naval coup in May. Many officers who are distrustful of Papadopoulos' steady consolidation of personal power, including a large number who are disillusioned by his "betrayal of the revolution," will now bide their time, hoping for some future opportunity either to remove him or to cut him down to size.

The apparent smoothness of the referendum probably will disarm the hardliners in the junta who opposed the plebiscite. Despite their apprehension over indications that Papadopoulos intends to "politicize" the regime following the plebiscite by replacing military officers with civilians, they felt unable to risk a break with him in the weeks before the plebiscite. As has happened before in the six-year history of the regime, Papadopoulos' would-be rivals in the junta have been outmaneuvered by the new President and are now in no position to dictate to him.

General Angelis' refusal to follow custom and resign as armed forces commander prior to the referendum can be viewed against this background. He probably fears overdependence as Vice President on

Papadopoulos and wishes to maintain his position at the top in the military hierarchy before irretrievably tying his fortunes to a master of intrigue who has successfully neutralized all rivals in what began in 1967 as a collegium.

Uncertain Prospects. Over the long run, however, Papadopoulos is not likely to preserve his current dominance. He will confront serious problems in coping with skyrocketing inflation, discontented students, and, perhaps most important, growing disaffection within the military which was badly shaken by the demoralizing consequences of the abortive naval coup last May.

Papadopoulos may have deluded himself by the results of his “plebiscite,” but his partners in the junta will not be fooled by the charade. They know that he is not popular among the people and that their own support of him owes much more to the imperatives of survival than to any sentiments of loyalty. This is probably a key factor behind Papadopoulos’ apparent intention to replace an undetermined number of the junta members in the impending government reorganization. Those who remain will be watching for some misstep by Papadopoulos in his handling of a major issue to weaken, at least, his hold on the government.

In any event, proclaiming the Republic and holding the plebiscite may have sown the seeds of still further regime troubles. The mere exercise of voting has probably whetted the appetite for elections of the Greek people, who pride themselves on their political awareness. Although for five years Papadopoulos refused to implement the parliamentary provisions of the 1968 constitution, he will find it more difficult to welsh on his promise of elections in 1974. In this connection, the ability of almost all shades of the hitherto disparate political opposition to unite on a common course of action in urging a “no” vote may yet represent the most significant outcome of the plebiscite.

7. **Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State¹**

Athens, November 18, 1973, 1155Z.

8046. Subject: Views of PM Markezinis.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 594, Country Files, Middle East, Greece, Vol. IV. Secret; Immediate; Exdis.

1. I talked briefly to PM Markezinis today regarding recent developments,² expressing favorable impression which President Papadopoulos and his reference to the importance of elections and political normalization had made. I said I personally regretted that it had been considered necessary to declare martial law throughout the country,³ adding the hope it would be of brief duration.

2. Markezinis said martial law had been required because subversive plot had clearly developed. He hoped need for martial law would be very brief and that progress on political front would be resumed. He thought that decisive intervention of army would make clear to the country and the politicians that the path to democracy could and would be restored through the efforts of the present government. I repeated the point that prompt removal of martial law could give the impression of strength.

3. Markezinis confirmed he was to have made important political announcement at his November 17 press conference. He said he very much appreciated my words and expressed hope to have more extended conversation with me this coming week.

4. Thrust of my exchange with Markezinis was to get message to him and Papadopoulos that we appreciated continued emphasis on political progress, understood efforts of subversive elements, as Papadopoulos stated, to seek to cause political program to fail, and to encourage them to lift martial law and get on with the political program. Markezinis said he will pass thoughts to Papadopoulos.

5. Incidentally I should stress that available intelligence just prior to the demonstrations gave a clear indication that prospects of full participation of old political world were quite promising, a fact which could not fail to disturb Andreas Papandreou (and his stooge in Washington, Demetracopoulos), as well as other extremist elements.

Tasca

² In airgram A-322 from Athens, November 9, the Embassy reported that the resumption of university classes for the fall-winter term also brought the return of student "dissidence sparked by academic and intra-professional woes as well as political unhappiness with the Papadopoulos/Markezinis era." (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 13-2 GREECE)

³ In the early hours of November 17, the Greek armed forces cracked down on increased protests. In telegram 8037 from Athens, November 17, the Embassy called the move a "setback to ongoing GOG efforts to return Greece to more normal pattern of political life." (Ibid., RG 84, Athens Embassy Files: Lot 77 F 105, Embassy/Athens Political Files, 1973, Box 9, POL 23-8)

8. **Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State**¹

Athens, November 26, 1973, 1730Z.

8297. Subject: Greece's Apparent New Master: Demetrios Ioannides; Some Fears.

1. As the reporting has indicated, Brigadier General Ioannides not only has masterminded the entire new coup² but remains without question the dominant figure. Our intelligence reveals that the new President³ has had an undistinguished career, is not considered to have been a strong military commander, and in general is likely to be completely subject to General Ioannides' objectives and desires. As for the new Prime Minister, Androutsopoulos, I have known him quite well over the years I have been here. I consider him honest and incorruptible but on the timid side. Here again, I believe he will knuckle down to whatever General Ioannides tells him to do.

2. General Ioannides' record has been that of a persistent tough critic of Papadopoulos, a hardliner, and the Chief of the Military Police, which is reputed to have been largely responsible for maltreatment of political prisoners. He is a puritan at heart and in action. His behavior as recently recounted by Isouderos and Palamas would tend to indicate clearly that it is only matter of time before he may decide to push himself to the fore to become the outward expressed symbol of Greek political power. I would not be surprised if he were to replace Ghizikis as President. There is no reason to think he believes in democracy. Perhaps he does but the declaration of the armed forces yesterday morning tends to make clear that if he does believe in democracy, it will probably be of a type unacceptable to public opinion of Western Europe and the United States.

3. Because of the background of its principal members, this regime can be characterized as likely to be pro-American. However, I think we should accept this conclusion with at least one grain of salt since their puritanism on internal matters may become of such overriding importance to them as to affect adversely their external interests. This could affect our security relations. This does not mean they would not

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 594, Country Files, Middle East, Greece, Vol. IV. Secret; Exdis.

² As reported in telegrams 8232 and 8233, November 25, and telegram 8473, December 3, all from Athens, and telegram 236011 to Athens, December 1, the Greek army ousted Papadopoulos in a bloodless coup on November 25. (Ibid.)

³ Phaidon Gizikis.

seek accommodation with the U.S., but they are likely to be tough in their bargaining and on some points even intractable.

4. Even more significant, in my view, will be the danger that a leader like Ioannides will polarize divisively the country's political forces. The proponents of a united front from Karamanlis over to the left, including the EDA and even the Communist left, both internal dissidents and external, will be greatly encouraged. The possibility of organized violence on the part of such a group, already strongly promoted by Andreas Papandreou, will become greatly increased. Further repression will increase polarization and could easily lead to a serious division in the armed forces which might lead eventually to conflict and great political instability. I do not believe that U.S. interests would gain in this process. This process would be greatly facilitated by the likely inability of the new regime to deal successfully with the many problems facing them and which, if not properly tended to, will increase political tension and polarization. What the country needs is not more repression and more control, but more freedom and more self-expression, politically organized. The problems facing Greece, such as inflation, Cyprus, students, bureaucratic modernization, etc. will need broad popular support if these are to be dealt with not only effectively but with a minimum of reaction to some of the tough measures required.

4. It is of course possible that none of this will happen. Some in Athens even believe that rapprochement may be in course between Karamanlis and the new regime. But based purely on the record I am not optimistic on this point. I find the manner in which Ioannides was able to cut across command channels and have discharged or released from service a number of officers senior to himself without commitment to any political program highly disquieting for the future. I also believe that even those Greeks who are presently in somewhat of a state of euphoria because of their glee with the disappearance of Papadopoulos, may find the gray "morning after" grim, dismal and depressing. There is some real indication that some of the military may already be concerned about where they are going. The Greek military are now engaged in what could be a disastrous operation of political intervention. This inevitably involves them in the divisiveness of internal Greek politics. Thus, instead of restoring their function as an independent defense force dedicated only to serving the country's defense and security needs, they are becoming entrenched as masters of the people.

5. It is within the foregoing context that I think the U.S. should consider what its posture should be toward General Ioannides and his efforts at this time.

9. **Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State**¹

Athens, February 8, 1974, 1040Z.

842. Subject: The Military in Greece: Dominant Political Power at the Crossroads—A Country Team Assessment.

1. Summary. The Embassy has previously reported on the Greek political mood and prospects for the future.² In this message we look beyond the exterior appearances of government, to focus on the basic power structure in Greece, the Hellenic Armed Forces, for, while the entire government, except for the President, is composed of civilians, decisive power lies behind the scene with the military. Events of the last nine months have had a traumatic effect on the military's effectiveness both as an organization and as basis for political stability. A sense of continuity and many of the benefits of experience have been lost as the upper ranks have been decimated by too frequent change. Discipline has been seriously impaired as the middle ranks have been politicized. The Armed Forces now constitute the single greatest barrier to stable political life. End Summary.

2. The Military on the Evening of the Coup. Dissatisfaction with the state of affairs in Greece had been growing markedly within the Armed Forces, particularly the Army, in the six months or so preceding the coup of Nov. 25. During the period preliminary to the November coup, however, the senior command positions in the military remained in the hands of the figures who, on the surface at least, remained loyal to Papadopoulos. They were put there, many only recently, precisely because of their presumed commitment to the President. Ironically, when the test did come, most went along with the coup, even if they had not been involved in the plotting from the beginning. A number, more deeply compromised by their association with Papadopoulos over a longer period of time, were themselves targets of the coup. They were unable to offer any effective resistance and were immediately neutralized.

3. While the majority of the officer corps may have been neutral on the question of military intervention, or at least were not inclined to agitate for it, a fairly well-defined group of middle-grade and jun-

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 594, Country Files, Middle East, Greece, Vol. IV. Secret; Priority; Exdis.

² In telegram 512 from Athens, January 24, Tasca described the euphoria over Papadopoulos's departure in the November 25 coup as giving way to a "bleak mood verging on despair" with martial law still in effect and economic prospects remaining grim. (Ibid.)

ior officers was becoming increasingly impatient with the situation. Almost all of them were declared or clandestine followers of Brig. Gen. Ioannides, the Commander of the Greek Military Police (ESA) and self-appointed watchdog of Papadopoulos' leadership of the "revolution" at least since 1970.

4. These officers, many of whom owed their position to Ioannides' influence when he set up a watchdog group under President Papadopoulos, believed that the "revolution" had been betrayed by the majority of its original leaders. Mistakes had been made; some considered that the military had assumed too direct a role in the government and had been corrupted by it. As a result the military was losing the respect of the Greek people. Its part in such frauds as the July referendum caused it to lose further ground in its struggle to maintain its integrity. These effects were magnified by the cult of personality developing in an atmosphere of increasingly blatant corruption.

5. Ioannides had never made any secret of his intention that if the day ever came in which it appeared that the principles of the 1967 revolution were about to be irreversibly compromised he would try to remove Papadopoulos from power. In his estimation and that of his followers, almost everything that the Markezinis government did from the day it took office brought that moment nearer. Throughout October and early November, morale among the military slumped. More and more of the younger officers began to question the route the government was taking. And, finally, to corruption, another issue was added: a formal return through elections to the very same type of parliamentary regime that had been ousted in 1967. The student disturbances, accompanied by bloodshed, forced the military to the front in the distasteful role of saviors of a regime that had abandoned the revolution. The critical level of dissatisfaction had been reached. It was the ideal occasion for Ioannides to move.

6. The Hellenic Armed Forces Today. The coup of Nov. 25 has severely affected the effectiveness of the Armed Forces. While such traditional defense functions as border defense still go on, no officer in any service can be confident of his position after the turmoil caused by the recent major upheavals in the top ranks. The continuity offered by orderly promotion is completely lacking. Our military contacts and analysis indicate lessening of command respectability and the creation of an atmosphere of uncertainty within the military.

7. Senior Officers Inexperienced. Three major changes in the Hellenic Army hierarchy occurred during the period June through November: one consisted of normal retirements and promotions in June; the second followed the July plebiscite and the elevation of Gen. Angelis to the Vice Presidency in August; the third followed the coup of Nov. 25. This third change was clearly a purge and brought very

inexperienced officers into the highest positions of leadership. Today, all of the lieutenant generals, eighty percent of the major generals, all of the brigadier generals, and eighty percent of the colonels in the Hellenic Army (the major force) have six or less months in grade. Nine of the top ten Army commands have had three incumbents within nine months; the other has had two.

8. At least sixty middle-ranked Navy officers were imprisoned and later discharged as a result of the abortive Navy mutiny of May 1973. Even before then, the Navy's capability as a fighting force was in question. The Hellenic Navy now finds it necessary to give most middle grade officers at least tow billets, due to the shortages in these grades.

9. In the Air Force, unrest at the same time but unrelated to the Navy mutiny, led to the dismissal of a number of Air Force colonels and lieutenant colonels. Following Nov. 25, dissatisfaction within the middle ranks led to the dismissal of further key officers—including the Chief, Deputy Chief and Operations Director. Because of these early retirements and forced organizational changes, the HAF lacks either experienced or innovative officers to provide effective leadership at the tactical/operational level.

10. The merry-go-round comings and goings of senior officers have seriously jeopardized the Hellenes' ability to implement long term planning. This has been clearly reflected in JUSMAGG'S discussions with SHAFC regarding equipment needs in the period ahead. The officers now holding senior command and staff positions at the headquarters in Athens simply do not have the prerequisite experience to organize and direct a widescale military establishment. Given time, and allowance for errors, the new commanders should master their assignments. Whether they will have the time in office and grade to gain the required proficiency will likely depend upon their ability to extricate themselves from the political morass in which they are now wallowing. Certainly an attack on Greece by an outside hostile force such as Warsaw Pact member would quickly erase all signs of internal Greek schism as Greeks united against a common enemy. Barring this, the senior military give no indication of how or when they will find the key to their political problems.

11. The Middle Grades—Key Role in the Balance of Power. The middle-ranking officers (lt. cols. and majors) of the Armed Forces, especially of the Army, are key arbiters of power. This is particularly true because of their ties to the operational units equipped to impose their will. Who commands the operational military units can effectively command the country. These officers were held in line for over six years under George Papadopoulos' leadership and Ioannides' patronage. They deferred to the hierarchy appointed by the "leader of the 21st of April revolution".

The fall of Papadopoulos at their insistence and with their planning and support has given them an unforgettable taste of politics and power. They are reported to be intensely nationalistic and appear not particularly attracted to the notion of early political normalization via the reestablishment of constitutional government. They are indifferent, perhaps even hostile in instances, to "political" solutions for Greece's many problems. Certainly the coup has intensified their attitude that the military, in the name of the "revolution" can override such considerations as law and legitimate political power. Appeals appearing to involve simply the return of "old politicians" are not likely to be welcomed. Among the middle ranks, the major unifying factor on Nov. 25 was the desire to remove George Papadopoulos. Agreement on a future course was not then material. Now, this group appears to be without unity of purpose or direction. It is still possible they will be swayed by effective senior leadership, particularly if persuaded that the future of the Armed Forces, including themselves, could be irreparably damaged by their open association, for example, with the business of governing Greece in a time of world economic crisis.

12. Politics and the Military. Ioannides and the senior officers could pull the military out of its morass if they could unite upon a political course for the nation. Moreover, the stated intent of the Armed Forces in establishing a "civilian" government while the coup leaders remained in uniform was to remove the Armed Forces from politics. Yet, in fact, the appointed government was given responsibilities without sufficient authority to act; the uniformed leaders retained the authority to act without concurrent responsibilities. And, the President of Greece remains a full general on active duty. More than two months after its installation, the new regime still has no clear political or economic program. It clearly gives the impression of being the administrative branch executing orders and policies determined by the military oligarchy. There is obvious disagreement between the senior generals who stand up front and the younger officers behind the scenes who supported the change and feel their power and views should play a key role in Greece's future.

13. The failure of a leader to come forward and gather in the reins and appurtenances of power (as George Papadopoulos did in 1967) has been the predominant contributor to the military disarray and governmental inactivity. It is universally acknowledged that BGen Ioannides makes all policy decisions from backstage. It is thought that if the domestic situation so deteriorates that anarchy and civil disorder appear imminent, Ioannides will try to step forward to take complete control. Alternatively, he may seek civilian government. He has already attempted to maintain his leadership *bona fides* by holding a series of pep rallies at military camps throughout Greece. His message has been one of personal pride and devotion to country. However, he is austere

and puritanical, has no charisma and no viable “national view” of Greek society and its dynamics.

14. If Ioannides does move for overt control, it is questionable whether he will have as wide approval, overt or tacit, as he did in November. He is already toeing a delicate tightrope between the senior appointed leaders and other, more zealous, middle grade officers. There is no doubt that in trying to restore discipline, the Ioannides pep rallies have created more disciplinary problems. These meetings are often reminiscent of gatherings of a “Praetorian Guard” or “Committee of Public Safety.” Few unit commanders can be appreciative of such overt forays into their areas of responsibility.

15. More important, it seems likely that before Nov. 25, in order to obtain at least the tacit acceptance of many moderate officers, Ioannides may have bandied the possibility of bringing Karamanlis back to head a Government of National Reconciliation. This would help account for the almost universal euphoria which pervaded Greece in the days immediately following Nov. 25. If true, a supporter once double-crossed is hardly likely to be fooled a second time. In any scenario which forecasts Ioannides reaching out to save Greece in time of imminent disaster, it seems likely that he will be actively opposed by the same moderates who until now have given him license to proceed.

16. A Bleak Future? The politicization of the Armed Forces is eroding its integrity as a military organization. In contrast to the early days of the Papadopoulos regime, the Hellenic Army does not stand united behind its leader. Loyalty to those holding effective power has become more important than efficiency. Unless firm leadership emerges, singly or in groups, dissidents can now look to the possibility of redressing their grievances by replacing those in power with their own patrons. The ease with which the November coup occurred has already offered encouragement to other groups to begin planning the next one. Many young officers have come to regard a coup as a legitimate—and feasible—way to get what they want, or what they perceive to be in Greece’s best interests. There have already been several reports of officers talking in this manner. At the moment all this is just talk, but the readiness with which such ideas leap to their minds shows that these officers may be coming to accept a coup as a way of life. As long as they see politics as an acceptable second calling, they pose an immediate threat to the leaders, who must face the realities of day-to-day government on the one hand, and on the other must satisfy the often misdirected nationalistic ideas of the younger officers.

17. Unless the leadership pulls itself together, the military’s preoccupation with the strategies of political power-brokering, the absence of discipline and the dearth of leadership at the top make it seem certain that Hellenic Armed Forces may continue to lose overall military-

operational effectiveness. The Armed Forces are a vital element within the equation of Greek stability. Their instability is reflected throughout the Greek society. United, the military might find the key to an effective government which corresponds to the aspiration of the Greek people. In this event, the Greeks might even forgive and forget. However, until someone reestablishes military discipline and withdraws the military from the day-to-day government, it will be difficult to come to grips with the broader social, economic, and political problems which now confront Greece. As things now stand, the Greek Armed Forces have become a symbol of repression, tyranny, and disarray. Their association in their present state and posture with NATO and the U.S. remains ominous for our future security interests in Greece.

Tasca

10. Action Memorandum From the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Lord) to Secretary of State Kissinger¹

Washington, February 15, 1974.

US POLICY TOWARD GREECE

We prepared the attached study on considerations affecting our relations with Greece for use at an analytical staff meeting. We have not been able to fit the meeting into your schedule and may not be able to do so for some time.² Also, Ambassador Tasca will probably be in Washington next month and you may prefer to wait until then before having a general meeting on Greece.

There are no immediate critical issues that need to be resolved in our dealings with Greece; I believe, however, that you may want to look over the paper we have prepared since the situation may be deteriorating and there are decisions in the offing that will have to be taken in a broad policy context.

¹ Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 324, Policy Planning—History, Selected Papers. V. 3, European Affairs, 1973–75. Secret; Exdis. Printed from a copy that indicates Lord signed the original. Drafted by Thomas Thornton of the Policy Planning Staff.

² See Document 12.

The attached study was prepared by a drafting group chaired by S/P and including representatives of NEA, PM, H, EUR and INR. As is customary with such papers we did not specifically clear it with these bureaus; their views are, however, fully reflected in it.

At the end of the paper there is a series of “interim decisions.” I would not suggest that you make any decisions on the basis of this paper without fuller discussion with the bureaus concerned; you may, however, find these “interim decisions” useful as a way of approaching the problem.

I regret the length of the paper, but accept the fact that the detail provided is necessary for dealing with this complex situation. If you are pressed for time, you may want to move quickly through Sections I–III which provide background on the political dynamics of Greece; Section IV A. (Homeporting) presents important data that you need not, however, absorb in detail. The remainder of the paper sets forth the basic philosophical problem, and I suggest that you devote your principal attention to it. Throughout we have provided underlining which should facilitate rapid reading.³

Larry Eagleburger, in reading this paper, felt that the Navy’s position on homeporting got short-changed in the presentation—especially as regards their requirement for maximum time on station overseas. Even if this is the case, however, I believe the conclusions that we reach are still valid.

After the study was completed we received a cable from Athens (Tab C to the study)⁴ that provided a disturbing country team assessment of the effect on the Greek military of its involvement in politics. The cable suggests that the Greek military’s capabilities have suffered greatly and that politicization of the armed force could lead to further coups. This is certainly a factor that we will want to take into account in our dealings with the present Greek government.

Action Requested:

Do you wish to meet with concerned parts of the Department to discuss the current situation in Greece?⁵

Yes; arrange early meeting.

Yes; wait until Tasca returns.

No.

³ Printed below as italics.

⁴ Not attached but printed as Document 9.

⁵ Kissinger did not initial any of the options.

Attachment

Paper Prepared in the Department of State⁶

I. Introduction

Four months have passed since the ouster of the Papadopoulos government in Athens. We have been able to form an adequate general impression of the new leadership, and its pattern of its intentions and attitudes toward the United States is emerging gradually. *While there are no pressing issues* to be resolved in bi-lateral Greek-US relations, we believe that *it is now time to develop an overall US approach to the new government* for these reasons:

—*Ambassador Tasca is to testify before a predictably skeptical House committee on March 27.* You may well be invited to testify on Greece soon thereafter. Ambassador Tasca will need to have clear policy guidance if he is to testify most effectively; also what he says will inevitably impact on certain bi-lateral issues in US-Greek relations, as well as broadly on the attitude of the Greek people and government toward us.

—*Renegotiation of the agreement under which we have use of certain Greek and naval facilities is proceeding slowly* and the Greeks obviously hope to drive a hard bargain. Our overall approach toward the Greek regime should influence the way we conduct these negotiations.

—Perhaps most important, *we do not want to build up a policy toward Greece solely by the accretion of small ad hoc decisions.* Where US-Greek relations end up some months or years from now should, to the extent possible, be the result of conscious, fully-articulated decisions on our part as to what best serves immediate and long-term American interests in Greece.

This paper is designed to illuminate the broad context of US-Greek relations and provide the framework for developing an overall policy approach toward Greece. To do this, it:

—discusses the nature of the present Greek regime, its attitude toward the US and likely future developments within Greece (Section II);

—describes some current issues in US-Greek relations (Section III);
and

—delineates general lines of approach that we can take toward the Greek government (Section IV).

This last section also attempts to set the Greek problem into the framework of a much broader question that affects our relations with

⁶ Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Thornton on January 8 and revised on January 30 and March 19; other principal contributors were John Day and Lieutenant Colonel Frederic Flemings (PM/ISO).

a number of countries: how to deal with an unpopular regime that offers important contributions to our security interests.

II. *The Current Greek Government*

A. Its Intentions and Character

“The President received me in full uniform, with four stars on each shoulder, and wearing dark glasses.”—Ambassador Tasca’s comment on his first meeting with President Gizikis.

The government that has ruled in Athens since November 25 is a direct descendant of the Papadopoulos regime that seized power in April 1967. Politically it has harked back to the simplistic puritanism of the early Papadopoulos years but lacks even the benefits of novelty that Papadopoulos initially enjoyed. It shows no signs of articulating a program that has relevance to Greek reality. Moreover, it has erased the tentative moves toward democracy that Papadopoulos made, and shows no promise of moving toward representative government. *In the literal and figurative sense, it is a reactionary government.*

The ostensible leaders of the government—President Gizikis, Prime Minister Androutsopoulos and the cabinet—are political nonentities without a power base. The power behind the regime is Brigadier Ioannides, who, under the Papadopoulos regime, was head of the military police and an anti-democratic hard-liner. He has an unsavory reputation, and is commonly linked to the tortures that caused so much international protest under Papadopoulos.

An additional drawback to the regime is that it disposes of even less technical capability for dealing with Greece’s growing economic, political and social problems than did Papadopoulos’ group. It can develop such a capability only by coopting politicians and technicians but its prospects for doing so are poor. The government simply does not command sufficient respect or confidence.

B. Attitudes Toward the US and NATO

The new regime is not a group of “Atlanticists” who see their relationship with the US and NATO based on shared values. Virtually inexperienced in the world outside Greece, their point of view is narrowly nationalistic. Their fanatic anti-Communism is based on deep fear of a threat from the North that impels them to value their ties to the United States and NATO. They tend to believe, however, that we need Greece at least as much as Greece needs us, so that *their approach to us is likely to be one of hard bargaining over such issues as base rights and homeporting—adversarial in style rather than cooperative.*

Their nationalistic orientation is also likely to make them highly sensitive to foreign meddling in Greek affairs—e.g., efforts to press them to restore democratic institutions. They probably have only a limited appreciation of the political pressures under which we operate and would

react considerably more sharply than the Papadopoulos group to prodings of this nature, probably cooling considerably the climate of US-Greek relations at the official level.

Popular attitudes are a different matter. *Greek appreciation of the United States, backed often by family ties, has been remarkably strong. A widespread feeling of good will continues to exist and will probably persist in part under almost any foreseeable circumstances. There is, however, an element of anti-Americanism growing in Greece that would have been unthinkable a few years ago.* In part this probably relates to a generational trend visible throughout Europe although this is much less pronounced in Greece than, say, in Germany. A more substantial element of disillusionment has grown from our previous association with the Papadopoulos regime, intensified by the widespread belief that the CIA was involved in the November 25 coup and that the United States favors the present regime. *This sentiment will grow as long as we are seen to be identified with unpopular rule and will erode the principal long-term force holding Greece close to the United States.*

C. Prospects for Greece

The overthrow of Papadopoulos was greeted with euphoria, but the honeymoon quickly ended as the nature of the new regime became apparent. In addition, *Greece is experiencing a major inflation* induced by both domestic and international factors, fueled now by the growing cost of petroleum. The economic problem may be aggravated by declining receipts from Greek workers in Germany, from Greek shipping and from tourism—and especially by the lack of competent economic management. *If the inflationary trend continues (as seems likely), it will only be a matter of time until opposition to the new dictatorship becomes manifest with the students and some elements of labor in the vanguard.*

The government will move quickly and harshly to stifle any opposition. It will not hesitate to make arrests or close newspapers that print critical commentary. Repressive measures will further its isolation from the politically active elements of the population and sharpen the incipient polarization within which leftist and Communist groups gain entree to the moderate opposition. Repression will probably breed more opposition and repression in a vicious circle; foreign investment and tourism will be scared off; and international criticism will become stronger.

Ioannides and his colleagues can probably stay in power indefinitely if they remain united and command the support of the key military units. This will be difficult to do, however, as pressures mount and offer further opportunities for the display of governmental incompetence. Governmental legitimacy, already greatly eroded under Papadopoulos, has been weakened still further and other military men may be tempted to topple a junta that lacks any popular base. Already there are indications that a number of senior officers are worried about the implications of the

Army's direct involvement in managing the Government. These officers believe that *the close identification of the Greek Army with the present regime is not only seriously discrediting the Greek military in the public mind but is also dividing the Army into factions and undermining its military capabilities*. There is a third group of officers in the Army—so-called Qadafites—who reportedly favor a neutralist position for Greece.

In this situation, *it is difficult to predict what forces will emerge in the Greek military in the coming months, but the life expectancy of the Ioannides regime is not good—a year would probably be a generous estimate*. Greece could experience a series of coups, each varying from the other at most in degree rather than in kind.

The question of what will come after the type of regime currently in power is the critical one for long-term US interests in Greece—i.e., for continued Greek recognition that their interests are best served by closer association with the United States. There are numerous possibilities including a period of enlightened guided democracy, gradual relinquishing of control by the military to the politicians, a new type of military regime that is nationalist and neutralist, a leftist assumption of power resulting from polarization and radicalization, or even a reinstatement of moderate political rule resulting from a violent upheaval.

We cannot choose with any confidence among these, but believe that two valid general predictions are possible:

—*The current type of regime cannot provide a long-term government in Greece; it lacks support and the capability to analyze problems and develop coherent plans and programs for dealing with them. Further, this type of regime is not likely to hand power over to the politicians willingly.*

—*The most natural and hence probably most stable system for Greece is parliamentary democracy of the kind that was fitfully evolving prior to the Papadopoulos coup. (The Greeks had finally managed to elect a majority party—George Papandreou's Center Union—in their last free election in 1964.) Whether the monarchy would be restored is a matter of detail.*

The justification for the first of these generalizations is inherent in the preceding discussion. The second is credible because of the way that Greeks prefer to go about doing politics. They are not wedded to an abstract concept of democracy, but the give and take of a parliamentary system helps satisfy their predilection for personal involvement with the sources of political and social power. Also, it provides scope for the exercise of the art of patronage which comfortably blurs the distinction between government and governed but is difficult to practice with distant, puritanical men of Ioannides' stamp who want to recast Greek political life.

The two generalizations do give us important guidelines in assessing our relations with Greece. *We are not likely to be dealing with Ioan-*

nides or types similar to him indefinitely. The people who will rule Greece in the not too distant future will probably come from the political opposition that has chafed under the rule of Papadopoulos and now of Ioannides for nearly seven years.

The moderate political leadership in Greece perceives a close identity of interest among Greece, the US and NATO, and under no circumstances is it likely to turn strongly against the American tie. Its attitude toward the US will, however, be significantly affected by the degree to which it sees us as supporters of military dictatorship. Put in minimum and simplistic terms, *there is probably an inevitable inverse relationship between the ease with which we secure Greek cooperation on security matters now and the ease with which we will be able to secure it from the kind of successor regime that is most likely and most desirable from our overall point of view.*

III. Bi-lateral Security Issues

The expansion of homeporting in Athens to include an aircraft carrier (Phase II) has been postponed for at least six months by Secretary Schlesinger.⁷ The Department has had serious misgivings about this Second Phase of homeporting and welcomes the postponement. In addition, we will find it useful to keep Phase II in abeyance at least until other bi-lateral issues have been sorted out and we have a determination on how we wish to proceed in dealing with the Greek regime.

We do not know whether Secretary Schlesinger will ever reinvigorate Phase II; this will probably be determined in large part by the study underway on carrier inventory. *Should we proceed with Phase II, however, there will be political costs.* While the physical visibility of Phase II would not be great (six destroyer-type ships are already homeported in Athens and a rotational carrier spends considerable time there now), the political impact would be disproportionate. *The Greeks would see this as a demonstration of our support for the Ioannides government and the regime will ensure that this implication is well publicized.* The reaction in the US—especially in Congress—would also be considerable.

Thus as we consider the military requirements for Phase II homeporting, it will be important to keep these political aspects in mind as well.

The Souda Bay negotiations are the prime matter of current concern in our security relationships with the Greeks. Our Navy has used Souda Bay airfield (on Crete) under a 1959 agreement with the Greek government. In recent years, our anti-submarine aircraft have been using it, with Greek acquiescence, far beyond the levels provided for in the agreement. Also, the Navy has been using Souda Bay extensively outside the framework

⁷ See Attachment A for background on the homeporting issue. [Footnote in the original.]

of the agreement for logistic support of the Sixth Fleet. Now both the Greeks and the Navy wish to regularize this increased usage.

Additionally, should we decide to implement Phase II of homeporting, we would need to use Souda Bay as a training airfield for the aircraft of the carrier that would be homeported at Athens. (Airspace around Athens is too crowded for this kind of activity.)

The Navy has been negotiating with the Greek military for expanded usage (ASW plus training) since early 1972. With the advent of the new regime, *Greek negotiators sought an amended agreement that would contain provisions unacceptable to us (e.g., summary unilateral termination by Greece and changes in status of forces.)* In January, these negotiations were raised to the political level and the matter is now under study in the Greek foreign ministry.

The Greek military indicated that they expect a quid pro quo as part of the package including Souda Bay renegotiation and Phase II homeporting. At one point they expected a renewal of grant military assistance, which was terminated at their request in 1973,⁸ but they now appear to recognize that Congressional opposition makes a renewal of grant aid impossible. The Greeks have also mentioned fighter aircraft to modernize their air force; thus it is clear that they expect something substantial and the negotiations are likely to be lengthy and difficult.

A final issue relates to the level of FMS credit available to Greece. So far in FY 1974 we have provided Greece with \$50 million in FMS credit which is to be applied toward the Greek purchase of F-4 aircraft. The possibility of an additional \$10 million in credits in FY 1974 is still under review. The proposed FMS credit level for Greece in FY 1975 is \$71 million. Increasing our level of assistance in FY 1975 to this level would be likely to enhance our negotiating position on Souda Bay and perhaps subsequently benefit possible negotiations related to Phase II homeporting. However, Congressional critics of the Greek regime will be watching closely and may launch a strong attack on any increase.

This complex of issues—Souda Bay negotiations, FMS and possible homeporting—make up a substantial element of our relations with Greece, both on security and political grounds. We will need to make a politico-military assessment of them if we are to manage them with maximum effect. We will need to determine what price we are willing to pay for facilities in terms of association with the Greek regime, problems in our relations with Congress, quid pro quo, and acceptance of agreements less favorable to the US than were previous defense agreements. In the broadest sense, these decisions must all be made in light of our overall posture toward the Ioannides government.

⁸ See Document 1.

IV. Overall Posture

A. Special Considerations

In appraising the various postures that we could adopt toward the Greek government, several special elements affecting Greek-US relations need to be examined.

The first is a widespread belief, nearly unique to the Greek polity, that the United States can and does determine the course of Greek politics. This is Sakharovism writ large; while few persons—Russian or other—seriously believe that the US can effect substantial short-term change in Soviet domestic politics, many persons—Greeks and others—take our capabilities vis-à-vis Greece as a matter of faith. As a result, US cooperation with a given regime is construed as support and becomes a significant factor strengthening the regime's position. In the present circumstances the "evidences" of cooperation are our close military relationships (most visibly homeporting) and the widely accepted rumors about CIA and Pentagon support of the regime. These will be enhanced to the extent that we fall back from our previous policy of stating our hopes for a return to democratic government.

A second element is the ambivalent position of Greece within our alliance framework. Our relationship is technically defined by NATO, but in fact shows many discrepancies:

—The Greeks, while valuing their ties to NATO and Europe in general, in fact see their security mainly as a bilateral matter between themselves and the United States.

—The other NATO members show varying degrees of disinterest and distaste for Greece. It is geographically remote from the focus of security concern in Central Europe and a number of the NATO members find it repugnant to deal with the type of regime that Greece has had since 1967. Policy toward Greece has been a perennial bone of contention within NATO, and the issue was raised again by the Norwegians, backed by the Danes, at the December Ministerial meeting.⁹ The Benelux Foreign Ministers associated themselves with the Scandinavian criticism. The Greek Foreign Minister was obliged to reject these attacks as "flagrant violations" of the Alliance doctrine of non-intervention. We can expect much more of this sort of thing as the Europeans gain a fuller appreciation of the Ioannides junta.

—While we treat Greece within an overall NATO posture, our most pressing concern at this point is to be able to use Greece as an element of our Eastern Mediterranean strategy outside the framework of NATO. The other NATO members recognize this fact and it contributes to their

⁹ December 7–8, 1972, in Brussels. Documentation on the meeting is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. XLI.

lack of enthusiasm for our attempts to maximize our security position in Greece.

—The Greek government's posture, however, is actually at variance with our role in the Arab-Israeli dispute. Although the regime was covertly helpful to us during the October fighting, its willingness to permit use of facilities in support of non-NATO contingencies is severely limited by concern for Greek interests and communities in Arab states.¹⁰

The third element relates to the approach that many Americans and other foreigners take to Greece. Lord Byron's heart still beats in many breasts and the urge to "do something for Greece" is often near-uncontrollable.

—Expectations still run high that Greece, as the alleged home of democracy, should keep the tradition going. A rather more cogent argument along this line is that Greece was, in fact, developing a democratic system prior to Papadopoulos' coup and, unlike many states with no democratic tradition, could probably make a go of such a system if given a chance.

—Greeks are intrepid emigrants. There are Greek communities all over the world and while their opinion is split on the current political situation in Greece, opponents of the regime are highly vocal and have been effective in fueling anti-regime sentiment.

Finally, we can expect the Congressional opponents of our policy toward Greece to intensify their criticism in the coming weeks and months. Ambassador Tasca's appearance before the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Europe will probably be the first occasion for concentrated criticism. The opponents of our policy will probably assert that the new regime is worse than the last one; that our attitude of forbearance while the Greeks work things out for themselves has not paid off; and that our claims about the strategic importance of Greece to US security interests has been put in doubt by the apparent Greek ambivalence toward our Eastern Mediterranean concerns. Some members may also express heightened concern about the well-being of American servicemen and dependents in Greece in light of the unstable and potentially explosive political situation there.

¹⁰ Publicly, the former Greek government under President Papadopoulos adopted a slightly pro-Arab posture during the recent war. Anticipating a negative response, we did not ask Greece for landing rights for our military supply airlift to Israel.

The government was, however, privately helpful to the United States in a variety of ways. [2½ lines not declassified] they allowed us use of Souda Bay airfield, to a much greater extent and for different purposes than is called for in our bilateral agreement. Souda Bay proved vital to the U.S. Navy for re-supplying the Sixth Fleet. Moreover, the Greeks placed no restrictions on: (1) the Sixth Fleet's access to Greek ports; (2) the activities of the U.S. Naval Communications Station at Nea Makri; (3) the USAF facility at Iraklion, Crete [3 lines not declassified]. [Footnote is in the original.]

B. Pure Strategies

There is predictably no pure strategy that can cope with the conflicting pressures and special considerations that form the framework for our policy toward Greece. Equally predictably, there are extreme, or ideal policies that provide the parameters within which policy can be devised and at the same time provide the dynamic tension shaping policy. These *pure strategies relate closely to the traditional debate in American affairs between:*

—*the hands-off approach* of those who assert that we have no business meddling in others' politics and should deal with governments solely in terms of their usefulness to our tangible national interests; and

—*the moralist/interventionist approach* of those who assert that we have a moral duty to speak out against injustice and, more specifically, that a "moral" element is essential to any policy that is to muster support at home and abroad for our role as a leader of an alliance that shares common values.

This debate is nowadays by no means relevant only to Greece; opponents of détente with the USSR, critics of South African apartheid, supporters of the Smith regime in Rhodesia, and opponents of the Thieu and Castro governments, all take part in it.

We by no means reject the moralists' argument. Debate on these grounds tends to be inconclusive, however, for intensely personal choices are involved. *A more useful approach is the test of American national interest over time—i.e., does a given policy offer a promise of maximizing our interests over the full range of foreseeable circumstances?* This requires presenting the basic positions of the debate in terms that are relevant to the choices at hand—in the present case, the arguments that relate to the situation in Greece and, specifically, to our interests in Greece.

There are a number of arguments adduced by partisans of a hands-off approach toward Greece:

—*Our semi-interventionist policy in the Papadopoulos years was not notably successful; his hesitant moves toward democracy were dictated mainly by internal considerations.*

—*We have declining leverage for pressuring the Greek regime. We no longer provide economic or grant military assistance (although FMS credits are still important) and Greece's economic ties are increasingly with Europe.*

—*The Papadopoulos regime was generally cooperative in security matters and we can probably assure continued low-key Greek cooperation at a reasonable price.*

—*By applying pressure on the military regime, we risk alienating it, thereby losing the access that we need to important military and broadcasting facilities—or even forcing it to look elsewhere for meeting its security requirements.*¹¹

¹¹ See Attachment B for a summary of U.S. facilities in Greece. [Footnote is in the original.]

—*By intervening, we could at most bring down a government, not dictate a successor.* The result might be chaos or a government that would be more harmful to our interests than the Ioannides regime. Andreas Papandreou is a favorite *bête noir* in this scenario.

—A final argument is hotly disputed and somewhat in contradiction to other points made earlier: *that Greeks will always feel isolated, encircled and in need of an American security guarantee.* Therefore we can maximize our position with the incumbent regime without much concern that a future government will make life difficult for us.

Supporters of the interventionist approach offer these arguments regarding Greece:

—Given the Greek belief that the United States strongly influences Greek politics, *non-interventionism is illusory.* A hands-off approach is seen as support for the incumbent government and is thus a form of intervention on its behalf. Our close military association with Greece underlines this consideration.

—Because of this belief *we in fact have considerable leverage* on the Greek political scene if we choose to use it.

—*The Papadopoulos regime failed* ultimately to meet the political and economic challenges of Greece. *The successor junta is more odious and less competent; it will fail more dismally and rapidly,* with grave consequences for the strength and stability of Greece—and hence for our long-term interests.

—Although the damage so far has been acceptable, *our present policy does incur costs in our relations with Congress and our NATO allies.* The benefits that we gain from the present government must therefore be discounted appropriately.

—As discussed earlier, *our interests in Greece over the long-term will erode* in direct proportion to our support of the current government and to its length of stay in power. And that long term may not be very long. When we made a similar set of judgments in 1969, it seemed reasonable to allow up to a decade of life-expectancy to military dictatorship. That decade is now over half gone and our original estimate seems too generous. *Thus the short vs. long term calculus is increasingly unattractive and warrants reassessment.*

C. Mixed Strategies

We do not believe that anything approaching the pure interventionist strategy would be a reasonable option for US policy. One could conceive of strong overt pressure or covert activity to dislodge the Ioannides group and install a democratic government, but such a course of action would be neither necessary nor desirable.

Something much closer to *the hands-off policy is feasible* and indeed, is approximately our present approach. *Some modifications of that policy may over time be necessary,* however, and *there are several middle-ground options* that might be desirable alternatives to maximize the trade-offs available as between the two pure strategies.

In the following discussion, we evaluate four viable postures in terms of these criteria:

—How much will it contribute to our long-term stake in Greece by establishing our bona fides with anti-regime forces?

—How much risk will it entail in our relations with Congress and our NATO allies?

—What kinds of precedents would we be creating for similar situations elsewhere?

—In the case of policies intended to effect change, what would be the chances of success?

a. *We could maintain a substantially hands-off policy.* This would involve a non-involved approach toward Greek internal affairs, modified only slightly—e.g., by the hold that we have put on high-level civil and military visits to Greece—to keep some daylight between us and the regime. *This policy would probably derive the maximum short-term gains* for our security interest as long as we make it clear that we expect this from the Greeks as their part of the bargain. It will be the most costly in terms of our relations with anti-regime forces and hence *may involve maximum risk to our long-term interests.* It will be the most difficult to sell to Congress and concerned NATO allies, but will avoid setting a precedent that could return to haunt us in such diverse places as the USSR, Chile or Portugal (also a NATO member).

b. *We could seek to distance ourselves publicly from the regime but take no action.* This would entail a nose-holding public posture in which we made clear our distaste for the regime but made equally clear that we did not consider it our responsibility to do anything about it. This policy would be received with approbation by the Greek opposition and their supporters in Congress and Europe, but would risk whetting their appetites for more direct action. It would have a limited, but positive impact as a precedent. The Greek regime would react negatively but its moves against us might be limited by the knowledge that we were holding back from taking any action. Its impact on developments in Greece would be problematical, but it would show that we do not fully support the Ioannides group and could be a significant factor heartening the opposition.

c. *We could return to the policy that we followed in the latter years of Papadopoulos' rule.* Although we tended to blow warm and cool, our general approach was to urge the Greeks privately to move toward democratic rule and to affirm publicly (and to Congress in particular) that we were making such representations. This policy would probably have even less impact on Ioannides and his colleagues than it did on Papadopoulos. *It would buy only a minimum (but perhaps an adequate minimum) of good will among anti-regime forces and is probably the minimum that Congressional critics of the regime will accept.* The Greek government would probably not be impelled to move directly against our interests, but they would be irritated and probably be more sticky in granting us the kinds of access that we would need. It would not set important precedents.

d. *We could revert to the policy that we followed in the early Papadopoulos years. This was a more outspoken approach. We left the post of ambassador to Athens open for some time; made public statements critical of the regime; and delayed supply of military equipment. Compared to the previous option, this approach would differ mainly as a sign that we were, in fact, “doing something”, albeit with little likely effect. It would probably be the course most acceptable to Congress and would be applauded in NATO, but would run some risk of creating a snowball effect in NATO and ultimately driving Greece from the alliance. If pushed hard, it could provoke retaliation by the Greek government against our security interests.*

None of the mixed strategies is attractive in all respects. The “hands-off” approach probably best meets urgent short-term needs, but it does not provide well for long-term concerns, and being closest to a pure strategy, does not exploit the trade-offs that are available.

The policies of exhortation that we pursued variously vis-à-vis Papadopoulos do offer trade-off benefits but necessarily entail the related costs. Neither one offers convincing benefits, but either would offer a viable compromise strategy if one were required. Both also enjoy some sanctity of tradition.

The nose-holding option has many of the costs and benefits associated with the exhortation options; its main virtue is that it is probably as close as we can come, given Greek realities, to a policy of true non-intervention.

D. Concluding Observations

Even if some change in posture along the above lines is desirable, there is no compelling case for making it immediately. We can maintain a hands-off position that is welcome to the regime during the course of the important Souda Bay negotiations. It may be several weeks before we know whether the Greeks will maintain their current tough bargaining position on the use of these facilities, and the stance that they take may in part determine the type of public posture that we will ultimately choose. We might also, in the course of the negotiations, wish to use our ability to change posture as leverage. As these negotiations progress, we may need decisions from you on:

- whether we wish to use this leverage in the negotiations, and
- the extent to which we are willing to provide positive incentives to the Greeks in the form of political support, military hardware or other.

Ambassador Tasca’s Congressional appearance will present a problem in this regard. Members of the Committee will press him for critical statements about the present Greek government and, at a minimum, the publicity surrounding the hearings could feed back into the negotiations. His testimony will be crucial as the authoritative exposition of

our posture toward Greece, and must be based on a full consideration of the many factors involved.

While the various issues we have raised are of intrinsic importance, *we are more concerned with their cumulative effect—that as we move into a relationship with the new government in Athens, we do not build our policy incrementally with ad hoc decisions:*

—We have already adopted a hands-off policy that is generally interpreted as favorable to the regime.

—*If* Ambassador Tasca's testimony affirms a US posture of toleration for the regime; and

—*If* we follow this with concessions in the course of the Souda Bay negotiations that are interpreted as drawing us still closer to the regime, especially beyond the NATO context; and

—*If* we increase FMS levels; and

—*If* we were to resume high-level military and civilian visits to Greece; and

—*If* we ultimately move ahead with Phase II of homeporting—

we will have moved well down the road of close identification with the incumbent government in Athens, entailing the various costs and benefits associated with this position. *Wherever we come out, we should reach that point as a result of a series of conscious decisions based on an awareness of available alternatives, rather than arriving there unexpectedly.*

Attachment A

HOMEPORTING IN ATHENS

Athens was selected from a number of possible sites when the Navy decided it would be beneficial to homeport one of its carrier task groups in the Mediterranean. Admiral Zumwalt's renewed interest in homeporting arose from two concerns: the need to maintain the number of ships on station while at the same time accepting reductions in the overall number of ships in the active fleets and, secondly, the expectation that homeporting would reduce periods of family separation and thereby improve Navy morale and retention.

Phase I of the Athens homeporting was implemented in September 1972, involving six destroyer-type ships. Approximately 2,000 military personnel and 1,250 dependents were homeported. The ships, families, and household effects arrived almost simultaneously, without sufficient preparation, and serious dislocations resulted. Most of these problems have been reduced to a manageable level, but the Navy still lacks a recreational complex for the single sailors, who comprise some 75 percent of the homeported crew strength. One of the Department's concerns in Phase II is to ensure that the "get them on the beach and sort them out later" experience of Phase I is not repeated.

The Navy had intended to proceed in early summer 1974 with Phase II of Athens homeporting. Involved were an aircraft carrier with its embarked air wing and a dependent support (hospital) ship, enabling the Navy to maintain a two-carrier force in the Mediterranean. It would bring an additional 5,100 military personnel and 2,550 dependents to Athens. The Department of State approved Phase II in principle over a year ago. However, the Department deferred final endorsement pending resolution of uncertainties which existed in the Navy plan, particularly location of airfield facilities to accommodate the air wing when the carrier is in port and determination that adequate medical, recreational and educational facilities will be in being, fully staffed and operational before Phase II dependents arrive in Athens. Also, the Department indicated a need for clear indications that homeporting is meeting its objective of improving morale and raising retention rates.

The State Department welcomes Defense's determination to delay for six months or more any final decision to go ahead with Phase II. It will provide more time to evaluate the new government and will permit a better measure of the success of Phase I in terms of improving morale and retention rates. The Navy would also gain more time to develop support facilities and negotiate the necessary air base support facilities for the carrier air wing. Further, we believe that a postponement will not impair the Navy's two-carrier posture in the Eastern Mediterranean. This judgment is reinforced by Secretary Schlesinger's decision to maintain a 15-carrier force through 1975.

Attachment B

U.S. DEFENSE AND BROADCASTING INTERESTS IN GREECE

Greek Ports

Beyond homeporting in Athens, access to Greek ports by elements of the Sixth Fleet is very important to the Navy in terms of logistic support and maintaining on-station time in the Eastern Mediterranean without excessive periods at sea between port visits.

Souda Bay NATO Maritime Airfield

ASW aircraft operate regularly from the base and carrier attack aircraft occasionally fly training missions there. Considerable amounts of Sixth Fleet logistic support stages through the facility.

Athenai Air Base

Most Military Airlift Command flights to the Middle East and South Asia stage through Athens. MAC terminal and maintenance support facilities located there make the field a focal point for logistic sup-

port of other U.S. military activities in Greece and for the Sixth Fleet. Some airborne reconnaissance missions operate from the base.

USN Communications Station—Nea Makri

The station provides primary command and control communications for the Sixth Fleet in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Black Sea. It also provides the HF link to Cyprus, Italy, Spain, Germany, and Turkey and serves as the area's diplomatic telecommunications relay.

Tropospheric Scatter Stations

Five stations provide wideband command and control communications [1 line not declassified]. They also provide the wideband communications link with U.S. Defense activities in Turkey.

Iraklion Air Base

[1 paragraph (2 lines) not declassified]

NATO [less than 1 line not declassified]

The U.S. and FRG are the principal users of this Greek operated facility. It is employed primarily for annual [2 lines not declassified].

Timbakion

An air weapons training facility which is much needed by NATO is being developed and is due to be operational in mid-1975.

NATO Depots

POL, ammo and mine storage facilities are available for U.S. use at Souda Bay.

[less than 1 line not declassified]

[1 paragraph (4 lines) not declassified]

Broadcasting Stations

The Voice of America maintains facilities at Rhodes, Thessaloniki, and the newly-opened station at Kavalla, representing an investment in excess of \$30 million. These facilities broadcast to Eastern Europe, the USSR, and the Middle East. It is hard to imagine relocating these facilities, for there is no potential site for relocating them which would be politically acceptable to other countries or technically acceptable to the United States.

11. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State¹

Athens, March 8, 1974, 1650Z.

1438. Subj: U.S. Expression of Concern to Senior Greek Military. State 43153.²

1. I appreciate the substance and thrust of the Dept's telegram 43153. The situation here continues to be discouraging. Interference by the hardline Ioannides junta has weakened the Armed Forces and incapacitated civil government. Popular resentment is continuing to build up against repressive political and capricious economic policies. The inherent instability of this power structure portends further change, possibly accompanied by civil unrest. There is widespread belief that the US is somehow responsible for this unhappy state of affairs.

2. Quite apart from the obvious danger of open unrest, however, I am increasingly concerned about the evolving chauvinistic attitude of the Ioannides junta as indicated in intelligence reports. If this group succeeds in creating a puppet military high command in addition to a puppet civil government or takes over direct ruling power itself, I fear that the policies it will impose in matters of defense and foreign policy as well as in the domestic, political and economic fields could also be adverse to our interests. These contingencies deserve serious and prompt attention.

3. In view of the foregoing, I look forward to discussing current developments in Greece which could adversely impinge on our national interests. In that connection I think the approach mentioned in reftel³ could be very helpful in protecting our bilateral security interests. Such an approach would have to be made with great care to the right individuals, however, to avoid its being mistaken as endorsement of the regime or encouragement to impose order on the Armed Forces

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 594, Country Files, Middle East, Greece, Vol. IV. Secret; Exdis.

² In telegram 43153 to Athens, March 4, the Department voiced its concern with the erroneous yet prevailing belief in Greece that the United States had played a role in the November 1973 coup, the lack of popular support for the Greek military regime, and the concomitant discrediting of the Greek military among the masses, all issues that could adversely affect the bilateral security relationship. The Department reiterated its policy that the U.S. Government refrained from "direct involvement in the internal politics of Greece," but offered suggestions for ensuring bilateral security interests. (Ibid.)

³ In telegram 43153, the Department proposed reiterating the long-standing U.S. interest in maintaining the integrity of the Greek military.

and the country by whatever means necessary. I would want to participate in it myself and to be supported with parallel action by a senior U.S. military leader, preferably in the JCS. An approach at a lower level or by an outsider is not likely to be effective.

Tasca

12. Minutes of Secretary of State Kissinger's Regional Staff Meeting¹

Washington, March 20, 1974, 3:18–3:54 p.m.

PROCEEDINGS

(The meeting convened at 3:18 p.m., Secretary Kissinger presiding as Chairman.)

Secretary Kissinger: Who would like to lead off?

Mr. Lord: Mr. Secretary, we thought this was a timely paper² not only because of reports of our relations with Greece and to take advantage of Ambassador Tasca's presence but also because it points up the basic dilemma we have in our foreign policy with many countries of different ideological views. We tried in this paper to treat this dispassionately in the U.S. interest as opposed to straw-man options, and Mr. Thornton of my staff will give a very brief presentation paper, and Ambassador Tasca and Mr. Davies perhaps could fill in some of the details of the discussion.

Secretary Kissinger: Unless everyone has already read it.

O.K.; can you do it in five minutes?

Mr. Thornton: Yes, sir.

The reason for going about a policy review for Greece now is that we have a new man since last November, which the paper characterized as not only in accord with our policies politically but also it's not moving towards representative government.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Transcripts of Secretary of State Henry Kissinger's Staff Meeting, 1973–77, Entry 5177, Box 3, Secretary's Analytical Staff Meeting. Secret. The following people attended the meeting: Kissinger, Rush, Sisco, Donaldson, Sonnenfeldt, McCloskey, Holton, Eagleburger, Lord, Thornton, Maw, Weiss, Tasca, Davies, Churchill, Hyland, Hartman, Springsteen, and Vest.

² Document 10.

Second, it's been giving us a little more time in an adversarial approach, particularly relating to the Souda Bay agreement.

Now, with Ambassador Tasca here, it's an eminently good time to press this interest.

There is the FMS question, Souda Bay renegotiation, and the home-porting thing.

What we're trying to do in here is to raise the question of a general approach to the regime, to look at this in a broad framework of relations with Greece—and, particularly, as Win said, with our particular interests with Greece—so when we get to individual actions, we're not going to build policy incrementally—rather, we'll have some focus.

Greece, again, like many other places, confronts us with the usual dilemma of how you deal with a regime that is important to your short-term national interests and long-term also and provides very definite security advantages but, at the same time, causes us problems in dealing with it simply because of the political nature of the regime.

In addition, in Greece, you have a particular problem, as we see it, in balancing off short- versus long-range.

In other words, it's what you get today as opposed to what you may get some years from now.

I would like to make some judgments on what this paper says on this. The first is this regime of Ioannides—we will name it after him—is not going to last very long. The experts who drafted this part of the paper said a year would be a generous estimate; and even with this type of regime, this narrowly based dictatorship is probably not going to be around too long.

The second is one which is not particularly critical in Greece—

Secretary Kissinger: Why is that? I mean, who is going to overthrow them? In fact, there are two contradictory statements in there. One says they can stay in office there indefinitely if they are united; the other says they can not stay there for more than a year.

Mr. Thornton: Yes. The fact that it is not going to be able to cope with the problems and there's going to be increasing discontent. The likelihood is they would have another military regime. And, who knows? Maybe another one after that. But ultimately, if there's a center of gravity, it's going to be towards a political regime. I think the paper calls it "democratic regime." Maybe one should say political regime rather than a military regime. And this would be over some period of years.

Mr. Tasca: Well, I think the point on that, I might underline, is the regime you have now is the most narrowly based regime they've ever had I think in this century—in their history—since 1821, since the revolution of 1821. Actually, there are only about, say, 20 or 30 officers—

maybe 10 or 12—and they have no other support. This regime is in a politically isolated country. They have nobody for them. And even the businessmen who used to be for Papadopoulos are very skeptical. They are concerned and they are worried about what this regime is going to do to business. And, of course, that has other implications—which I will touch on later. But there is an instability in the fact that this narrowly based regime does represent only a sector of the military picture. They are one part of it. If you take the air force, the air force at best is neutral towards this regime. The navy is definitely hostile, and Admiral Arapaca—there's nothing he would like better than moving against the regime, if he had an opportunity to do it. And, as far as the army is concerned, I think that there's a lot of instability developing, and the intelligence is showing it, because of a situation in which every major officer from brigadier general up to lieutenant general is new in his job since last June and all the colonels are new, or nearly all the colonels are new—and where a brigadier general, with his majors and captains, gives orders to the two-star generals and the three-star general is an abnormal situation; it's one that has the seeds of disillusion in one form or another.

Secretary Kissinger: How does the brigadier general give orders to the major general?

Mr. Tasca: Because he's the one that master-minded the coup in November.

Secretary Kissinger: Who is the brigadier general?

Mr. Tasca: That's Ioannides.

Secretary Kissinger: Oh. He is a brigadier?

Mr. Tasca: Yes, he is. He's preferred to operate in the background. There's a group of officers who are majors and lieutenant colonels and they decide what the policy is and then they give orders to the civilians, and the civilians order the so-called government that is nothing but a group of men that are administering the major policy decisions that are made by Ioannides and his officers.

Secretary Kissinger: Yes; but now, assuming all of this is correct, what policy decision does it involve for us?

Mr. Tasca: Well, what it involves for us is that in the struggle that's developing between the more senior officers and Ioannides—well, there are a number of elements. First of all, it's important that within this struggle that's developing I think that our interests, in terms of security, would lie at whatever weight appropriately we can throw in the direction of the people who want to get back to some normalization—which means getting back in contact with a reasonable majority of the Greek people—to assure that our security interests will not be jeopardized with the regime they have with the United States and with NATO—which is now increasingly the case, and which is the main

thrust of Androutsopoulos and was of Papandreou—which is what this whole policy objective is about.

The second point is that as far as the Greek people are concerned—
Secretary Kissinger: Wait a minute. Before we get to that—

Mr. Tasca: Yes.

Secretary Kissinger: —how do we associate with the Greek people?

Mr. Tasca: Well, I'd like to submit, Mr. Secretary, that I think our policy in this Administration to date has been reasonably successful. It's been difficult, but I don't think there's any other policy to be followed today—

Secretary Kissinger: Which is what?

Mr. Tasca: Which is, the way I've interpreted it, protecting the higher part of our security interests—but, at the same time, making it clear that the United States has a part in Greece which, I also submit, cannot be compared with any other country—because they are a nation which has a history and a cultural tradition and a place that's different—and we do feel that we want the Greeks, because of our bilateral relations—and the Congress of the United States has made it very clear that if we don't make progress in this sense we won't even be able to maintain our security relations. Sooner or later, with the repression that's going on in Greece, we're going to lose in the Congress of the United States; we won't be able to give them the military credits, the military supplies. And if they don't do that they will go French. If they don't do that, they will go Arab. And that, in my judgment, would mean Quaddafi and Libya—because they have had relations there; they have trained the Libyan air force and the Libyan navy.

The third point is: As far as NATO is concerned, the British have adopted it. The Scandinavians have adopted it—

Secretary Kissinger: I still don't understand what you think our policy is.

Mr. Tasca: Saying publicly that we're for democracy in Greece, the way we've said in the past.

The last thing that was said was said by Secretary Rogers back in '73,³ and I don't think we should change that. If we change that, we'll face a whole new host of problems that we don't want to face. And if

³ In telegram 135038 to Athens, July 11, 1973, Rogers sent an oral message to Papadopoulos as follows: "We have consistently held that the form of government in Greece is a matter for the people of Greece to decide. We therefore welcome, as do all the friends and allies of Greece, Papadopoulos's pledge that the Greek people will be given an opportunity for free expression on their opinion on their future, through the scheduled plebiscite and general elections. In the spirit of respect and affection that has long characterized relations between our countries, we cannot fail to stress the importance that must be attached to the exercise of genuine freedom of choice on the part of the Greek

I go to Congress and testify before the Rosenthal Committee,⁴ if he asks me if we're still publicly for democracy in Greece and I say we think it would be nice to do it if [*but*] it's their business, I think we're going to raise a lot of other problems in Congress.

Secretary Kissinger: Which is pretty close to my convictions.

Mr. Tasca: Well, all I can do is tell you how I see it. And I think it's a mistake to change our policy at this time.

Secretary Kissinger: Of course, I haven't seen any great results from our policy. You want us to say once a year that—

Mr. Tasca: Mr. Secretary, I'm not sure there have been no results. First of all, we've maintained our security interest during this period. I think during the Arab-Israeli war, if we had gone to the Greeks and we said, "This is important because we're going to have a confrontation with the Russians," they would have come through.

I think, as far as NATO is concerned, it would have been possible during the NATO meetings to come to the fore because of the posture we took.

I think, as far as the Congress is concerned, the testimony I've given, we've had a lot of support in the Congress, because we were able to show that we publicly made it clear to Greece we thought in terms of our security relations—which is what I happen to believe: that the Greeks have got to get back to some kind of representative government.

And so I think, when you look at those factors, I'd say our policy, considering the difficulties, has been rather successful. I think it's been quite successful. The fact that we could get the Dutch—Vanderstahl⁵ [*sic*]*—to go along with our policy—and the Dutch, the Scandinavians and the Danes. And I think we'll find with [the] British Labour Party is going to take a very strong position on Greece, as they've already shown in the last week, where a fleet visit has been set.*

That means that that posture is a posture that's going to help us with our Congress, as well as the public opinion that counts—the one that's going to be running the country again, and with our own public opinion.

electorate. In the broadest sense, the conduct of the plebiscite and the elections to follow will inevitably have an effect on the alliance and on the traditional cordial relations between our two countries." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 594, Country Files, Middle East, Greece, Vol. IV)

⁴ Tasca testified before Congress on March 27. This is presumably a reference to the House Foreign Affairs Committee, chaired by Congressman Benjamin Rosenthal (D-New York).

⁵ Reference is to Max Van der Stoep, Dutch Foreign Minister.

Now, that's the way it looks to me.

Secretary Kissinger: Joe, this is one area in which you haven't started a crisis yet. What do you think?

(Laughter.)

Mr. Sisco: Well, I'm not entirely satisfied with our present policy, and I have never been entirely satisfied with the totally hands-off policy that we have pursued. I feel that our present policy does not sufficiently and clearly enough disassociate ourselves from Greece in this respect.

I detect two developments that bother me: One, any Greek leader that you talk to today, in our discussions on the base, takes the point of view that there is not really a mutuality of interest between ourselves and Greece within the NATO framework—in other words, any time we discuss a base—and they're talking in terms of *quid pro quo*. It's basically in the context that that they are doing us a favor.

I want to put it very crudely. I don't think the present—

Secretary Kissinger: That puts them in a very unusual position within NATO.

(Laughter.)

Mr. Sisco: Well, not so unusual.

I think, in that respect, this is fundamental in our dialogue with the Greeks. And I don't think it's a very healthy one.

Secondly, if the assessment is correct that this is the most narrowly based government in the history of Greece—and if the assessment is correct that Ioannides is not apt to last over this next year, that it may be a palace coup or a coup within the group—then it seems to me that the policy of, I believe, too close association with this present crowd is going to cause difficulty for us—

Secretary Kissinger: Just a minute. Who is associated? What is your definition of "too closely associated"?

Mr. Sisco: Well, I think that, basically, to the degree to which you have a public opinion in Greece, that Greece—the Greek people—basically feel that we are fully behind this present group.

I think there was a period of time under Papadopoulos where they made certain commitments—actually wrote a letter to the President, specified dates—none of which they carried out.

Secretary Kissinger: But, again, why should we assume that it is in the United States' interest? Where else are we requiring governments to specify dates for elections in communications to the United States?

Mr. Sisco: Well, Greece has a unique relationship to the United States in this regard. This goes all the way back, insofar as movement towards representative government. It goes all the way back to commitments that Papadopoulos made to the President.

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I know, but that's what we made it do.

My question is: Why is it in the American interest to do in Greece what we apparently don't do anywhere else—of requiring them to give a commitment to the President to move to representative government?

Mr. Tasca: Because—may I add a note on that, Mr. Secretary?—

Mr. Sisco: Go ahead. I want to say something further.

Mr. Tasca: —well, I think because Greece and the Greek people—in terms of their position and public opinion in Western Europe—are quite unique. You can go back to the constitutional Greece or the Greek lobby—whatever you want to call it—and they've got a position in Western Europe and the United States that Brazil and Chile and these other countries don't have. None of those countries has a Androutsopoulos—a Greek refugee who's been activitated [*active?*] and who for four years has been leading a very vigorous fight on our policy in Greece.

Secretary Kissinger: But that just means we're letting Androutsopoulos' particular group make policy.

Mr. Tasca: How do you stop it?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I'm just being the devil's advocate. You can say the Department of State doesn't have a Political Science Division. It conducts the foreign policy of the United States. It deals with any government—communist or non-communist—within the context of the foreign-policy objectives of the United States. That way you don't get caught with each individual government in giving approval and disapproval. Why is that wrong?

Mr. Tasca: Well, that may help you with other countries, but it wouldn't get you to first base as far as Greece is concerned.

Secretary Kissinger: Why not?

Mr. Tasca: Because Greece has had a foreign factor since 1821 and since the revolution. We're right in the internal Greek foreign institutions, whether you like it or not; we're part of their value system, part of their political process. And we ought to get out of it. But it's going to take time to get out. In the meantime, we're going to be responsible.

Secretary Kissinger: But if we're going to be manipulating their domestic structure, we're not going to be able to get out. If we make pronouncements about their domestic structure, we are obviously doing it for some effect.

Mr. Tasca: Well, I think we are having some effect. This isn't something you can measure. But, after all, within the Greek armed forces—that's where the first game is going to be played. It's going to be very important how the United States stands. These people are going to be watching us. If we change our policy and we give them the impression

that we're not as much of a democracy as we were, we in effect are intervening in the Greek situation—we're intervening in favor of Ioannides.

Now, another thing about Ioannides to remember—

Secretary Kissinger: Well, in that case we cannot change our policy because whenever we change to a neutral stance, we're going to be accused of interference or non-interference.

Mr. Tasca: Well, another thing, Mr. Secretary: That depends on what happens to the Greek situation.

Secretary Kissinger: Well, what's your definition of democracy in Greece?

Mr. Tasca: Well, there's some reasonable consensus of, let's say, the majority of people. And the institutional form of that consensus is something for the Greeks to define.

Secretary Kissinger: And we hold that view with Greece—not Yugoslavia, Morocco, Algeria. How about Algeria?

Mr. Tasca: I don't think it's the same kind of a problem.

Mr. Thornton: Well, Mr. Secretary, nobody thinks we can influence the situation in Algeria. In Greece it's different. This is a qualitative difference.

Secretary Kissinger: Why should we not adopt the position that we, therefore, don't influence things?

Mr. Tasca: Then you're intervening. You're intervening in favor of Ioannides now.

Mr. Lord: The paper suggests an interventionist approach. The issue seems to follow a policy of complete hands-off—which the paper says is probably going to be, for the maximum benefit, short-term. So it's a very reasonable short option, it seems to me. Or there are shadings—which we call a nose-holding option. You don't go for election time; you merely make statements that you can proffer—that we would like to have democracy. But some kind of symbolic test which would be very close to a hands-off policy, which may give you some representation on the Hill—or you can refer it back to the previous policy of trying to influence them privately or publicly—which leads toward democracy, which gets more intervention. But I don't think we should set it in terms of pure policy here.

Mr. Sisco: I wouldn't think so either.

Secretary Kissinger: But we surely can't be arguing about whether I'm going to revoke something my predecessor said in August '73, which did not make front-page headlines in most newspapers that I read.

Mr. Lord: As I understand present policy, over the last few months we haven't been saying anything about democracy. Therefore, we have to be clear in our own mind what is "present policy."

Mr. Tasca: We haven't said anything publicly about democracy. In my discussions with him, the position I've taken is that it's their business, and, in the press of discussing that, from the standpoint of bilateral relations and cohesiveness of the NATO Alliance, there ought to be some real advantages in their moving ahead. But it's their business, without any question of deadline or dates.

But the question, increasingly, that's being asked by people in the opposition and some very distinguished people who brought Greece into NATO, is that they're surprised that since Rogers has left no statement has been made publicly on this subject. And I may very well get that on the Rosenthal Committee—why is that so—

Secretary Kissinger: And what will you say?

Mr. Tasca: What will I say? That's what I want to get instructions about.

Secretary Kissinger: Tell them to ask me.

Mr. Tasca: All right.

Secretary Kissinger: I'm up there often enough.

Mr. Tasca: May I put one other note on the security side—because I want to be sure that's put on the table too. There's one thing about these people that is worrisome, and that is: They're very primitive in their foreign-policy approach.

And there's evidence now that they could easily get into an argumentation with Turkey on the question of the Aegean Sea and Cyprus. I think the oil-exploration problem in the Aegean Sea does tend to indicate that these people might get into a real confrontation with the Turks on that. And I think that would raise all the problems that Cyprus did.

Secretary Kissinger: Yes, but that's a foreign-policy problem. That I think we are capable of making judgments on.

Mr. Davies: Mr. Secretary—

Secretary Kissinger: What would satisfy the Rosenthal Committee would be a Secretarial statement every year—or is there some quota?

Mr. Tasca: I don't know. I don't think it's a matter so much of satisfying Rosenthal, because I think his posture—as I understand it—appeared before them in '71—I think their posture is something that would not be in harmony at all with our objectives, or the national interest, as I understand it—as we conceive it in the area. But what I'm thinking about is some kind of posture that we can use to defend the position that we're taking, opposing as an alternative the kind of thing that might raise more questions than it answers.

I think we're talking about a fairly restricted range in terms—we're not talking about any extreme change in policy but trying to keep this

in a position where we don't raise new problems. And I submit that by keeping the kind of posture we've had—Ioannides expects it; he's not going to be surprised—it helps us to reconcile these very difficult elements.

We'll still have problems, but we're in a better position than saying, "It's none of our business. It's their business."

Secretary Kissinger: What is the subject of this meeting—whether we should change what Rogers said in August? Has anyone proposed this? What exactly are we trying to accomplish here?

Mr. Thornton: Well, the paper is kind of set up to accomplish where we come down within the range at either extreme, for that matter, or somewhere on one of the various possibilities within the range between hands-off and intervention—and not only in terms of, let's say, the Rosenthal Committee but also in terms of what is going to protect our long-range interests as well as short-term interests.

Mr. Lord: There are two aspects of the problem—to what extent does anyone think you should pressure the Greeks privately—and I don't sense much sentiment for that. The other question is: To what extent do you say anything publicly about their political system.

Secretary Kissinger: But, with all respect, this issue is being put in a hopelessly abstract manner because the issue isn't between democracy and non-democracy. And we don't support—whether Rogers or I make a statement once a year is relatively unimportant. What our Ambassador does day in and day out is a helluva lot more important.

And if they get the idea we're against it, that's one thing. If they get the idea we're an active force for it, that's another thing. But before we can even make that judgment, one would have to know what the likely political evolution is as between Papandreou and this fellow.

I don't know whether it's in our interest to rush to the defense of Papandreou—

Mr. Tasca: No. I agree completely.

Secretary Kissinger: —even if he's for democracy. So even before one can make any judgment of what the likely evolution is, of what our right stance is, I would like to get some assessment from Bill what the likely evolution is—

Mr. Hyland: Yes, sir.

Secretary Kissinger: —and what we are starting. I mean, if we are pressing them and if we make our displeasure known to a certain point and if we're as influential as you say we are, then we're going to trigger a political process or we're going to demonstrate our impotence. If we demonstrate our impotence, we're going to drive these people into a Quaddafi situation. If we don't correct them, then before we can make

a reasonable decision we'll have to know what the likely evolutions are that can occur.

The Papandreou situation is a possibility—that's one thing. We've worked with him before. And, if we can work with him, obviously, from our point of view, it would be best to have a government that protects our security interests and doesn't put you before the Rosenthal Committee. If, however, we cannot get this, if we have to choose between our security concerns and some other evolution, then we have a tough problem.

If you could produce a Papandreou tomorrow in a stable government, I wouldn't even want to know how you did it. But before we make any decisions like this, I think we ought to know what the probable evolutions are and what the probable impact is about taking a certain course.

I think we can survive Congressional hearings if we know what's right. And we should know what we really want in Greece, what is in our national interest. If we can combine that with our moral values, so much the better—and with the Congressional pressure.

So, Bill, could you produce something fairly quickly and let the Ambassador see it?⁶

Mr. Hyland: Yes, sir.

Mr. Tasca: May I make one very brief comment on this, Mr. Secretary? I think the way we would appraise the problem which you raise—which is, clearly, the most fundamental issue—is, as of right now, there's very likely no⁷ opportunity that the army would allow Papandreou to come back and any normalization would have to take place on the basis of Papandreou not coming back. This is not to make it possible for Papandreou to come back and make it impossible for the communists to have any voice in the new government. So you'll be talking about—

Secretary Kissinger: Of course, you could be wrong, because I knew Papandreou when he was an American professor working on monetary planning.

Mr. Tasca: But they don't trust him, and the army certainly doesn't trust him. And he's very outspoken in some of the statements he's made about taking Greece out of NATO and kicking the Americans out of Greece.

⁶ Hyland sent Kissinger an INR analysis on March 29; a copy is in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1312, NSC Secretariat, Contingency Plans 1974, Cyprus and Greek-Turkish Contingency Plans. NEA and Tasca submitted comments separately on April 5. (Ibid.)

⁷ An unidentified hand crossed out the word "the" and added "no."

Secretary Kissinger: I'm not saying that Papandreou would come back. I have no judgment of who would come back, because they are great specialists in starting political upheavals whose consequences we don't foresee—I don't mean in Greece but as a nation. So if Bill—

Mr. Hyland: Yes, sir.

Secretary Kissinger: —could do this, and then let you take a look at it—

Mr. Tasca: Yes, sir.

Secretary Kissinger: —then when do I have to make a decision? I mean, I don't even know what the decision is that I'm being asked to make.

Mr. Lord: That's the whole point. It's not that you're asked to make decisions. There is a feeling that perhaps incrementally you might slide into a posture—but maybe the right posture, that someone should know you're doing it.

Secretary Kissinger: Basically we conduct foreign policy here, not domestic policy. We don't muck around with the countries.

Now, before we change that course, I want to hear overpowering reasons why we should.

Now, it could be that Greece is a special case, I don't deny that. I'm perfectly open-minded on that. But there's no danger of my sliding into that posture. That is my posture. It's one that I've tried to impose on Sisco when he didn't slide cables past me when I was in the White House—

(Laughter.)

—which he did, not without success, from time to time.

(Laughter.)

Mr. Sisco: I think what the paper considers is a very, very narrow range; and it actually considers a narrow range within basically I think the guidelines of policy over the last four or five years. I don't think anybody here assumes that we can influence the situation in Greece in the kind of decisive manner that was described here, and I don't think that anybody has suggested this kind of an all-out interventionist policy because I just don't think we've got this kind of capacity. I think that we've got security interests there.

The questions being posed in this particular paper between these ranges are: How do we protect that security interest—not only in terms of the present government but in circumstances where our assumption and our assessment is that this narrowly based government may very well be out of power a year from now, and how do we prevent whatever comes out a year from now from being a Quaddaffi Government or an anti-American Government? That's the way I see the issue.

Secretary Kissinger: That's a very important question. And if it is our judgment that this government is going to be substantially modified, then it is important for us to know whom to deal with—

Mr. Sisco: That's right.

Secretary Kissinger: —and how to protect our interests in the next group so not to identify with it that our interests go down the chute with the next government.

Mr. Sisco: That's right.

Secretary Kissinger: That does not mean whether we should take public positions against the government or we should have contacts with many of the leaders. I still would like to consider whether it is not better for us, in the long term in Greece, to have a very catholic approach to all political groups, and contacts with all political groups, and work with each political group that gets into office, unless it is violently anti-American—whether that is not a healthier posture for us to be in rather than to make public pronouncements of what we think about this or that political group—which would mean a degree of association with any government and a degree of association with any political group that may be functioning there and greater public aloofness, if that government is as precariously situated as you say that it is. That would raise many practical questions, aside from the moral questions which you raise (addressing Mr. Tasca).

Mr. Tasca: Well, I might say this: I don't think that we should get into a position where we are ever supporting one particular government as against another government. And the general posture that we've taken—which I think is the right one—is that they can adopt any form that they want; and we do make contact with all elements but, when we think sometime of a government that has some kind of relationship to the people, some kind of leadership which is going to have to build the kind of government that's going to help to strengthen our relations and also their posture in NATO.

Secretary Kissinger: It's just a question of to what effect we're doing it. If we don't have the capacity to change the government, then we can do it for one of two reasons—either for our domestic reasons or to win the favor of a group that's going to get into office in Greece—either as a result of what we say or no matter what we say.

If it's the first, our domestic policy, you know, Rosenthal is a problem. But I think, on the whole, we do best on the Hill if we do what we think is right and let the Hill worry about their predilections.

On the whole, we've done well on the Hill with the approach that we defend our best judgment of the right foreign policy and take an occasional flap. If we believe that our action may change the government or may move it in a certain direction or that there is somebody waiting in the wing to take over, then I'd like to know who that is.

Now, that's what I'd like to iron out in our analysis, and then we can make a judgment.

I'm not likely, while I'm in the Soviet Union next week, to make a pronouncement on Greek politics.

(Laughter.)

Mr. Sisco: I think you could apply, sir.

Secretary Kissinger: But if somebody can get some Congressional wives for me, it's not bad.

(Laughter.)

Mr. Sisco: And you might support Security Council Resolution 242 in relation to Greece.

(Laughter.)

Secretary Kissinger: In fact, if we could reach Greece next week and the Soviet Union, I'd be a happy man.

O.K.; can you do that?

Mr. Tasca: Yes, sir.

Secretary Kissinger: And, Joe, I want to see you for a minute. Win, I want to see you for something.

(Whereupon, at 3:54 p.m., the meeting was adjourned.)

13. Interagency Intelligence Memorandum¹

Washington, April 18, 1974.

[Omitted here is a table of contents.]

SUBJECT

Greece Under Ioannidis: Implications for US-Greek Relations

¹ Source: Central Intelligence Agency, NIC Files, Job 79–R01012A. Secret; No Foreign Dissem. This memorandum was prepared under the auspices of the National Intelligence Officer for Western Europe. It was principally drafted by CIA with the participation of representatives of DIA, INR, and the intelligence components of the Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force.

Major Judgments

The Ioannidis regime has not attracted support outside the military establishment and has not shown decisive or talented leadership. Nonetheless, it can withstand challenges from civilian politicians, youth, and labor as long as it retains the loyalty of the military.

Although Ioannidis has a far-flung network of informers and the support of strategically placed junior and middle-grade officers, his position is not secure. Even among his own backers there are alternative leaders, such as Armed Forces Chief Bonanos. Some followers of deposed President Papadopoulos remain; there is also a hard core of tough nationalists who would like Greece to adopt a more independent posture toward the US and NATO. And the silent majority of the armed forces would probably favor military disengagement from politics.

Yet all military factions are united in rejecting return to an entirely free political scene. And if the Ioannidis regime were ousted—something that could happen soon, but might not come for a few years—it would probably be replaced by another group of military officers.

Some factions might allow civilians more latitude than others would. Some senior officials might be inclined to turn to former Prime Minister Karamanlis, who would not return unless given a free hand—something that would be difficult for the military to accord. Hard line younger officers would probably dispense with even a facade of civilian rule.

The Ioannidis regime is more adventurous than its predecessor in regard to Cyprus and Turkey, and is more narrowly nationalistic in dealing with the US. The mixture of these elements poses even more problems for the US than were raised by the Papadopoulos regime.

While the present government views cooperation with the US as the base of its foreign policy, it will not shift domestic policies to repair what it considers unsatisfactory relations with Washington. Moreover, Athens, in its quest to extract more aid, is likely to become even stickier in dealings in regard to US facilities in Greece. It may seek to renegotiate the broad range of security arrangements to gain greater control of US military activities as well.

Continuing routine dealings by the US with the Greek Government alienates critics of the regime without fully satisfying Ioannidis. While civilian politicians would prefer the US to distance itself from the military rulers, a Karamanlis regime would not be likely to display dissatisfaction over past US policies by severing major ties with Washington. There is some risk that a more representative regime would feel under popular pressure to retaliate against the US, but any likely successor would be very reluctant to destroy this connection.

I. Prospects for the Regime

1. Since it took power in November 1973, the clique of military officers led by strongman Ioannidis and its puppet government in Greece have not managed to attract support outside of the military establishment. Those political forces that hoped that the ouster of Papadopoulos would speed the return to parliamentary government were rapidly disappointed. Military force remains the only important prop of the government. And sharply deteriorating economic conditions—runaway inflation—and the absence of decisive leadership are further eroding the position of the rulers. From the beginning they have been unable to attract qualified administrative talent, and there is increasing factionalism and politicization in the army.

Civilian Sentiment

2. Figures from the pre-Papadopoulos days have shown little disposition to risk the consequences of speaking out against the regime. Though disenchanted with the current government, they do not seem to have attempted to organize opposition to it. None of the prominent personalities of the old political scene is likely to emerge as a center of resistance to the present rulers. Ex-Prime Minister Constantine Karamanlis remains the choice of many within Greece as an alternative to the military regime, but perhaps because he feels the military rulers may turn to him for help, he has yet publicly to attack the regime from his self-imposed exile in Paris.

3. Youth and workers have the potential to challenge the regime—but it's still only a potential. Their open agitation played a significant part in Papadopoulos' downfall. Yet thus far they have made only half-hearted efforts to challenge the new government and seem cowed by its no-nonsense approach to law and order. Government determination to act decisively against dissidence was illustrated by the recent arrest of some 45 members of the outlawed Communist party accused of publishing pamphlets urging youth to boycott classes.

4. For the students to rally significant overt support from labor and other elements of society would require either (a) signs of weakness or indecisiveness on the part of the government in acting against dissidence, or (b) an issue, such as overt army or police brutality, which would bring the people out in the street. Public outrage over such incidents during the riots last November has cooled somewhat, but could be rekindled by another violent confrontation. Also, economic distress is clearly working in the dissidents' favor as it did in November. And students and labor would enjoy popular sympathy, if not overt support, should they again openly defy the government.

5. No combination of civilian forces, however, could topple the regime without the support of important elements in the military. The

growing number of civilian dissidents recognizes this fact. Yet action by students and workers could have reverberations within the military establishment. If the government failed to cope satisfactorily with this challenge, factions within the military could be provoked to move against Ioannidis.

Factionalism in the Military

6. The officer corps is not solidly united in its loyalty to Ioannidis. Through his control of the military police and security forces, Ioannidis has a far-flung network of informers which makes it hard to catch him unawares. He has thus far maintained himself behind the scenes, where he has the greater flexibility in dealing with opposition. Yet it is clear that Ioannidis' performance has not satisfied all segments of the officer corps. Already some officers are voicing their dissatisfaction to the tentative, ad hoc approach to policies that has characterized his puppet government.

7. Though the situation has not yet jelled and our evidence remains scanty, it is possible to identify various long-existing factional tendencies among the officers:

a. *A group presently loyal to Ioannidis.* These officers themselves are not completely unified in view and include other possible leaders, such as Armed Forces Chief Bonanos, who might eventually make their own bid for power. This group is united in distrust of democratic processes and is intensely and narrowly nationalistic. It wants the army to hold power indefinitely, because it fears that any form of democratic government would lead to political turmoil and eventual Communist takeover. It is the best organized of all military groups and is supported by the entire military police organization as well as some strategically placed junior and middle-grade officers in all the services. These officers are determined to purge pro-Papadopoulos elements from the army and punish those involved in corruption under the previous government. It was pressure from within this group that overcame Ioannidis' reluctance to move against officials involved in corruption under the Papadopoulos government. And similar pressure would tend to inhibit Ioannidis from giving in to popular demands to liberalize the regime.

b. *Other proponents of continued military rule.* While differing little with Ioannidis in their views of the proper military role, there are other more or less amorphous groupings which aspire to power. The purges undertaken by Ioannidis have not removed all the former supporters of Papadopoulos. It is hard to tell how many would fall in this category, but, though the most prominent and dangerous of these were removed in the November coup, Ioannidis still believes they pose a significant threat to his regime. Another fringe group of younger officers is commonly referred to as the "Qadhafiites." They are a hard core of tough nationalists who would like to see Greece adopt a more inde-

pendent posture toward the US and NATO, particularly in negotiations for use of facilities. But most of them supported Ioannidis in November because they believed he would impose a more nationalistic regime.

c. *Moderates*, who comprise the silent majority of the officer corps. They are distressed by the politicization of the military establishment and favor the armed forces' disengagement from politics. At the same time, they fear that return to an entirely free political scene would lead to political anarchy. They would thus support a restricted form of political freedom to prevent the type of political free-for-all which preceded the army takeover in 1967. Many of the professional younger officers sympathize with these views and would prefer to stick to military duties without becoming involved in political activity. A number of senior officers are also in this category. This group is directly influenced by family and friends outside the military who are disenchanted with the regime.

8. Ioannidis has launched a program ranging from purges to pep rallies to counter dissidence within the army. He has taken care to place his own supporters in key military posts. Continuing purges of the military establishment are dangerous, however, and even newly rewarded generals may switch sides if they feel threatened.

What Kind of Successors?

9. For the present, Ioannidis and his supporters hold sway. But theirs is an uneasy rule. As grievances accumulate, the government will become increasingly vulnerable to another military coup by those who are either impatient with the regime's lack of progress or fearful that they will be purged because of real or imagined anti-government plotting on their part.

10. It is not yet possible to set a timetable for this development nor to specify what group of officers would emerge in control. Some US observers believe that the regime's lack of talent, public hostility, and military factionalism will lead to Ioannidis' downfall rather soon; they would be surprised if he lasted much more than a year. Others, stressing his ability to cow opposition, give him a fair chance to survive somewhat longer. But most agree that the present regime is unlikely to remain as long as the six-year term that Papadopoulos enjoyed. And when it goes, it is most likely to be replaced by a new clique of military conspirators, similarly adept at plotting but unskilled in administration. There could even be a succession of military coups.

11. Yet while any military successors would probably be unwilling to allow civilian politicians to run the whole show, some military factions might allow civilians more latitude than others would. For example, the senior officers from the "silent majority" might be inclined to delegate greater responsibility to civilian government. To form such

a government they might seek younger civilians not tainted by involvement in the older political scene, or turn to former Prime Minister Karamanlis. But Karamanlis would not return without guarantees of a free hand in governing—something that would be difficult for the military to accord him. Even the moderate officers would no doubt be prepared to intervene if the civilians threatened the military's autonomy or appeared to be failing to provide stable and effective government. The hard line younger military, on the other hand, would probably dispense with even a facade of civilian rule and would talk more of a lengthy process of basic social reform as necessary before permitting any movement toward return of parliamentary government.²

II. Implications for the US

12. The Ioannidis regime has yet to develop its own distinctive and well-articulated foreign policy: it is continuing along the general lines followed by Papadopoulos. The officers who control the government are strongly committed to the West and are intensely anti-Communist in outlook. At the same time, they are even more nationalistic and parochial in their views than their predecessors. They are more adventurous than Papadopoulos in their approach to the Cyprus problem and worried about a military confrontation with Turkey. The mixture of these elements poses even more problems for the US than were raised by the Papadopoulos regime.

Cyprus and Turkey

13. Like many Greek officers who have served on Cyprus, Ioannidis has a special interest in the island's fate. But his interest is combined with deep distrust of Makarios and an exaggerated view of the Communist threat on Cyprus. The danger that Greece will increase its activity in Cyprus is probably not imminent because Ioannidis seems now to be devoting his primary energy to consolidating his position internally in the Greek army. If he succeeds in this effort, however, he might at some stage try to unseat Makarios. Such a move would introduce great strains into Greek relations with Turkey and would face

² In airgram A-135, May 22, Tasca asserted that the interagency memorandum overstated Ioannides' position, despite his strength within the military. "Nevertheless, intrigue against him continues within the Armed Forces and among 1967 coup members. Also, there is evidence of increasing concern among the silent majority of military officers at the continued politicization of the Armed Forces. The business community is becoming alienated; unemployment among the politically sensitive construction workers can create new sources of tension; and the Greek people are turning from apathy to antipathy toward political repression in the absence of any hope of a return to democratic government." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1312, Saunders Chron File, NSC Secretariat, Contingency Plans 1974, Cyprus and Greek-Turkish Contingency Plans)

the United States with the difficult task of dampening conflict between NATO allies.

14. At least as ominous for the US is Ioannidis' approach to relations with Turkey. The Greeks and Turks have long had differences about the territorial waters of the Aegean. The recent discovery of oil in an undisputedly Greek area off the island of Thassos, indicating that the Aegean may overlay rich deposits, has made this dispute more potentially explosive. The Greeks and Turks are in dispute over claims to the right to drill elsewhere in offshore areas in the Aegean. Thus far the Ioannidis regime has been unwilling to negotiate with the Turks over this thorny issue on the grounds that even to agree to talks would compromise the Greek position on the disputed area. Ioannidis' inflexibility on this point may stem partially also from a calculation that confrontation with Turkey would help solidify his internal military support as well as distract popular discontent with his government. The Greek military has begun to take certain precautionary measures for possible conflict with Turkey. While the Turkish government has sought to dampen tensions, already a cycle of action and reaction seems underway which eventually could embroil Greece and Turkey in confrontation.

Relations with the US

15. Like its predecessors, the Ioannidis regime views cooperative relations with the US as the base of its foreign policy. Moreover, the reservoir of pro-US sentiment among the ruling military circles appears stronger and more pervasive than any minority tendency that would wish to loosen these ties. At the same time, the government is unwilling to shift domestic policies to repair what it considers the unsatisfactory present state of relations with the US. While the Greek rulers would like US endorsement of their regime and open-handed assistance, they do not expect Washington to be that forthcoming. What they fear particularly is difficulty in acquiring the weapons they believe they need to modernize their armed forces to cope with "local war situations." And they are sensitive to overt signs of US displeasure with their regime. They will especially watch to see how the US treats them now that both sides have had some months to assess the November coup.

16. In this context, the new rulers are currently reviewing the conditions under which military facilities are made available to the US. They regard US facilities in Greece to be worth more in terms of aid than the US is presently providing under Foreign Military Sales, and they are more avid than their predecessors in desiring the US to up the ante. For example, they are raising difficulties and causing delays in present negotiations over the use of facilities at Souda Bay. Thus far, they are still feeling their way along, and are unsure how much the

traffic will bear. The Greeks are considering turning to other Western arms suppliers if the US will not allow them to purchase the quantities they believe they require.

17. There has also been a growing ambivalence toward the US among the Greek civilian body politic. On the one hand, underlying pro-US sentiment still remains strong among the public as well as one can judge. The emotional and family ties binding Greeks in general to the US are too profound to be sundered by surface disagreements. On the other hand, because the US is widely regarded as the moving force behind this—and any other—regime in Greece, there is a well of popular suspicion of US motives that can be exploited to promote anti-Americanism if the opportunity arises. And popular resentment of the US seems sure to grow. This could impel the regime to become even stickier in its dealings with the US.

18. Dealing at a routine level with the Greek regime and avoiding identification with it as far as possible can create a growing irritation in relations. But it does not threaten an abrupt crisis. Pained as the present rulers may be with the lack of US enthusiasm for their regime, they seem ready to accept this posture with resignation. They recognize that the US urged Papadopoulos to restore parliamentary rule and they would impute no special motives to continuation of this pressure on them as well. Yet they will remain resistant to liberalizing the political system to satisfy their foreign allies.

19. Even with deferral of the second phase of the homeporting agreement, Ioannidis and his colleagues may seek to renegotiate the broad range of mutual security arrangements between the two countries. The Greek military, which would dictate the Greek stance on these matters, views American facilities as hostage to extract concessions on the acquisition of American military equipment. Though the Greeks will base their appeal for weapons on NATO force requirements, the underlying aim would be to acquire the capability to handle potential hostilities with Turkey and Bulgaria and also to meet the expectations of the Greek officer corps. Ioannidis probably sees his ability to secure weapons from the US or elsewhere as critical to his own survival.

20. In addition to assurance that the US would supply modern weapons in some quantities, the Greeks will press for changes to give them greater control of US military activities and to limit the privileges and immunities of American personnel in Greece. We regard this as essentially a bargaining ploy, but it may nonetheless lead to significant alteration of the US position in Greece. During the October war,³ the

³ Reference is to the Arab-Israeli war of 1973.

Papadopoulos regime, while adopting a policy publicly at variance with that of the US, was nonetheless [*less than 1 line not declassified*] helpful in various ways. For example, it [*1 line not declassified*] allowed more extensive use of US facilities in Greece than is provided by bilateral agreements. In the future, we could not expect this type of cooperation from the Ioannidis regime, unless the US were prepared to be more forthcoming in a variety of military matters.

21. US willingness to continue to deal with the military rulers would not be popular with civilian politicians within Greece. In the unlikely event that Andreas Papandreu (or someone of his political stripe) were to return to head a new Greek regime, he probably would use alleged US support for the Ioannidis government as a pretext for action against the US. It seems unlikely, however, that popular resentment against the US would impel Karamanlis, if he should be recalled by a military regime, for example, to sever major ties with Washington. There is some risk that a more representative regime would feel under popular pressure to retaliate against the US for its alleged identification with military dictatorship, but the US and NATO's role in Greece's security system is substantial; a likely successor regime would be very reluctant to destroy this connection.

22. Efforts by the US to distance itself from the present rulers would complicate bilateral working arrangements. Given the sensitivity of the Ioannidis regime, it would probably react by pressing the US on the use of facilities. How far the government would go in restricting US activities in Greece would depend on how much open displeasure the US expressed. Merely urging the Greeks to permit an early return to parliamentary procedures would not appear to the Athens regime nor to its opposition to be much of a change in the policy the US pursued toward Papadopoulos. Public characterization of the present regime as repressive—thus encouraging additional opprobrium from other NATO allies—would be seen by Ioannidis as unnecessarily irritating and would provoke him to retaliate, without, however, convincing most critics of the regime that the US had abandoned Ioannidis. It is likely that under these circumstances the Greek attitude toward military relations with the US would become much less cooperative across a broad range of issues.

14. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State¹

Athens, June 14, 1974, 0900Z.

3705. Subject: Foreign Policy Views of Brig. Gen. Ioannides. Following message was transmitted to Ambassador Tasca from Brigadier General Ioannides:²

1. Greek/Turkish Dispute: Greece really does not want war with Turkey as the only winner in such a war would be the Soviet Union. Greece will not attack Turkey (preemptive) but will not permit Greek interests in Aegean or Cyprus to be jeopardized. The U.S. can assist in preventing a Greek-Turkish war by selling Greece the arms it needs to achieve a level of military strength sufficient to prevent a Turkish attack on Greece. It will do no good, however, to sell arms to Greece and then give twice that amount to Turkey, as has been the U.S. custom. If Greece cannot buy arms from the U.S. (it prefers U.S. arms to any other) then France, Germany, and other countries will get the orders.

2. Souda Bay: Ioannides would rather not sign an agreement at this time. The press would demand to know the details, especially the "rent" to be paid to Greece as is now paid to Spain, Turkey, etc., for base rights. He is willing to let U.S. forces simply use Souda as we have in the past without an agreement.

3. Cyprus: Ioannides sees one of two things happening in Cyprus. Either Cyprus will slowly drift left and become a Cuba of the Mediterranean (this drift will be caused by the Communist propaganda which is being taught in the school system), or the 80 percent Greek majority will achieve union with Greece. The one thing that cannot happen is union with Turkey.

4. Aegean Oil Rights: To suggestions that Greece give Turkey some oil rights in the Aegean, the answer is no. If Turkey has Aegean oil rights, so does Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, and perhaps other countries. The Aegean is Greek. The potential wealth can be shared, however, by extremely heavy Greek purchasing of Turkish products, even more than can be used, thus providing a financial benefit to Turkey.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 594, Country Files, Middle East, Greece, Vol. IV. Secret; Exdis.

² In telegram 3704 from Athens, June 14, Tasca informed the Department: "In order to maintain flexible and effective communications with Brigadier General Ioannides, I have opened a separate and additional channel to him, via DAO and the Greek military." This was the first message transmitted through the alternate channel. (Ibid., Box 1312, Saunders Chron File, NSC Secretariat, Contingency Plans 1974, Cyprus and Greek-Turkish Contingency Plans)

5. Greek Morale: The Government of Greece has been receiving letters from hundreds of Greeks now in foreign countries pledging to return to Greece if war with Turkey should come. Ioannides is 100 per cent sure that if attacked by Turkey, the Greek people will unite and fight.

6. *Comment:* Substance of foregoing generally conforms with earlier messages, though tone somewhat more moderate. One point worth underlining is implication that GOG intends to continue the 1959 agreement in effect as far as Souda Bay is concerned. This may be the Greek way of conceding that any special approach to Souda, outside of general context of our military relation, may not be practical.

Tasca

15. Interagency Intelligence Memorandum¹

Washington, June 21, 1974.

SUBJECT

The Likelihood of Conflict Between Greece and Turkey

Principal Judgments

Greek-Turkish relations are currently troubled over conflicting claims to the right to sovereignty and potential minerals in the bed of the Aegean Sea. These claims are longstanding, but did not gain serious dimensions until early in 1974 after oil was found off the Greek island of Thassos, suggesting that the Aegean might overlies other significant deposits. The Turks have issued claims to sovereignty over areas of the seabed that the Athens government regards as Greek. The Greek Government has thus regarded the Turkish request for negotiations to delimit the continental shelf as a challenge to Greek sovereignty and has maintained that even to agree to negotiate would grant unacceptable validity to the Turkish claims.

¹ Source: Central Intelligence Agency, NIC Files, Job 79–R01012A. Secret. This memorandum was prepared under the auspices of the National Intelligence Officers for Western Europe and Conventional Forces. It was principally drafted by DIA and CIA with the participation of representatives of INR and the intelligence components of the Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force.

The posturing of both sides in the last two months has heightened tensions. Although these moves and countermoves could touch off an armed conflict, neither Greece nor Turkey is actively seeking to trigger hostilities with the other. Neither wants to risk dislocation of its relationship with the US and NATO over this issue. Current international meetings where both the Greeks and the Turks are represented may offer an opportunity for direct but informal contacts to defuse the issue.

While deliberately initiated war thus seems unlikely in the near future, some sort of armed clash or incident remains possible. With present inflamed tempers, incidents could lead to a localized engagement. Should Athens unilaterally declare a 12 mile territorial limit, the danger of incident would increase. But it seems likely that Athens and Ankara would seek to prevent larger-scale conflict from developing.

Even if negotiations were to begin, the issues would not yield easily to satisfactory solution and the controversy is likely to be prolonged. Thus the issue of delimiting the continental shelf boundary and of oil exploration in this disputed area is likely to drag on, carrying with it potential for future damage to NATO.

The recent period of heightened tensions raises the question of the relative military capabilities of the Greek and Turkish armed forces. Turkey has a clear numerical superiority in its military forces, particularly in its ground and air arms. This superiority probably would permit a successful but limited Turkish offensive in eastern Greek Thrace and seizure of some Greek Aegean islands near the Turkish coast. Neither side, however, has the capability to support a prolonged and intensive military campaign. Both would require extensive resupply from other countries if fighting lasted more than a few weeks, even at relatively low levels of intensity.

[2 lines not declassified] Both countries, even in the event of hostilities, would be vying for US assistance and would probably avoid any actions which would almost certainly cause a rupture of relations with the US.

I. The Likelihood of Hostilities Between Greece and Turkey

Genesis of the Dispute

1. Greek-Turkish relations are troubled over conflicting claims to the right to sovereignty and potential minerals in the bed of the Aegean Sea. But the controversy is heightened by centuries of latent hostility reflected in the last 50 years in conflict over the treatment of respective minorities and Cyprus. Even common membership in NATO has not dissipated this mutual mistrust.

2. The present governments in Greece and Turkey have had less contact than their immediate predecessors and have yet to establish an

effective dialogue to compose their differences. From the start, the Ioannidis regime in Greece has shown itself to be narrowly nationalistic and parochial in its views. It has not pursued an easily discernible approach to the Cyprus problem. While worried about a military confrontation with Turkey, Ioannidis may have viewed dispute with Turkey as helpful in solidifying his personal military support as well as in distracting popular discontent with his government. And indeed, there is evidence that the current controversy with Turkey is a popular cause within the Greek armed forces. At the same time, the Greek regime has avoided brash moves that would risk armed conflict with Turkey.

3. The formation of the Ecevit coalition government in Turkey in January 1974 also added momentum to the rise of tension in Greek-Turkish relations. While Ecevit has little in his background to suggest particular animosity toward Greeks and has publicly renounced aggressive intent, the weakness of his coalition regime and his inexperience in government leadership may have given more scope to popular nationalist suspicions of Greece. In any event, the coalition government protocol committed him to pursue the exploitation of offshore mineral resources and to accelerate prospecting for basic energy resources. In addition, his initial government policy proclamation endorsing a federated state in Cyprus contradicted earlier assurances that the Turks were not seeking a “federal” solution and that they accepted the principle of a “unitary” Cyprus.² Ecevit’s statement, therefore, was read in Greece as provocative.

4. It was the discovery of oil, however, that triggered the present crisis. Conflicting claims to the seabed in the Aegean are longstanding, but this controversy did not gain serious dimensions until early in 1974 after oil was found in what promised to be substantial quantities off the Greek island of Thassos in the northern Aegean. The seabed here is undisputedly Greek, but the presence of oil suggested that the Aegean might overlies other significant deposits. The Turks have long been frustrated by seeing valuable oil reserves discovered near their borders (in lands formerly part of the Ottoman Empire), while Turkey has had only minor success in finding oil in commercial quantities within its own boundaries. The Turks granted concessions to the Turkish Petroleum Monopoly; and in order to press its claim to the Anatolian shelf, the Ankara government in February 1974 sent Athens a note for-

² Telegram 834 from Ankara, February 2, relayed the Turkish preference for a “confederation.” The Turkish Government position tried to link the concepts of federalism with a unitary state by stating “that the government’s objectives had all along been to achieve a result which was ‘in effect a function of federalism without using that actual name’.” (National Archives, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1974)

mally asserting sovereignty over the seabed up to the 100 fathom line, notwithstanding that the area in question lay to the west of the numerous Greek islands that line the Aegean coast of Turkey. And the Turks asked for negotiations to delimit the continental shelf.

Current Maneuvering

5. The Greek Government regarded the Turkish request for talks on this matter as a challenge to Greek sovereignty. Athens maintained that even to agree to negotiate would be tantamount to admitting that Ankara's position had some validity. Hence, the Greek regime delayed answering the Turkish *démarche*. Greek contingency plans for military action against Turkey were dusted off, some troops were moved to the islands off the Turkish coast, and in general the Athens regime took steps to prepare to defend its claimed rights by force if it should deem necessary.³ At the same time, informally, the Greeks sought to enlist US backing for their position. And on May 24 Athens finally replied to the Turks in an ambiguous fashion, hinting that it might entertain some sort of preliminary discussions, though not agreeing to formal negotiations. A subsequent note on June 14 reaffirmed the basic Greek position.

6. Greece has for some time indicated an intention to extend its territorial waters from the present six miles to 12. Since such a move would apply to its many islands, it would effectively transform the Aegean into a Greek lake. Athens is not likely to act before the Law of the Sea Conference in Caracas has considered the question of territorial waters, but a unilateral extension by Greece would be viewed by Ankara as a serious challenge to its claimed rights in the area.

[Omitted here is a map of the Aegean seabed.]

7. The Turks throughout have sought to force Athens to agree to negotiations over the status of the disputed seabed. In April, the Ankara government publicized its decision to permit oil exploration in the seabed west of the Island of Lesbos. When this announcement failed to induce the Greeks to negotiate, the Turks increased the state of readiness of their forces and prepared to send a Turkish hydrographic vessel into the Aegean to conduct surveys of the area in question.⁴ And after the Greek Foreign Office rejected Ecevit's hopeful interpretation of the May 24 note as acceptance of negotiations, Ankara announced

³ Intelligence cables, May 20, 23, 30, and 31, reported Greek troops reinforcing the Greco-Turkish border and the Dodecanese Islands. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1312, NSC Secretariat, Contingency Plans 1974, Cyprus and Greek-Turkish Contingency Plans)

⁴ Intelligence cables, May 26 and 28, reported the Turkish General Staff's issuance of a national general alert to all military forces. (Ibid.)

that it was dispatching the hydrographic vessel accompanied by Turkish naval units, some of which were on route to participate in the bilateral NATO exercise "Good Friendship." This move was calculated to demonstrate Turkish determination to press for Ankara's alleged undersea rights. Subsequently, the Turks announced that the hydrographic vessel was returning to the Dardanelles after five days in Aegean waters.

8. While these Turkish tactics contributed to the increase in tensions, they have not yet accomplished the aim of securing full-scale negotiations. Ioannidis, although viewing the Turkish actions as provocative, decided to ignore the Turkish hydrographic vessel and has assured the US that he would not consider military response unless and until actual oil drilling began. Athens cites the precedent of having tolerated Soviet surveying operations in international waters over the Greek seabed. Moreover, Ioannidis may have adopted this more relaxed position because there is geological evidence from oil company research indicating that oil is highly unlikely to be found in the research particular area under dispute. The Greeks are relying on what they regard as a strong legal case, improving their military readiness but avoiding action that would provoke the Turks.

The Likelihood of Armed Conflict

9. Although these moves and countermoves could touch off an armed conflict, neither Greece nor Turkey is actively seeking to trigger hostilities with the other. The leadership in both countries is aware of the far-reaching implications of military conflict between NATO members. Both states would like to be less dependent on the US, but still regard their relations with the US as the central facet of NATO membership and of their defense strategy. From past experience in crises over Cyprus they fear dislocation of this relationship if war should break out. What pressures emanate from the respective military establishments to have recourse to arms have not reached proportions so far that would lead the decision-making levels deliberately to initiate armed conflict.

10. The pressure for war is also reduced by current high-level diplomatic contacts. The respective foreign ministers discussed the problems at the NATO meeting in Ottawa on June 18–19.⁵ The Law of the Sea Conference now convened in Caracas provides another opportunity for discussion. From the start, Athens has wanted to await the outcome of the Caracas Conference before considering the possi-

⁵ As reported in telegram 3700 from Athens, June 13; telegram 4684 from Ankara, June 14; telegram 3744 from Athens, June 15; and telegram 3776 from Athens, June 17. (Ibid.)

bility of substantive negotiations with the Turks in hopes that the general principles worked out here would bolster the Greek case. The Turks, on the other hand, pushed for negotiations before the Conference.

11. While deliberately initiated war thus seems unlikely in the near future, some sort of armed clash or incident remains possible. Greek and Turkish naval units in the disputed area could through some miscalculation exchange fire. With present inflamed tempers, other incidents (say over fishing rights) could lead to a localized engagement. Should Athens unilaterally declare a 12 mile territorial limit, the danger of incident would increase. But even in these cases, it seems likely that Athens and Ankara would seek—undoubtedly through US mediation—to prevent larger-scale conflict.

12. The present crisis has demonstrated the mutual mistrust between Greek and Turk. Even if negotiations were to begin, the issues would not yield easily to satisfactory solution. The controversy is likely to be prolonged at least in part because it will be particularly difficult for the Turks to force the pace of mineral exploration. The amount of actual exploratory activity that the Turks can perform is extremely limited. Oil drilling rigs are in short supply and are already committed to drill elsewhere. Moreover, as long as the area remains in dispute, oil companies will be unwilling to make available the oil rigs necessary for actual drilling. Thus the issue of delimiting the continental shelf boundary and of oil exploration in this disputed area is likely to drag on, carrying with it potential for further damage to the NATO alliance.

[Omitted here are sections II, "Balance of Forces" and III, "The Likelihood of Seizure of U.S. Nuclear Weapons."]

IV. Impact on Other Countries of Greek-Turkish Hostilities

On the US and NATO

39. Active hostilities between Greece and Turkey would have a serious adverse effect on intra-NATO relationships and on the military balance between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Some NATO countries, particularly those in northern Europe, would likely make strong diplomatic overtures to both combatants in the search for a cease-fire. If one participant were seen clearly to be the aggressor, there might even be some public comment calling for its removal from the alliance. Should either Greece or Turkey suffer serious military reverses, it might come to feel abandoned by its allies if they did not bring pressure to bear on the "victor" to restore the situation.

40. Under any circumstances, in the aftermath of full-scale hostilities between these two NATO partners there would be a weakened NATO posture against Soviet political and military pressures in the area. Continued bitterness between the two could extend for a

considerable period after the end of hostilities and seriously disrupt allied efforts at combined military planning for the region.

41. Even a widening split between Athens and Ankara that did not lead to open hostilities would, at the least, exacerbate the isolation that, because of geographic location, characterizes southern NATO. At the worst it would cause a serious breakdown of defenses on the southeastern flank.

42. Considerable pressures would be exerted by both sides to enlist the US as an ally to the disadvantage of the other. Each side would be likely to cast the other in the role of aggressor as it appealed for US assistance and perhaps even direct military support. The situation is further complicated because US forces are stationed in the two countries.

On Cyprus

43. Greece and Turkey have several times threatened to go to war over the Cyprus question, but Cyprus stands a reasonably good chance of escaping direct involvement in hostilities between the two over other issues, especially in a conflict of short duration. A Greek-Turkish conflict would, however, raise intercommunal tensions and increase the chances of serious strife on the island. It is within Turkey's capabilities to cut off Cyprus from any Greek access, and to launch a successful landing on the island, if it chooses. Ankara would take such action only in the unlikely event of a Greek attempt to take over the island or in order to protect a threatened Turkish minority on the island.

44. If hostilities did break out on Cyprus, it is doubtful that the two British Sovereign Base Areas or the aircraft located there would be attacked deliberately. It would not be in the interest of either Greece or Turkey to take provocative action against the British, some of whose aircraft there are NATO-committed.

[Omitted here are several maps and annexes.]

16. Telegram From the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to the Department of State¹

Brussels, July 4, 1974, 1925Z.

3745. Subj: Greek-Turkish Dispute.

1. On July 4, SYG Luns invited to his office Ambassador of U.S., U.K., France, FRG, Italy, and Belgium for discussion of initiatives Luns intended to take in near future regarding Greek-Turkish dispute over Aegean. Luns said that he feared the possibility of conflict between Greece and Turkey and that he had concluded that he should take an initiative very quickly to try to engage the two countries in efforts to de-fuse the situation. He believed that as in the case of the Middle East, if one tried to solve all of the issues in one package, very great difficulties would ensue. Therefore, he favored a step-by-step approach of the kind which had proven successful in the Middle East context.²

2. Luns then said that he favored leaving aside for the time being the legal aspects, the question of minorities, and question of Cyprus. He thought it desirable to concentrate on the issue of oil and mineral wealth in the Aegean and to try to solve this problem now before major discoveries of oil were made. Therefore, he intended to propose to the Greeks and the Turks that they might establish joint companies to exploit the oil and mineral resources of the Aegean. The question of percentage of participation and other specifics of such joint companies would be matters for later decision.

3. In making such a proposal, he had in mind that he did not wish to call into question the legal rights which Greece insisted upon and that, on the other hand, Turkey should be able to say that it has a reasonable share in the mineral resources off its shores. He recognized the danger that the Government of Greece might think that NATO or its Secretary General was trying to impose a solution and he intended to be discreet in his manner of proceeding with this initiative, thinking first of preliminary contacts with the Greek and Turkish PermReps on the Council. This might be followed up, if appropriate, with visit to Athens and Ankara by A/SYG Kastl or by the SYG's Chef du Cabinet Paul Van Campen. He intended to avoid all publicity, Luns stressed. He would hope at a suitable time to elicit diplomatic support from the allies represented in this meeting.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1312, Saunders Chron File, NSC Secretariat, Contingency Plans 1974, Cyprus and Greek-Turkish Contingency Plans. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Repeated to Athens and Ankara.

² Reference is to the incremental agreements Kissinger concluded with the shuttle diplomacy he began in the wake of the October 1973 Arab-Israeli war.

4. Luns anticipated that if his initiative were at all successful there might be follow-up discussions, perhaps in NATO headquarters, in which he would assist. He thought this approach would avoid the creation of ad hoc machinery which the Greeks did not like and yet start a process of negotiations. As regards timing, Luns said that he intended to make a brief statement in the DPC on July 5, in which he would exhort the Greeks and Turks to refrain from any actions which might lead to use of force. At Belgium Ambassador De Staercke's suggestion, Luns said he might also refer to the "Three Wise Men's report" of 1956 and to a resolution of the North Atlantic Council which was adopted as a result of that report, which called for submitting disputes to good offices procedures within the NATO framework. Luns said he would follow this up with private *démarches* to the Greek and Turkish delegations to NATO during the week of July 8. Luns said that he intended to undertake this initiative on his own responsibility, although he would be grateful if his intentions were reported to capitals.

Rumsfeld

17. Editorial Note

In Greece, the failure of the July 15, 1974, coup in Cyprus to realize fully the goals of the Ioannides regime, and the threat of war with Turkey over Cyprus, led to political turmoil. Constantine Karamanlis, a former Prime Minister of Greece who had gone into self-imposed exile in 1963, reemerged as a viable political leader for Greece. On July 17 he spoke out against the coup and the Greek military regime. The Embassy in Athens reported his statement in telegram 4561: "He warned 'dramatic events in Cyprus constitute national disaster and can have painful consequences for the (Greek) nation at home and abroad.' He also urged a return to democracy in Greece and offered to lead return to normalcy and national reconciliation." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1974)

Within a week, Ioannides' colleagues quietly ousted him from power and asked Karamanlis to return from exile. Events moved quickly and quietly within the Greek Government. When Tasca met with President Gizikis on July 21, Gizikis made no mention of the political turmoil within the Greek junta. (Telegram 4716 from Athens, July 21; *ibid.*) On July 23 Tasca reported that another former Prime Minister, Panayiotis Kanellopoulos, would replace Ioannides and form a government of national unity and return Greece to democracy. (Telegram

4872 from Athens, July 23; *ibid.*) Although Kanellopoulos' name had been discussed when the senior generals in the junta informed Gizikis on July 22 that they would no longer take orders from Ioannides, two days of meetings between civilian and military leaders resulted in Gizikis calling Karamanlis in Paris to ask him to return to Greece. On July 24 Karamanlis returned from exile to be sworn in as Prime Minister at 4:15 a.m. (Telegram 4899 from Athens; *ibid.*) Later that day, Tasca met with Karamanlis and delivered a congratulatory message from Nixon. (Telegrams 4954 and 4962 from Athens; *ibid.*)

18. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State¹

Athens, July 26, 1974, 1200Z.

5049. Subject: Future of King Constantine. In the present situation there may be some who believe King Constantine should be brought back. It is my considered view that Karamanlis has so many grave issues facing him that we should not complicate his task by raising the constitutional question in any form at this time. Most of the Army is strongly opposed to the King, and many of the politicians are also opposed. He is clearly at this time, particularly now that Karamanlis in fact is back, likely to constitute a divisive factor. I urge, therefore, that we refrain from getting into this subject in any way and let the Greeks decide this issue for themselves.

Tasca

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 84, Athens Embassy Files: Lot 78 F 134, Greece, 1974, Box 39, POL 14 ELECTIONS 1974. Secret. Repeated to London. Drafted and approved by Tasca.

19. Biographic Report

BR74–45

Washington, August 14, 1974.

[Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, NSC Staff for Europe, Canada, and Ocean Affairs: Convenience Files, 1974–1977, Box 8, Europe, Greece 1974 NSC. Secret; No Foreign Dissem. 9 pages not declassified.]

20. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State¹

Athens, August 15, 1974, 1120Z.

5704. Subject: Greece, NATO, and the US—Some Reflections. In evaluation the Greek Government's decree to leave NATO,² I believe it is useful to bear in mind a number of essential facts:

1. The GOG and the Greek people are highly frustrated because of their inability to come to the aid of their fellow Greeks in Cyprus. The conflict with Turkey is aggravated by the fact its historic adversary Turkey is involved. The country is still vividly associated with four centuries of occupation and their own war of independence.

2. During the crisis, it has felt let down by its NATO allies which it felt could have compelled Turkey to observe its cease-fire.

3. On the other hand, I believe when the dust settles the basic elements tying Greece to the United States and its NATO allies will be given their appropriate weight. They are a small country surrounded by hostile and potentially hostile forces. Geographically, they clearly need friends. With democracy in the process of being restored, many friends will be apparent.

4. Our traditionally close ties with this country, and particularly its people, will prove to be strong and I believe can be decisive. They

¹ Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for the Middle East and South Asia, Box 10, Greece, Exdis to Secretary of State 1. Secret; NIACT; Immediate; Exdis.

² Telegram 5665 from Athens, August 14, transmitted the text of the announcement, in which the Greek Government stated that NATO had failed to "stem Turkey from creating a situation of conflict between two allies." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1974)

know that the American people are friendly and mean well. The Greeks who are keyed into realities, and others must or will realize the most difficult dilemma which has faced our government in the development of the crisis—i.e., the overriding necessity of seeking to bring our important allies together without irreparable damage in our or NATO's relations with either one in the imperative interest of Western security in the Eastern Mediterranean.

5. Their decision to remain in the Alliance, French style, does underline their understanding of the importance of the security protection which the alliance provides them against the potential dangers from the Warsaw Pact area. I do not believe Caramanlis wants to act hastily with regard to unravelling their participation in NATO military structure where basic military elements are involved such as NAMFI, our NATO use of Souda Bay, etc. Clearly, however, the practical implications of Greece's decision to withdraw from NATO, and the speed with which the Greek Government proceeds to disengage from the military portions of the alliance, will depend upon events in Cyprus and in Ankara over which Caramanlis and his pro-Western colleagues have little or no control. The US and NATO have become, almost inevitably, the scapegoats for Greek frustration over the Cyprus problem. The sooner we can manufacture a settlement that meets Greek as well as Turkish minimum objectives, and which is not injurious to Greek self-respect, the sooner we can begin to mitigate the effects of Greece's decision to loosen its military cooperation with NATO. That decision is thus far rhetorical but it cannot remain so for long in the absence of US action which the Greeks will interpret as responsive to their concern about continued Turkish military advances on Cyprus and what they regard as a blunt and unheeding Turkish diplomatic posture.

6. In the short term we must act promptly along the following lines:

A) Demonstrate that we are mindful of Greece's importance to the US and the Western alliance and that we have not "chosen Turkey over Greece". Our desire to avoid public criticism of the Turks is logical in view of our intention to retain diplomatic leverage in Ankara, but our even-handed public posture has cost us leverage in Athens and has contributed to Greece's psychological estrangement. I continue to believe that a trip by the Secretary to Ankara and Athens is indispensable to reverse the disturbing trends we are witnessing in Greece.

B) Demonstrate also that we understand Caramanlis' domestic and personal problems; that we regard him as a friend and want him to succeed in restoring strong and effective parliamentary government. Here again a visit by the Secretary would do more than anything else in the short term. Eventually, and depending on future developments, we should consider a visit by Caramanlis to the U.S. In this connection I do not believe that a Mavros visit to Washington can accomplish

much. Mavros is the least articulate and most politically threatened of the present Greek leaders and the dialogue between our two governments requires a clearer channel of communication than he can provide.

7. In the longer term we should consider the following:

A) Once Greek relations with Turkey have quieted down, and I must frankly say that many Greeks fear Turkish aims against Greece are not limited to Cyprus but other objectives such as the eastern Greek islands off the Turkish coast, Thrace, etc., we should make every effort to be as forthcoming as possible in the Greek program to modernize their Armed Forces. In this regard, the military from the lowest to the highest ranks still prefer our equipment over that of our allies although sometimes delivery schedules and economics have forced them otherwise.

B) Some assistance in obtaining credit to carry them over the difficult balance of payments position they are facing could of course also help to underline our basic interest in a friendly and strong Greece.

C) With the exception of significant military modernization, we should encourage our NATO allies similarly to act along the foregoing lines. Summit level meetings with Caramanlis would be particularly in order as they become feasible. Ambassador Vlachos told me last evening that Greece was deeply offended that Secty General Luns had refused to postpone his vacation sufficiently to be present at the NAC meetings to deal with the Greek-Turkish crisis. Steps need to be taken to repair this feeling of wounded *philotimo*.

D) Forward movement in Greek association with the Common Market, including the renewal of the remaining tranches of financial assistance suspended after the 1967 coup would of course be useful.

8. The foregoing are suggestive. For the present, we should make clear in every way possible American friendship and attachment to Greece. When the GOG gets around to sorting out its policies we shall have ample opportunity to make clear to the Greeks the truly reciprocal security interest we have in the availability of facilities to our Armed Forces in Greece.

9. One word of caution in closing this message. The left, notably Andreas Papandreou, will, of course, do everything possible to exacerbate Greece's relations with the U.S. and the West. We should, therefore, expect a major effort of these forces in key Greek sectors against the U.S. position in Greece. They will have their successes. But I believe that with Caramanlis at the helm and other intelligent and Western oriented leaders such as Mavros, Pasmazoglu, etc., if we act decisively and in depth and breadth, our position in Greece can be maintained in its essential aspects.

21. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State¹

Athens, August 15, 1974, 1250Z.

5705. Subject: Initial Assessment of Greek Withdrawal from NATO. Ref: (a) Athens 5653 (NOTAL); (b) Athens 5665.²

Summary: GOG decision to withdraw from NATO probably taken without full realization of its impact. Earlier experience, however, suggests that GOG contemplates a relationship with other NATO countries like that of France but a base-rights relationship with USG similar to Spanish example. Since GOG has not thought through impact of withdrawal, we can only estimate impact on US security interests in Greece. End Summary.

1. Action taken by GOG August 14 to withdraw from North Atlantic Treaty Organization, while continuing to adhere to the North Atlantic Treaty, clearly has far-reaching implications. We attempt in this cable to give initial assessment of meaning of Greek action and its implications for US-Greek security relationship. As situation matures, we will have further comments.

2. Following commentary is based on assumption that any clash between Greece and Turkey would be confined for all essential purposes to Cyprus and that it would be brief, leaving mistrust and unhappiness between two countries but without legacy of hatred toward each other and bitterness toward bystanders which full-scale war would engender. Latter eventuality would require considerable re-evaluation of US position in Greece.

3. We believe this decision, like the January 1973 decision to forgo further grant military assistance,³ was taken without adequate thought to ramifications for Greece's future security needs. We doubt that impact of decision on NATO infrastructure program or implications for

¹ Source: Department of State, RG 84, Athens Embassy Files: Lot 96 F 335, Box 1, DEF 4-6 1974, Greek Withdrawal. Secret; NIACT Immediate. Drafted by Robert Pugh (POL/MIL), approved by Monteagle Stearns (DCM), and cleared in draft by General Burke (JUSMAGG) and Elizabeth Brown (POL). Repeated Immediate to the Secretary of Defense, Ankara, Nicosia, London, Thessaloniki, USNATO, JCS, USNMR SHAPE, USCINCEUR, CINCUSNAVEUR, CINCUSAFE, CINCUSAREUR, USDOCOSOUTH, and COMSIXTHFLT.

² In telegram 5653, August 14, Tasca reported that the Greek Foreign Ministry would announce Greece's withdrawal from NATO, but that it would remain an alliance member for political purposes. (Ibid.) Regarding telegram 5665, see footnote 2, Document 20.

³ See Document 1.

future operations of NAMFI, Souda Bay or NAWTC at Timbakion, for example, were fully taken into account. We assume that as a minimum, GOG intends to withdraw Greek military personnel from NATO commands in Brussels, Naples and Izmir; to cease participating in various NATO committees, etc. involved in military activities; and to align Greece's defense activities with its own concept of Greece's national interests and not necessarily in accordance with NATO plans. Whether withdrawal would go beyond this is matter we doubt GOG has thought through and might in any event depend upon outcome of current events.

4. Whether or not Greece's decision is irrevocable, and speed and extent to which it is implemented, clearly depend on our ability to defuse the Cyprus crisis and formulate a settlement that Greeks can live with. Should Greece contemplate re-integration, we do not believe that assignment of Greeks to NATO headquarters on Turkish soil would be possible for the foreseeable future. Thus, reintegration might be accomplished in headquarters in Naples or Brussels but not in Izmir.

5. For Greece (as for Turkey) NATO has always meant a multilateralized relationship with the United States. There is considerable reason to think that Greece intends by its withdrawal action to put pressure on alliance but not to give up the central relationship with the United States. In this scheme of things, GOG doubtless believes that Greece's strategic position is such that USG will wish to continue close security relationship within or without NATO, and we presume that this Greek judgment is not wide of the mark. Question then is what kind of relationship would GOG envision and how would this accord with United States view of USG-Greek security relationship under North Atlantic Treaty but outside NATO?

6. Our experience in negotiating with GOG on base rights and related issues is that GOG feels that fundamental changes are overdue. Although this feeling manifested itself under two authoritarian regimes which preceded current government, it evidently developed from Greek perceptions which are not necessarily dependent upon shared views on best means of governing Greece. They seem to be held both by Greek military leaders and Foreign Ministry. Salient features of these changes, as predicted by our recent experiences, would include:

a) Existing as well as additional US facilities and other manifestations of US presence should not result in any cost to GOG. This conviction results from reappraisal by Greeks of advantages and disadvantages for Greece of Alliance relationship, stimulated basically by unfortunate 10% local currency deposit requirement and imminent expiration of grant military assistance which together prompted Greece early in 1973 pre-emptively to announce renunciation of further grant aid. We have sensed and experienced results of this in several contexts,

but in future would expect further GOG demands to restore what it perceives as financial balance.

b) Restoration of balance might be expected to take form of quid pro quo for US use of Greek facilities which would put Greece in category of base rights countries. Spain is model GOG probably has in mind and Spanish experience might be quite relevant in our future security relationship with Greece.

c) NATO SOFA and bilateral US-Greek implementing agreement concerning jurisdiction over US military personnel might well be challenged, with elimination of latter as first objective. Since other provisions of NATO SOFA have proven to be troublesome in GOG's views, its general applicability might also well be challenged and a superseding bilateral more favorable to Greece demanded.

d) Assertion of close Greek control over unilateral US activities, such as special reconnaissance missions, might also be anticipated. A heightened desire to avoid irritating Arab countries could well emerge from a Greek attempt to broaden its foreign policy base in wake of withdrawal decision and humiliation on Cyprus, making reconnaissance missions particularly vulnerable.

7. Greece's withdrawal from NATO also could have implications in following areas, and probably in other ways not immediately called to mind:

a) *[11 lines not declassified]*

b) US Sixth Fleet visits to Greek ports might be less welcome in the short term but their basic acceptability from Greek point of view should not lessen significantly in longer term. Dormant Phase II of homeporting would probably be far less acceptable to GOG in aftermath of likely unhappy resolution of Cyprus problem. Presence of Sixth Fleet in eastern Mediterranean will still be seen as important to Greece's defense against threat from north, but it will take some time for Sixth Fleet to get rid of onus for failure to intervene to stop Turkish invasion of Cyprus, however unrealistic or unfair we know that Greek view to be.

c) Future of multilaterally-used NATO installations on Greek soil, NAMFI and NAWTC, is very uncertain. It is difficult to envision continued functioning of these installations with Greece outside of NATO, yet considerable value they have for integrated training argues in favor of their continued operation. If this could be accomplished, it would keep Greeks engaged with NATO in meaningful fashion and thereby make possible reintegration decision that much easier.

d) Impact on NATO infrastructure program is not clear to us. We presume infrastructure funds could not be utilized to maintain the many Greek facilities erected through this program. Any construction USG might normally wish to have funded through infrastructure presumably would have to be unilaterally funded now.

e) Greek participation in NATO exercises would again seem to be excluded for foreseeable future, but slack might be taken up to great extent expanded program of bilateral exercises with US Navy, or even multilateral exercises (excluding Turkish units) without NATO identification.

f) Status of JUSMAGG should not be altered so long as Greece continues its extensive weapons modernization program. JUSMAGG's charter predates Greece's original entry into NATO, and it plays a significant role in assisting Hellenic Armed Forces modernization effort, so it should not suffer as result of recent withdrawal decision.

8. As indicated above, as GOG assesses meaning of its own decision and we are able to discuss matter with contacts at various levels, we shall refine this analysis.

Tasca

22. Paper Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency¹

Washington, August 29, 1974.

ATHENS' FRUSTRATIONS WITH THE US AND THE PROSPECTS FOR THE GREEK LEFT

The Greek Popular Mood

The Greeks are angry at the US because the alternatives are either very frustrating or very unpalatable. They should be angry at the Turks, and they are, but they cannot afford to respond militarily to the Turks because they know they probably could not win.

The other obvious alternative, blaming themselves, for the Cyprus disaster is also distasteful. Even though the Karamanlis government was not involved in the decision to oust Makarios, it would not be politic to overly chastise those who were at a time when Karamanlis is attempting to develop widespread support.

¹ Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry, Job 80-M01048A, Box 3, Greece, Folder 17. Secret; No Foreign Dissem; No Dissem Abroad; Background Use Only; Controlled Dissem. The paper was prepared in response to Kissinger's request for an assessment of current Greek resentment of the United States and was transmitted by a covering memorandum from Acting DCI Vernon Walters on August 29.

But someone has to be blamed for the humiliation Greeks have suffered over events in Cyprus in the past six weeks. The US became a likely target because of the alleged US "tilt" toward Turkey over the Cyprus issue. This allegation fell on fertile ground in Greece. Not only did the sense of national frustration have to be relieved in some fashion, but there is an underlying tendency among Greeks to believe that the "American factor" is the principal determinant of events in their area. This notion derives from a long history of great power involvement in Greek politics.

Karamanlis' Position

Karamanlis does not share the average Greek citizen's view about the extent of US responsibility for Greek reverses on Cyprus. Nevertheless, Karamanlis probably felt obliged to make some dramatic gesture to placate public opinion, and his actions against NATO and the US are designed, in part, to relieve this frustration.

By adopting an anti-US attitude and dangling the prospect that it could get worse, Athens no doubt hopes that Washington will be encouraged to influence the Turks to moderate their position. This type of diplomatic brinkmanship has limitations, however, and Athens has already shown signs of wanting to avoid irreparable damage to Greece's relations with the US and NATO. Great fanfare has been given to Athens' intention to withdraw from NATO, for example, but Greek officers have not yet been ordered to leave their posts at various NATO commands, and the Greek government is considering ways of maintaining various connections with NATO even as it indicates its intention to formally withdraw.

Finally, Karamanlis' step is of great importance to his political position. The moves against the US and NATO pre-empt, at least temporarily, the primary issue on which his government would be vulnerable to attack from the Greek left. This is not to say that Karamanlis has adopted an anti-US policy simply to secure a domestic political advantage. He is genuinely upset with US Cyprus policy, but he also recognizes that the anti-US gestures he has been making are popular and will give him time to consolidate his own political position.

Position of the Left

For the moment, the left is at a disadvantage because it is badly disorganized and divided into separate factions. There are several communist groups, but most appear to have grown more conservative during their years of political exile and are probably willing to limit their contest with Karamanlis to the ballot box.

The reported plans of maverick leftist Andreas Papandreou are less reassuring. Although he has reportedly cautioned his followers to avoid provocative actions in the near future, Papandreou plans to

resume his “unrelenting struggle” once the Cyprus issue subsides. According to a reliable source, this will entail a campaign of demonstrations and public disorders designed to topple the Karamanlis government and catapult Papandreu to power.

Karamanlis appears to have two principal options in dealing with excesses by Papandreu-led leftists. He could place severe limitations on leftist political expression and participation as he did during his previous administration. Such a policy would strengthen his position with the right, but it also could rally the left around Papandreu who might then be in a position to seriously challenge the government.

Alternately, Karamanlis may seek to coopt some of the left’s program and even some of its more moderate leaders in an effort to keep it divided and Papandreu isolated. This option could create some disaffection among Karamanlis’ supporters on the right, but he probably could convince them of the possible long run advantage of such a policy, particularly as it pertains to Papandreu.

Karamanlis’ performance to date, particularly his threat to leave NATO, suggests he favors courting the left. He has already included several representatives of the center and some moderate leftists in his cabinet. He has also toyed with the idea of offering a cabinet post to well-known leftist composer Mikis Theodorakis who could be expected to attract many youthful supporters away from Papandreu. He reportedly is considering legalizing the Moscow-backed communist party, particularly if he receives some sign that it might abandon its present close relationship with Papandreu.

The more moderate United Democratic Left is also showing signs of distancing itself from Papandreu. Ilias Iliou, its principal spokesman, reportedly believes Papandreu’s expected extremist tactics will hurt the left and intends to make every effort to isolate him. Shorn of support from the other leftist groups, most of which have considerable organizational experience, Papandreu’s loosely organized, amorphous movement could probably be contained by the Karamanlis government.

Karamanlis’ efforts to contain the left and deal with Papandreu could, however, be jeopardized either by a humiliating Cyprus settlement or successful Turkish encroachments in the Aegean. Such reverses would almost certainly strengthen the left, which would blame Karamanlis’ continued association with the west for any losses to Turkey. In such a situation, the left’s chances of assuming power would be enhanced.

Prospects for Relations with the US

If a Cyprus settlement that preserves Greek dignity can be negotiated and further troubles in the Aegean avoided, US-Greek relations

may improve. At best, however, they would likely be less cordial and more businesslike than they were during Karamanlis' first term. According to a senior Greek foreign ministry official, Karamanlis does not want to "dismantle" Greece's cooperation with the US but he is inclined to "restructure it." This will reportedly involve, in the coming weeks and months, a renegotiation of the "modalities" of many of Greece's agreements with the US. The US sixth fleet homeporting agreement is a likely candidate for revision. The official emphasized, however, that Greece had no desire to abandon its place in the western camp or have the US relinquish its role as Greece's closest friend.

This view is probably shared by most members of the military who, until the present disillusion with the US role in the Cyprus issue, have been western oriented and very pro-American. The military reportedly viewed Karamanlis' moves against the US and NATO as regrettable but necessary given the US failure to give more support to the Greek case on Cyprus. This appears, however, to have been an emotional reaction and most military men would probably not want to pursue such moves any further and might even prefer they be rescinded once emotions are cooled. The armed forces high command, for example, has concluded [*less than 1 line not declassified*] that Greece's withdrawal from NATO would create havoc in its defense establishment and leave it incapable of defending itself. Moreover, the military and probably Karamanlis recognize that too hostile a policy against the US could cause it to "tilt" even closer to Turkey. Consequently, Karamanlis will probably be aiming to limit the damage to Greek relations with the US and NATO arising from the Cyprus problem, and not exacerbate it.

At the same time, Karamanlis is looking forward to a closer relationship with Europe. He is motivated in this direction by the political and economic benefits of closer integration into the European Economic Community and related institutions. He is also looking for an alternate arms supplier because he believes US and Greek interests do not coincide in the revived Greco-Turkish rivalry to the extent they do vis-à-vis the threat from the Soviet bloc.

The French are the obvious candidate for the Greeks to look to for assistance because they are the world's third largest arm supplier, because of their own loose relationship with NATO and because Karamanlis has established pro-French sentiments during his eleven years of exile in Paris. The French, meanwhile, are anxious to accommodate the Greeks for the same reasons and because they are concerned over what they see as the vulnerability of the Karamanlis government to a challenge from the Greek left.

France and the other European states also have appeared anxious to encourage the trend toward democratization in Greece and prevent

a drift toward neutralism. They have been receptive to the Greek initiative for closer ties and are expected soon to unfreeze Greece's association with the EC and readmit her to the Council of Europe.

If Things Turned Really Sour

Should Greece be forced to accept a humiliating settlement over Cyprus or if it does not receive what it considers adequate US backing in the Aegean controversy, the Karamanlis government would be under severe pressure to eliminate the US presence in Greece. This pressure would emerge from the left but it would probably encompass most, if not all, Greek political groupings and would even receive support among substantial segments of the military, particularly the junior officer corps. In such a situation, Karamanlis would probably terminate all bilateral agreements with the US and either swing completely toward Europe or adopt a neutralist posture.

Should Karamanlis fail to take severe action in such circumstances, his government would either be voted out of office or overthrown by a coalition of leftists, both in and out of the military. A new government, which would almost certainly have a leftist or at least neutralist orientation, would probably sever remaining ties between Greece and the US.

23. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization¹

Washington, August 30, 1974, 1945Z.

191420. Subject: Greece and NATO. Ref: USNATO 4524; Athens 6210.²

1. Letter from PM Caramanlis to President Ford (Athens 6210), which UK also has received and which Embassy Athens assumes has been delivered to other allies, indicates that "Greece shall recover forthwith over her entire territory, airspace and territorial waters full exercise of her sovereignty which was heretofore limited on account of her

¹ Source: Department of State, RG 84, Athens Embassy Files: Lot 96 F 335, Greece, Box 1, DEF 4–6 1974, Greek Withdrawal. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Repeated to all NATO capitals, USCINCEUR, USLOSACLANT, USNMR SHAPE, and USDOCOSOUTH.

² Telegram 4524 from USNATO, August 22, and telegram 6210 from Athens, August 29, are *ibid.*

participation in NATO and as a result of the permanent presence on Greek soil of foreign military installations and facilities or of the regular use of Greek airspace and territorial waters by foreign military aircraft and naval vessels. Greece is willing to examine with her allies the practical measures called for by the implementation of these decisions." The allies thus face the need to begin considering approaches to be taken in dealing with GOG, based on careful consideration of implications of full or partial Greek withdrawal from NATO's integrated military structure, as well as possible steps to encourage Greece to reconsider its position. (We are considering implications for US facilities in Greece and will provide further guidance as appropriate on this aspect.)

2. Accordingly, you should initiate informal bilateral discussions with SYG Luns and selected allies (UK, FRG, Italy and Belgium or Netherlands) on implications of Greek decision. Our initial thinking is that France should be excluded from this circle since France is not a member of the DPC, though we would welcome your views on holding talks also with French at NATO. For the present, and in order to avoid any indications to Greece that other allies are acting precipitately, all discussions should be conducted on a highly confidential basis. In initiating discussions, we believe USNATO could draw appropriately on the excellent analysis contained USNATO 4524, identifying it as Mission analysis.

3. A principal objective of consultations would be to consider with key allies development of a common "damage assessment," outlining the impact on the NATO and Greek defense postures of Greek withdrawal and defining the magnitude of increased tasks which will have to be shared to close resulting defense gap. In the course of such a study, it may also be possible to identify "pressure points" to be used in discussions between the other DPC allies and Greece on the shape of future defense cooperation in the event of Greek withdrawal. We see as the benefit of this the development of a heightened awareness on the part of other allies of the potential implications of Greek withdrawal and of coordinated tactics aimed at promoting Greek reconsideration of their decision.

4. In the course of discussions, you may draw as appropriate on the following additional considerations.

5. France's withdrawal from NATO followed several years of signaled French dissatisfaction and partial withdrawals of French forces (i.e., naval) from participation in NATO activities. Postulated on a calculated Gaullist policy, France sought and gained greater "independence," and expanded its global as well as European influence at least partially because of its break with NATO. Greece's proposed withdrawal, however, appears based almost entirely on a desire to find a

public scapegoat for its humiliation by Turkey. This suggests that basically cosmetic face-saving devices (e.g., restructuring of subordinate AFSOUTH commands to separate Greek and Turkish forces) could, after Cyprus tempers cool, greatly help Greek leadership rationalize a reconsideration to their public. We strongly hope the Greek leadership over time may conclude that withdrawal from NATO's military structure would not only expose Greece to greater pressures from the Warsaw Pact, but also weaken it further in relation to Turkey which already has shown an interest in assuming some of Greece's former NATO military responsibilities in the Eastern Mediterranean. These factors would likely add to other pressures on the Greek Government to find ways over time of perpetuating as many links as possible with the alliance, in contrast to the French position.

6. Even if it withdrew from integrated military activities, Greece would remain bound by the provisions of the North Atlantic Treaty and would sit in the NAC. However, it would be reasonable to assume that, as principal gestures of disengagement, Greece, like France, would not continue to sit in the Defense Planning Committee (DPC), nor would it assign officers except in a liaison capacity to the NATO military headquarters. We assume, too, that absence from the DPC would also entail Greek non-participation in NDAC and the NPG. [*1 line not declassified*]

7. Beyond this, we agree with the view expressed in USNATO 4524 that, because of its economic weakness and exposed military position, Greece may seek to engage itself more fully than France in other institutions and activities associated with the integrated military structure of the alliance. Greece may judge that, by staying somehow linked in bilateral military arrangements with the US it is preserving a central element of its security policy, [*4½ lines not declassified*].

8. For both military and financial reasons, we suspect that Greece is likely to seek continued involvement in NADGE, NATO's air defense, early warning and other communications systems and NATO weapons research and development. It would also clearly be in Greece's interest to continue to participate in the infrastructure program, now paying for military construction in Greece at the rate of about \$15 million per quarter. However, it is difficult to see how Greece could continue to benefit from the infrastructure program as long as Greece refused to be part of the NATO integrated military structure, a prerequisite to having facilities qualify under NATO infrastructure criteria. Greece would also likely be interested in continued participation in NATO military exercises, and in maintaining the closest possible liaison with NATO military authorities charged with developing integrated defense plans for southern Europe. Such arrangements are conceivable, though they would complicate planning and implementation

and, in any event, Turkey would remain in a position to constantly exercise a check on the quality and quantity of Greek participation.

9. It is also possible that Greece would agree that the NATO air weapons training center and NATO missile firing installations could be made available on some reimbursable basis to NATO forces. Similarly, it might be prepared to continue operation on NATO's behalf of naval communications facilities. Too, the Greeks like France likely will be prepared to provide overflight rights. However, the Greeks cannot undercut the alliance military posture to the extent the French could (and still can) by prohibiting such flights.

10. While recognizing the possibility of creating a unique relationship tailored for Greece, and willing to carefully consider any Greek proposal, the risks of encouraging Greece to assume it will continue to have all of its previous benefits without past costs is that it would set an example for other allies, and thus over the longer term could lead to a serious degradation of NATO's military structure. Thus, it would seem preferable to leave Greece in the position of demandeur, should it withdraw, and to deal with Greek requests for continued military cooperation in a way that would lead Greece back to full military integration. As the Secretary stated on August 19: ". . . we assume that all of our allies, including Greece, join in collective defense in their own interests. We are willing to strengthen these common alliance ties and to help the Greek Government in any way possible. We will not be pressured by threat of withdrawal from the alliance. . . ."

11. Insofar as work of the alliance at NATO headquarters and elsewhere is concerned, we believe that it should move forward, insofar as possible on a "business as usual" basis. As issues arise, we would be prepared to deal with them as required. Moreover, we recognize, for example, that military exercises may have to be altered or cancelled, and we are already dealing with these case by case.

12. In sum, it should be up to the Greek Government to take the initiative to alter its relationships with its allies; we must avoid even the suggestion of making GOG take undesirable decisions because of perceived pressures by her NATO allies. Finally, it will be in our interest to extend as long as possible discussions with Greece on its future NATO role in order to give time for tempers to cool and to avoid prematurely closing doors to Greek participation.

Ingersoll

24. Telegram From the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to the Departments of State and Defense¹

Brussels, September 10, 1974, 2205Z.

4875. Subject: Cyprus: Informal Meeting of the Thirteen on the Karamanlis Letter. Refs: (A) USNATO 4844; (B) USNATO 4845; (C) State 198059.²

1. As reported in Refs A and B, Secretary General Luns convened an informal meeting of the thirteen PermReps (minus Greece and Turkey) at 4:00 p.m. September 10 to discuss a response to the Karamanlis letter. Luns said that although it was up to each government to respond individually, he thought it useful to have a discussion so that the views of PermReps could be exchanged.

2. He called initially on U.K. Ambassador Peck who essentially repeated points in British text provided in Ref A.³

3. In general, most PermReps favored British approach, in essence a low-key reply of an unprovocative nature. De Staercke (Belgium) described the informal meeting of the thirteen as a way to develop a basket of ideas from which various allies could draw in their responses. He strongly supported the outline provided by Ambassador Peck. Hartogh (Netherlands), Busch (Norway), Menzies (Canada), Svart (Denmark) and Boss (Germany) endorsed the general British approach. All indicated their governments felt that a reply to the Karamanlis letter was required. De Staercke was particularly emphatic about the obligation to respond.

4. Rumsfeld, drawing on Ref C, said Washington questioned whether a written response to the Karamanlis letter was required at this time, but that in any event Washington was interested in having the views of the other allies. Rumsfeld said that if Washington decided to reply, he personally felt that it could be much along the lines advocated by the allies. If and when a response is made, it could be short

¹ Source: Department of State, RG 84, Athens Embassy Files: Lot 96 F 335, Box 1, DEF 4–6 1974, Greek Withdrawal. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Repeated Priority to all NATO capitals, the Mission in Geneva, USUN, Nicosia, USNMR SHAPE, USCINCEUR, and USDOCOSOUTH.

² Telegrams 4844 and 4845, both from USNATO, September 9, and telegram 198059 to USNATO, September 10, are *ibid*.

³ As reported in telegram 4844, the British Government preferred a short and unprovocative reply that merely acknowledged Karamanlis' message, assured him of the mutual value of Greece's membership in NATO, and expressed hope that the present strain would not unduly damage the alliance or joint efforts to improve East-West relations.

and unprovocative, essentially indicating that the letter had been received, that the subject was important, and that we wished to consult with our allies on its implications. Rumsfeld emphasized the U.S., while questioning the need for a written reply now, was not advocating that no response whatsoever be made.

5. Catalano (Italy) noted the particular importance of the Greek matter to Italy because of Italy's geographic location. In addition to supporting a response to the Karamanlis letter, he felt it was necessary to conduct studies within the alliance to examine the implications of a Greek withdrawal and also to determine what needs to be done to close the security gap which would be created by Greece's withdrawal. Luns indicated that a study of this matter was under way. He presumably had in mind the work being done by the international staff.

6. Ambassador De Rose (France) appreciated being invited to the meeting and was there because France had also received the Karamanlis letter and they were interested in hearing the views of the other allies. However, they were, for obvious reasons, in no position to give their views on how the French would reply to the letter or to suggest to other allies how they should reply.

7. The Secretary General indicated he would be meeting with Greek Foreign Minister Mavros at 6:00 p.m. tomorrow (September 11). He would see him again at a dinner the following day along with Ambassador De Staercke. Luns said he intends to dispel any impressions Mavros may have that NATO failed to call a Foreign Ministers meeting based upon a Greek request. He also said that he would emphasize to Mavros that the Government of Greece had signed a contract when it joined the alliance and that it could not unilaterally decide under what conditions it would withdraw. Luns will also emphasize to him the implications of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, indicating that once Greece withdraws from the military side of NATO, military assistance would not be automatic.

8. *Comment:* It is obvious that the other allies intend to respond in the near future to the Karamanlis letter along the lines suggested by the British. Mission recommends that in light of these allied intentions Washington give early consideration to the position it wishes to adopt concerning a response to the Karamanlis letter. U.S. failure to respond to the letter while all of our other allies do so might be misinterpreted and could be prejudicial to improving our relations with the Government of Greece.

Rumsfeld

25. Telegram From the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to the Departments of State and Defense¹

Brussels, September 16, 1974, 2050Z.

5002. Subject: Greece and NATO.

1. At DPC meeting afternoon September 16 (which Greek representatives did not attend), SYG Luns announced that he had been officially advised by Greek delegation to NATO that henceforth Greek representatives will not attend meetings of Defense Planning Committee (DPC), Executive Working Group (EWG), Defense Review Committee (DRC) and Nuclear Planning Group (NPG). Luns added that SACEUR has received official notification from the Commander in Chief of Hellenic Armed Forces that effective August 14, 1974, all units of the Greek Army, Navy and Air Force are withdrawn from assignment, commitment, or ear-marking to NATO.

2. De Staercke (Belgian) remarked that it was curious that GOG had not withdrawn its representatives from NATO Military Committee (MILCOM). Although recognizing that Greece would wish maintain effective liaison with NATO military authorities while sorting out and adjusting its relations with the integrated military structure of the alliance, De Staercke said it was illogical that Greeks in MILCOM should be in position to decide or even block normal NATO business. Logically, he maintained, Greece should become one party of new contractual relationship, NATO being second party. Luns agreed, saying that he would speak with Greek Ambassador calling attention to manner in which France, while not member of MILCOM, maintains liaison with that body.

3. Rumsfeld expressed agreement with De Staercke observing that DPC has every bit as much pending business to define NATO–Greece linkage as MILCOM. It would therefore be logical to have same GOG relationship to both groups. Menzies (Canada) said MILCOM meetings divided into sections A (which France attended) and B (which it did not attend) seemed a useful model. Picking up Rumsfeld's point, De Staercke said that both DPC and MILCOM had to review all NATO relations with Greece in their totality and work out new modus operandi satisfactory to both parties.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Records of Henry Kissinger, 1973–1977, Entry 5403, Box 10, Nodis Memcons, 9/74. Confidential; Immediate. Repeated Priority to all NATO capitals, USNMR SHAPE, USCINCEUR, USLOSACLANT, USDOCOSOUTH, CINCUSAREUR, CINCUSAFE, and CINCUSNAVEUR.

4. Eralp (Turkey), while saying he might be speaking prematurely, pointed out that Greek withdrawal from NPG will raise the question of Greek/Turkish rotation in that body.

Rumsfeld

26. Intelligence Memorandum¹

SR IM 74-2

Washington, October 1974.

IMPLICATIONS OF THE GREEK WITHDRAWAL FROM MILITARY PARTICIPATION IN NATO

Principal Conclusions

The decision of Greece to withdraw from military participation in NATO could have important consequences for the defense of the Alliance's southern flank. How significant they will be depends on how the Greek government decides to implement its decision in practical terms.

—The decision to withdraw was probably taken without full consideration of its consequences for Greece. As these consequences become more clearly understood, the Greeks may develop second thoughts on the subject.

—Although the Greeks probably had the French example in mind when they made their decision, it is unlikely that they will attempt to follow the French precedent closely. Unlike France at the time of its withdrawal, Greece possesses no nuclear weapons and all of its contiguous neighbors are potentially hostile.

—The leaders of the Greek armed forces have concluded that military withdrawal from NATO would seriously weaken the country's defense. They will probably attempt to keep the Greek position as vague and tentative as possible and may eventually press for a return to the NATO military structure.

—In the event of a Warsaw Pact attack in the southern region, Greece probably would enter the war in its own interests, regardless of whether formal NATO treaty obligations existed. Greek capabilities in such a case would, however, be degraded if, in the years prior to the

¹ Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DDI Files, Job 99-T01488R, Box 19, Folder 18, CIA/OSR IM 68-1/IM 75-03. Secret; No Foreign Dissem; No Dissem Abroad; Controlled Dissem; Background Use Only. This memorandum was prepared in the Theater Forces Division of the Office of Strategic Research of the Central Intelligence Agency in consultation with analysts of the Defense Intelligence Agency.

attack, there had been no joint military planning or exercises with other NATO states.

The future relationship of Greece to NATO—including decisions on the questions of maintaining [*less than 1 line not declassified*] foreign bases in Greece, and continuing joint planning and exercises—will be determined primarily by the outcome of the Cyprus crisis and other issues outstanding with Turkey. If the Cyprus affair can be settled without further damage to Greek dignity and no new crisis develops in the Aegean, relations between Greece and NATO will improve, but the Greeks' bitter memories of the crisis would make it unlikely that relations with NATO could ever be restored to pre-Cyprus terms.

Implications of the Greek Withdrawal From Military Participation in NATO

The decision of Greece to withdraw from military participation in NATO could have important consequences for the defense of the Alliance's southern flank. How significant they will be depends on how the Greek government decides to implement its decision in practical terms. NATO's experience with France has shown that such a withdrawal does not preclude the continuation of some measures of military cooperation.

Greece probably will decide, as did France, that it is expedient in terms of national interests to maintain some military ties with other NATO members, though they may be informal and unacknowledged. This is especially likely because of the problems Greece has traditionally experienced with its neighbors. The Greek military in particular will continue to be concerned about a possible threat emanating from neighboring Communist states, especially in view of the uncertainty surrounding future developments in Yugoslavia. The future development of Greek relations with NATO, however, will be determined by a number of factors, notably the outcome of the Cyprus crisis and the domestic political situation, which cannot be predicted on the basis of current information.

The decision to withdraw from military participation in NATO was probably taken without full consideration of its possible consequences for Greece. It stemmed from frustration over the inability or unwillingness of the US and other NATO allies to persuade Turkey to exercise restraint in its Cyprus policy, rather than from a calculation that such an action would be of positive advantage. A strong tide of popular emotion made it necessary for the Karamanlis regime to make some dramatic gesture, and the decision to withdraw bolstered his domestic position. While the Greeks probably hoped that such a gesture would cause NATO to put pressure on Turkey to moderate its position, Athens evidently did not study how it would implement

its decision or consider the practical consequences for the Greek armed forces.

Steps to Withdrawal

The possibility of Greek withdrawal from NATO had emerged in July during the first phase of the Cyprus crisis. After the Turkish invasion the Ioannides regime issued an order recalling Greek officers from Brussels and other NATO headquarters, although this was later modified to a notice of possible recall as part of the country's general mobilization. The Greeks did withdraw their personnel from the NATO regional headquarters in Izmir, Turkey, and discontinued cooperation with Turkey in the areas of NATO communications and joint planning.

The 14 August announcement by the Karamanlis government concerning Greece's withdrawal from NATO offered few details. It stated that, in view of the Alliance's inability "to stem Turkey from creating a situation of conflict between two allies," Greek forces would be withdrawn from NATO and that Greece would only participate in the political activities of the Alliance. Since that announcement, some government spokesmen have maintained that the decision is irrevocable, while others have hinted that it might be reconsidered. Athens has been proceeding, however, as if it intended to carry through.

Prime Minister Karamanlis' letter to NATO heads of government in late August left little doubt that Greek forces had been placed under national command. Subsequently, official notice was given to NATO by the Greek commander in chief that Greek forces were no longer NATO assigned or earmarked. Greece has also announced its intention to cease sending representatives to the Defense Planning Committee, the Defense Review Committee, the Executive Working Group, and the Nuclear Planning Group. The Greeks plan to continue to participate in the Military Committee (composed of the chiefs of staff of all member countries except France and Iceland) during the withdrawal period.

The withdrawal steps taken by the Greeks so far could be reversed merely by an announcement to that effect. In addition, Athens has not removed its officers assigned to the various NATO headquarters (with the exception of Izmir). The other NATO members, while still hoping for an eventual Greek return to full participation, have nevertheless begun to prepare for negotiations with the Greeks on the withdrawal.

The French Example

The Greeks probably had the French example in mind when they made their decision and may attempt to follow at least the general outlines of that precedent as they implement their withdrawal. The Greeks almost certainly recognize, however, that there are differences between their situation and that of France at the time of its withdrawal from

military participation in NATO in 1966. The significance of these differences for the Greek position is striking:

—France was already a nuclear power, with both warheads and the means of delivering them; [*1½ lines not declassified*].

—France had an independent arms industry and was in fact a major exporter of weapons; Greece is heavily dependent on other countries for major weapon systems and even for many smaller weapons.

—France was capable of fulfilling its force goals without foreign assistance; Greece has traditionally relied on such assistance.

—France did not perceive any military threat from her neighbors; all four of Greece's contiguous neighbors are potentially hostile.

In view of such important differences, it appears unlikely that the Greeks will attempt to follow the French precedent blindly, but they may adapt it to their special circumstances.

Protecting the Southern Flank

One major implication of the Greek decision is that the Greek government, like the French, would no longer consider its armed forces under any obligation to assist militarily a fellow NATO member that became the victim of Warsaw Pact aggression. In theory this would have some potential consequences for NATO's defense of northern or central Europe. If the Pact were planning an attack on these regions, any concern by the Soviets about a NATO response on their southern flank might be lessened if Greece were not a military member of the Alliance. In fact, however, Greece's primary mission in NATO war plans does not involve her forces in any other capacity than to counter a Pact attack in the southern region. This mission would call for Greek forces both to engage directly in combat operations and to provide support for other NATO units reinforcing the area.

Were such an attack to occur, the danger to Greek interests would be such that, formal NATO treaty obligations or not, Greece probably would feel compelled to enter the war in its own interests, although its reaction would depend on an assessment of the purpose and aims of the Pact attack and its prospects for success. Greek capabilities in such a case would, however, undoubtedly be degraded if, in the years prior to the attack, there had been no joint planning of military activities with other NATO states, especially the US and Turkey. The Greek forces would be at a disadvantage if they had not been taking part in peacetime military exercises with such states.

[Omitted here is a map of Europe and the Mediterranean area showing the NATO members.]

An important question for the future, therefore, is whether Greece will be willing to continue such exercises and joint planning for the use of its armed forces in wartime, despite the lack of a treaty commitment to military cooperation or a formal integrated military structure.

The Greek armed forces probably will favor the continuation of such activities, and liaison may be maintained with such NATO military organs as the Defense Planning Committee and Nuclear Defense Affairs Committee even if Greece is no longer formally a member of them.

Arms Acquisition

Another question is how the acquisition of modern weapons and equipment by the Greek armed forces will be affected by their withdrawal from the NATO system. Traditionally Greece has received NATO guidance in the formulation of its force goals and has been heavily dependent on foreign military assistance for the fulfillment of these goals. If such assistance does not continue, the effect on Greek military capabilities will certainly be adverse, although the Greeks probably will try to compensate for this by increasing their own military expenditures and by efforts to obtain support from other states, particularly France. Even if NATO assistance does continue, it is probable that Greece will try to avoid relying on it exclusively and will attempt to establish ties with other states.

The French have indicated a willingness generally to support Greece in its new policy course. The nature of such support will apparently include the supplying of advanced weapon systems, possibly on easy credit terms; political support for the Greek effort to move closer to the European community; and advice concerning various legal and technical aspects of its new relationship with NATO. The French will probably provide as much support as they can along these lines, but a French spokesman has acknowledged the dissimilarities between the Greek situation and that of France at the time of its withdrawal.

[less than 1 line not declassified]

[1 paragraph (16 lines) not declassified]

Bases in Greece

Another question is whether Greece, like France, will demand the closure of foreign military bases on its soil. Some of these bases are NATO installations, but most are the result of bilateral agreements between Greece and the US. Of particular interest:

—US facilities, actual and projected, for the support of Sixth Fleet units. The loss of these facilities would be an inconvenience and would make it more difficult to counter Soviet naval activities in the Mediterranean, but would not constitute an insurmountable obstacle to Sixth Fleet operations. There have been some indications that Greece will eventually terminate the agreement whereby a US destroyer squadron is home-ported there, but no definite steps have yet been taken.

—NATO training facilities on the island of Crete. These are used by Alliance members primarily for training air and air defense crews. Such training cannot be conveniently conducted in the crowded confines of central Europe; other training facilities would have to be

found, resulting in increased expenditures and disruption of training plans.

—[1 paragraph (5 lines) not declassified]

—US and NATO communications facilities. Loss of these facilities would significantly reduce the capability to communicate with Turkey and US naval units in the eastern Mediterranean. Some communications to Turkey have already been blocked by the Greeks.

—US air facilities. Loss of these facilities, plus those maintained by the Greek air force, would reduce NATO's capability to augment its forces in the southern region, as well as the US capability to support operations in the Middle East. Some restrictions have already been placed on US use of these installations. In the event that US air facilities were to be closed down entirely, however, the Greeks would probably favor some contingency planning, either with the US or with NATO, for their use in a crisis.

It should also be noted that Greek air defense installations operate as part of the NATO integrated system. A refusal to continue cooperation in this system would reduce NATO early warning radar coverage of the sector encompassing the Balkans and the adjoining seas. Greece has already stopped passing early warning information to the NATO net, but has made no formal decision to end this cooperation. NATO's experience with France has shown that a country can continue to participate in the air defense system even after other measures of military cooperation are terminated.

Maintaining a Tentative Position

How Greece will decide such questions remains unclear. The leaders of the armed forces have concluded that military withdrawal from NATO would seriously weaken the country's defense. They recognize that Karamanlis' decision was probably necessary under the circumstances, but will attempt to minimize its impact on the relationship of the armed forces to other NATO forces, especially those of the US. If the Cyprus question can be resolved on terms satisfactory to Greece, the armed forces may eventually press for a return to the NATO military structure. However, such pressure is highly unlikely in the near future. The main effort of the military leadership will probably be confined to keeping the Greek position as vague and tentative as possible.

Premier Karamanlis will be generally sympathetic to the military's arguments. However, he is also aware that popular emotions are running strongly against continued ties with the US and NATO and that his decision to withdraw Greek forces from the alliance has deprived the left of a powerful weapon it might have used against his government. Thus far, Karamanlis has been successful in his efforts to neutralize the left on this issue without actually getting into the practical details. Sooner or later, however, he will have to make more definite decisions on the questions of [less than 1 line not declassified] bases, joint planning, exercises, and so forth.

Outlook for NATO

Karamanlis' decisions will be determined not only by the domestic situation but by the outcome of the Cyprus crisis and other issues outstanding with Turkey. A Cyprus settlement humiliating to Greece or successful Turkish encroachments in the Aegean (involving, for example, the exploitation of oil deposits) would strengthen the Greek tendency to blame NATO and the US for Greek failures. In such a situation any Greek government would probably break completely with NATO militarily and possibly even politically.

If the Cyprus affair can be settled without further damage to Greek dignity and no new crisis develops in the Aegean, relations between Greece and NATO will improve, but the Greeks' bitter memories of the crisis would make it unlikely that relations with NATO could ever be restored to pre-Cyprus terms. At the very best NATO will have to cope with a situation in which there is little or no cooperation between the two alliance members in the eastern Mediterranean. Additional restrictions will probably be placed on the use of US and NATO installations, even if such installations are not actually reduced, and any plans for future installations—for example, to home-port a carrier—will be impractical.

More generally, current Greek behavior may encourage other NATO members to contemplate a similar policy. Several members, [1 line not declassified] have recently experienced difficulties with their military role in the Alliance. Although their problems are very different from those of Greece, they might be tempted to use the French and Greek precedents to justify some attempts at disassociation, thus creating a centrifugal tendency that could seriously weaken NATO.

27. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State¹

Athens, November 1, 1974, 1629Z.

7908. Subject: Return of Makarios to Cyprus: Attitude of Greek Government. Ref: State 240013 (Tosec 445).²

1. Caramanlis and the Greek Government at the moment view Makarios, as they view almost everything else, in the light of the coming Greek elections on November 17. Thus far in the Greek electoral campaign Cyprus has been a national rather than an electoral issue. Because Greece's options are so limited, it has been difficult if not impossible for candidates opposing Caramanlis to argue plausibly that if elected they would handle the issue better than he has. Caramanlis himself has adopted a cautious and, in our view, realistic strategy, emphasizing that the Cyprus crisis was triggered by the colonels whose shortsightedness was exploited by the Turks to move toward their longstanding objective of partition. He has been careful not to indicate publicly what he would regard to be an acceptable Cyprus settlement or how the Greek Cypriot leaders should compose their differences either with the Turks or among themselves.

2. To be effective this strategy requires Caramanlis to give quiet support to Clerides while avoiding an open break with Makarios with whom Caramanlis has a long history of troubled relations. Caramanlis realizes that Makarios has it in his power to convert Cyprus into a Greek political issue simply by stating publicly that the Caramanlis government is not doing enough to defend Greek Cypriot interests. Andreas Papandreou in particular would seize a statement of this kind and use it against Caramanlis in the campaign. Of all the leading candidates in the Greek election, Papandreou has been the most outspoken, calling for the early return of Makarios to Cyprus. He and the Archbishop cooperated in the past, notably in 1964, when their combined efforts sabotaged the Acheson plan. Their views on foreign policy would appear to be very similar, favoring non-alignment with an anti-Western bias.

3. Papandreou's evident desire to turn the Cyprus issue against Caramanlis has thus far been frustrated by the reticence of Makarios.

¹ Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for Middle East and South Asia, 1974–1977, Box 11, Greece, Nodis to Secretary of State 4. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Sent with a request to pass to other posts as desired.

² Telegram 240013 to Islamabad, Kabul, Ankara, and additional posts, November 1, is about the return of Makarios to Cyprus. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1974)

Little as he may like Caramanlis, the Archbishop is doubtless inhibited from openly criticizing the Prime Minister by the knowledge that Caramanlis is likely to emerge from the elections with a strong parliamentary majority. Makarios cannot, therefore, afford to antagonize him at this stage. The result has been an uneasy truce which neither Caramanlis nor the Archbishop has any reason to disturb for the time being.

4. We conclude from the foregoing that Caramanlis will continue to handle the Archbishop in a gingerly way before the elections, that his leverage after the elections will increase in direct proportion to the margin of his success, but that in the future as in the past he will use his influence discreetly and stop well short of the point where he would risk an open break with the Archbishop. Caramanlis might be willing to suggest to Makarios before November 17th that the Archbishop postpone his return to the island, but it is most unlikely that he would be willing to make a real issue of it.

Kubisch

28. Intelligence Memorandum¹

Washington, November 5, 1974.

SUBJECT

The Greek Elections

PRINCIPAL CONCLUSIONS

Prime Minister Karamanlis will win this month's election; the size of his victory will determine how flexible he can be on Cyprus, NATO, and in relations with the US.

If he does not gain an outright majority in parliament, he will form a coalition government with the Center Union–New Forces led by George Mavros. Such a coalition government would be much like that which took over this summer when the military stepped down.

¹ Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry, Job 80–M01048A, Box 3, Folder 17, Greece. Secret; No Foreign Dissem; Background Use Only. Prepared in the CIA. According to an attached note from [name not declassified] NIO/WE to Acting DCI Walters, November 5, the NSC requested the memorandum.

Popular discontent with seven years of military rule, plus anti-American sentiment over Cyprus, provide the left wing with promising terrain to exploit; but the left is split between Andreas Papandreou's Panhellenic Socialist movement and the United Left. They nonetheless may take up to one third of the national vote, with 20 percent going to Papandreou and 10–12 percent to the United Left. The left therefore will be a vocal factor in the new parliament.

Right wing forces seem unlikely to win more than 10 percent of the vote. Although pro-junta forces cannot be discounted as potential perpetrators of a coup against Karamanlis, they probably lack sufficient support in the army to bring Karamanlis down. This could change should the army eventually conclude that the government was drifting too far left or that there was a danger of Papandreou gaining power.

The Greek economy, although still troubled by a combination of inflationary pressures and balance of payments problems, does not pose immediate problems for Athens; to a certain extent, the Karamanlis government will continue to benefit from the effects of the austerity program instituted by the junta in 1973.

A Karamanlis-led government will not accept a solution on Cyprus that does not include some satisfactory resolution of the Greek Cypriot refugee problem; failing that, it would rather have no solution at all.

Athens is in an ambiguous holding action as far as military participation in NATO is concerned. Given progress on Cyprus, Karamanlis would probably eventually rejoin the military side of NATO. In the absence of a settlement, he might move further away, but not irrevocably.

Although Karamanlis can be expected to try to improve relations with the US, the public relationship will remain correct and businesslike in the absence of a Cyprus settlement. The Greek-Turkish dispute over sovereignty in the Aegean may also influence the Greek attitude toward the US and NATO, and Karamanlis probably would hope for backing from the US and other NATO countries should the going get very rough with Turkey on this question. In any case, Athens will continue its attempts to expand economic and political relations with Western Europe as insurance against further deterioration in Greek relations with the US.

1. Greek voters go to the polls on November 17 in the first parliamentary election in 10 years. No one knows for sure what effect seven and a half years of military dictatorship will have on the electorate, nor to what extent the trouble on Cyprus and in relations with Turkey will rally the voters around the commanding figure of Prime Minister Karamanlis. The old political parties are in disarray and the new ones are just staking out their territory. The election is taking place under such unique circumstances that the traditional patterns of

voting—heavily influenced by patronage and family ties—may not apply. Estimates of the outcome are necessarily tentative, particularly in the absence of scientific polling.

2. The new parliament is empowered to revise the constitution. If Prime Minister Karamanlis gets an absolute majority of seats, he will be able to tailor the constitution to his needs—setting up either a strong presidency or a strong prime ministership. If Karamanlis does not do sufficiently well in the election, there will be much political in-fighting over the form of the constitution and the nature of the governing coalition.

3. The election is to be followed within 45 days by a referendum on the monarchy. The parties of the center and left oppose a return to the monarchy. Karamanlis has avoided taking a stand on the issue and without his support, the vote is not likely to re-establish the monarchy.

The Probable Outcome

4. Karamanlis' conservative New Democracy party is expected to win at least a plurality of votes in the elections. It may win a majority, but despite public statements to the contrary, Karamanlis and his aides are not confident at this point that they will be able to do so.²

5. A majority government under Karamanlis would be more flexible on Cyprus and more favorable to US and NATO interests than would a coalition, which would be forced to strike a compromise between differing personalities and policy views. The chances of Greece re-entering the military side of NATO would be best under a strong Karamanlis government.

6. Should Karamanlis fail to gain control of parliament, he will probably form a coalition government with the Center Union–New Forces led by former foreign minister George Mavros. Such a government would be similar to orientation to the one that took office last July when the military stepped down. There are few major ideological differences between Karamanlis and Mavros. They used to differ on the monarchy, with Mavros favoring a republic and Karamanlis, the King. The Prime Minister has changed his mind on the issue, however, and is taking a neutral stand on the return of the King. Mavros also favors harsher measures against individuals who collaborated with the military regimes than does Karamanlis.

² Political manipulation of the electoral laws is an important part of Greek politics. Under the present reinforced proportional representation law, drawn up in 1963 under a Karamanlis government, it is possible to win an absolute majority of seats in the 300-member parliament without a majority of the popular vote. The law favors large parties and works against small parties and coalitions. To enter the second distribution of seats, individual parties must win 17 percent of the votes, two-party coalitions 25 percent and three-party coalitions 30 percent. [Footnote in the original.]

7. Mavros, however, has been less pragmatic than Karamanlis regarding Cyprus and more favorable to the return of Archbishop Makarios to the island. He has also been more critical of the US and more insistent that the Greek withdrawal from NATO is irrevocable. Mavros' policy statements are often erratic, reflecting his personality, political ambitions, and the need to make concessions to the left wing of his party.

8. We have received reports that Karamanlis was dissatisfied with Mavros' performance as foreign minister and might replace him in a future cabinet. Mavros, however, has told Ambassador Kubisch that he and Karamanlis have already agreed on a post-electoral coalition irrespective of how well New Democracy does in the elections. We suspect that the purported agreement between the two is not so firm as Mavros portrays. Nonetheless, although Mavros might be a little difficult for the US to live with, a Center Union–New Democracy coalition would provide a stable and effective government which would keep Greece on a pro-West course and act responsibly on Cyprus and in the Aegean.

9. Such a government would try to avoid a Cyprus settlement which required Greek acceptance of the fait accompli brought about by Turkish military actions on Cyprus. If faced with such a prospect, it would prefer no settlement at all. An honorable settlement for the Greeks would involve some increase in the present distribution of land and wealth held by the Greek Cypriots, some withdrawal of the Turkish army, and the return of a significant number of Greek Cypriot refugees to the Turkish-controlled area. A Karamanlis–Mavros government would probably accept that some form of bi-regional federation is inevitable.

The Political Setting

10. Greek politics have traditionally been characterized by a multiplicity of parties. These parties have usually been clusters around political prima-donnas, rather than parties based on programs, philosophies or socio-economic interests. Of the 19 parties competing in next month's elections, the most important are Karamanlis' New Democracy and Mavros' Center Union–New Forces.³ The nucleus of Karamanlis' party is the conservative National Radical Union (ERE) which

³ The large number of parties is somewhat misleading. The election hinges essentially on five political groupings: New Democracy: —Konstantinos Karamanlis' conservative group;—Center Union–New Forces: Georgios Mavros' centrist group;—United Left: a temporary alliance of three Communist groups;—Panhellenic Socialist Movement: Andreas Papandreou's radical left group;—National Democratic Union: Petros Garoufalios' right wing anti-Communist group. [Footnote in the original.]

won a majority in parliamentary elections in 1955, 1958 and 1961. This was the party of the economic and political establishment until it was outpolled by the centrist, more progressive Center Union in 1963 and 1964. The Center Union won a clear majority of the vote in 1964 but was badly split a year later when over half the deputies left to form another party. The Center Union never became much more than a loose amalgamation of personally oriented groups, organized to oppose the predominant influence of the military, the Palace, and the political right. The "New Forces" group, which has joined the Center Union for the election, is a collection of prominent personalities, all relatively young and moderately liberal, who were associated with resistance to the juntas. Many of them had been in the left wing of Center Union prior to the military coup in 1967.

11. The parties that will compete in the elections are just beginning to announce slates of candidates and stake out positions on the issues. Because of the circumstances under which Karamanlis came to power, his prestige and popularity are high. Many view him as a necessary transition figure between military dictatorship and civilian rule and as the only leader who can forge sufficient national unity to deal with such sensitive issues as Cyprus and relations with Turkey. Karamanlis is also helped by the reinforced proportional representation electoral law, which favors larger parties.

12. All parties except New Democracy have criticized the timing of the elections, claiming that it does not allow them time to organize. Leftist Andreas Papandreou has denounced the elections as an "electoral coup" designed to prevent the left from making a good showing by depriving it of time to prepare. An early election works to Karamanlis' advantage as he is still riding the crest of a wave of popularity caused by the return to civilian rule.

13. Karamanlis' New Democracy slate includes 288 candidates, 194 of which are political debutantes. The New Democracy candidates are drawn from a broad spectrum of society, but the large number of political newcomers and unknowns would probably be a drawback in an election not held under crisis conditions. Breaking into Greek politics has always been difficult and the Greek voter is usually more influenced by traditional and patronage-related considerations than by programs or new faces. When the names of the candidates are published, however, it may well be that the list in each of the 56 electoral districts will in fact be headed by well known figures with the new faces lower on the list. Karamanlis is an old political pro, and it is probable that he knows what he is doing on this score.

The Left

14. The left is likely to benefit in some ways through reaction to seven years of military rule. Popular discontent with the military

governments has coincided with an increase in interest in Marxism among many Greek university students. Demography and political psychology suggest that the electoral base for the left may have broadened in the past decade. The cities now contain half the population, up from a third only a decade ago. Unions are weak, but there are more industrial and blue collar workers who are potential conscripts for the left. Anti-NATO, anti-American, pro-EC, pro-neutralist, and pro-domestic reform slogans appear to evince considerable popular response. Overall, the left has a promising terrain of national sentiment to exploit.

15. The Communist left was electorally tested in 1949 when 12 percent voted for the extreme left. During the subsequent two decades, when communists were forced to merge politically with the communist-front EDA, that party's vote ranged from 12 percent to 25 percent in national elections (12 percent in the last elections held in 1964). The 25 percent vote in 1958 was an aberration and the traditional strength of the Communists—still discredited for their role in the civil war—has been between 10–15 percent.

16. The left is now split between Andreas Papandreou's Panhellenic Socialist movement and the United Left. The latter grouping embraces the Moscow-backed Greek Communist Party (KKE-exterior), the dissident Communist Party (KKE-interior), and the communist-front United Democratic Left (EDA). The Moscow-backed party probably joined the alliance, which is not likely to last beyond the elections, as a result of Soviet pressure and financial inducement. The Soviets *reportedly* have given that party, legalized for the first time in more than a quarter of a century, more than \$2 million for its election campaign.⁴ A unified campaign by the United Left alliance will enable it to exploit the government's policy of giving equal time on national radio and TV to all major political groups. The United Left expects to lose votes to Andreas Papandreou, and by its own assessment—with which local observers agree—the United Left will probably not get more than 10–12 percent of the vote.

17. Andreas Papandreou, probably the most feared and controversial figure on the Greek political scene, is trying to carve out a constituency between the Communist left and the Center Union. But in many respects he is more radical than the Communists, who are eager to appear respectable and who thus have been circumspect in their behavior. Papandreou's ideology—intensely nationalist, militantly anti-American, anti-NATO, neutralist and vaguely socialist with a large dose of expediency—is ambivalent enough to attract a diverse constituency. Because his views are considered extreme, both the right

⁴ [2 lines not declassified] [Footnote is in the original.]

and center think they must head him off. [*less than 1 line not declassified*] he might get as much as 20 percent of the vote. Much depends on his ability to attract support from the left wing of the Center Union, which he had so far not been able to do. His campaign has gotten off to an unimpressive start.

The Army and the Extreme Right

18. Certain elements within the army are dissatisfied with the policies of the Karamanlis government, especially the legalization of the Communist Party and the ongoing purge of individuals who supported the military juntas. Some of these elements will support the right-wing anti-Communist National Democratic Union (EDE) led by Petros Garoufalios. Although the party is unlikely to get even 10 percent of the vote, any votes it does pick up will be drawn from Karamanlis' conservative constituency, the army, and former supporters of the junta. Although monarchist, EDE has avoided taking a stand on the return of the King.

19. Other discontented army elements will inevitably turn to coup-plotting but, for the time being, they seem to have adopted a wait and see attitude. The embassy's most recent estimate is that the junta forces, although still a factor that cannot prudently be discounted, do not have the necessary supporting base in the army to bring down Karamanlis. A prolonged period of stable rule under Karamanlis could lead to increased civilian control over the highly politicized army and a lessened threat of military intervention. Should the army eventually conclude that Karamanlis is being too lenient toward the Communists or allowing the kind of political climate to develop which could lead to the assumption of power by a leader like Andreas Papandreou, the danger of another military intervention would increase.

Economic Situation and Outlook

20. Under the junta, the Greek economy experienced six years of extremely rapid real growth—averaging 8.6 percent annually—but it overheated severely in 1973. Consumer prices shot up by 30 percent while the chronic trade deficit almost doubled to \$2.4 billion.

21. Faced with these mounting problems, the government imposed an austerity program late in 1973. The economy responded quickly, with industrial production falling 11 percent from January to June. The rate of inflation slackened at the same time, and in the second quarter some improvement was observed in the balance of payments—despite the impact of higher oil costs.

22. Just before its ouster, the junta decided to begin easing restraints. This policy was implemented by the new civilian government. The Cyprus crisis diverted men into the armed forces, delaying a production comeback, and disrupted the important tourist industry, but did not fundamentally alter the economic situation.

23. Some further policy easing—particularly of credit restraints—is likely by year’s end. Industrial production should begin a recovery, if it has not already done so, but probably will not equal its previous peak during the next six months. Real GNP growth this year will be close to zero but should recover substantially in 1975. Inflation and the external payments situation meanwhile have shown further improvement: a 10 percent inflation rate—one-third that of 1973—is possible for the year, while the current account deficit may be held slightly below last year’s \$1.2 billion. Foreign loans needed to cover this deficit have already been obtained.

24. In sum, the economic situation does not pose immediate problems for Athens, and to a certain extent the Karamanlis government is benefiting from the effect of the austerity program instituted by the junta.

The US and NATO

25. At the height of the recent wave of anti-US feeling caused by what the Greeks perceived as Washington’s failure to stop the Turks on Cyprus and its support of the former juntas, Karamanlis wryly remarked to an American official that he was the “last pro-American” in Greece. Given a working majority in parliament he can be expected to try to improve relations with the US, particularly if he can portray the US position on such issues as Cyprus in a positive light. Should the situation on Cyprus worsen, he would try to put increased pressures on the US. In the absence of a Cyprus settlement, public relations with the US will probably remain correct and businesslike. Prior to the elections, Karamanlis may make another gesture against NATO or US installations designed to show his independence but it is unlikely to be a significant one.

26. Greece is in an ambiguous holding action as far as its military participation in NATO is concerned. It has announced its intention to withdraw from NATO’s integrated military structure but has done little to implement it. While Greek representatives in Brussels do not attend meetings of the Defense Planning Committee and the Defense Review Committee, they do participate in meetings of the Military Committee and continue to discuss infrastructure matters. Behind the scenes they keep themselves informed on developments in meetings from which Greece has absented itself. Athens has announced its intention to send a representative to the next Nuclear Planning Group ministerial meeting. Greece has never threatened to leave the political side of NATO, and George Mavros has indicated a desire to be honorary president of the next spring’s ministerial session of the North Atlantic Council.

27. A Greek foreign ministry official has told the US embassy that—at Karamanlis’ request—he is currently drawing up a list of possible steps Greece might take to implement its withdrawal from NATO. He asked if the US government had an input to add. From the sug-

gestions that the official made—that the US might make a gesture by reducing its military installations somewhat—it appears that the Greeks are casting about for a visible gesture that would mollify Greek public opinion without irrevocably damaging its relations with the US.

28. Other officials have implied that decisions on NATO and US bases will be deferred until after the elections. Defense Minister Averoff has publicly hinted that, given satisfactory progress on Cyprus, Greece might rejoin NATO. Failing such progress, Karamanlis might move further away from NATO, but not irrevocably so since he needs the US and would continue to hope that the US would promote a better outcome on Cyprus; he is more likely to remain in the present holding action for some time.

29. The continuing Greek-Turkish dispute over sovereignty in the Aegean may also influence the Greek attitude toward the US and NATO. Karamanlis probably would hope for backing from the US and other NATO countries should the going get very rough with Turkey on this question. Strong governments in Athens and Ankara might be able to resolve their differences over the Aegean in the context of a Cyprus settlement, but negotiations would be long and difficult in any case.

30. Whether or not relations improve with the US, Athens will continue to strengthen its ties with France, Germany and the European Community. Relations with Europe had been frozen in the seven years of military rule, and with the return of a civilian government, a thaw was to be expected. The bad turn in relations with the US made the "European option" even more important to Athens as insurance in case relations with the US do not improve significantly. For their part, France, West Germany, and the other EC members hope to reciprocate Greek interest in a closer relationship, both through bilateral and EC channels. The development of the "European option" is limited, of course, by the requirement for the EC members to maintain some balance between Greece and Turkey (both EC associate members) and by the level of Greece's economic development which precludes immediate full membership in the EC. The extent to which Greece receives support from the European countries, however, will influence, though it would not guarantee, the longer-term survivability of moderate policies in Greece.

29. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State¹

Athens, November 15, 1974, 1655Z.

8236. Subject: Greek Elections: Background and Significance.

1. The Greek elections that will take place on Sunday, November 17, are likely to decide more than the identity of the next Prime Minister of Greece. Indeed that question was probably answered by the discredited colonels in July when they acquiesced in the return of Constantine Caramanlis to Athens and by the Greek people themselves when they greeted his return with a spontaneous outburst of emotion that has tinged almost everything that has happened since with anticlimax. There is no reason to doubt, nor any sign to contradict the general expectation that Caramanlis will be returned to power on Sunday with a clear parliamentary majority.

2. The more difficult and far-reaching question is what kind of society Greece has become in the ten years that have elapsed since the last election, and how the changes that have occurred will affect the theoretical basis of Greek political life. The Monarchist–Venizelist split that animated Greek democracy in the inter-war period was rendered meaningless by the civil war, at least to the politicians. It lingered on in the popular consciousness, as political myths often do, for another fifteen years, until it was generally revealed to be an anachronism in 1965 by the formation of a “Venizelist” cabinet supported by “Monarchist” votes in the Greek Parliament. The Stephanopoulos government of that year, it seems clear in retrospect, confirmed the bankruptcy of the old political system and prepared the way for the seven-year military receivership which ended last July.

3. What Sunday’s elections will decide is the context within which Greek political life will evolve in the post-Venizelist period. We say post-“Venizelist” advisedly, because Venizelism was the Greek expression of political views that in the more industrialized countries of Western Europe are variously called liberal, social democratic or socialist. These political movements did not previously develop in Greece because no social and economic constituency existed to sustain them. In the past ten years Greek society has changed profoundly and the evidence suggests that Greece today is closer in economic and social terms to the Italian than to the Turkish model. From 1964 to 1973 per capita GNP at current prices has tripled, rising from \$624 to \$1820, and agri-

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1974. Secret; Niact Immediate; Limdis. Repeated to Thessaloniki.

cultural production, which ten years ago accounted for 75 per cent of Greece's export earnings now accounts for only 40 per cent. Athens and Thessaloniki have increased their population by one million, which means that roughly one-third of the entire population of Greece lives in these two cities, whose voters, together with those of Piraeus, will elect 84 of the 288 regional deputies in the Greek Parliament.

4. In short, Greece has become significantly more urbanized and industrialized since the last elections were held in 1964. These changes are bound to affect voting patterns and the participation of an estimated 500,000 new voters—that is, voters who have come of age since 1964—could have a multiplier effect since they are less likely to follow traditional patterns than older voters. The success of Caramanlis in enlarging a conservative constituency whose voting strength is 35–40 per cent of the electorate will be of critical importance in determining Greece's political stability in the immediate future. As significant for the country's ultimate stability may be the way the rest of the electorate chooses to redefine Venizelism in terms appropriate to the new Greek society. This then can well be a watershed election whose results will not only determine who leads the Greeks but how and where he will lead them.

5. In this process the voters are receiving only intermittent and contradictory advice from the country's political leadership who are themselves just beginning to appreciate and to translate into words the dimensions of Greek social and economic change. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the appreciation of change is most acute among the leaders who were out of Greece during the period of military government and therefore better able to perceive what was happening than those who remained at home. The two leaders who have made the most conscious effort to present new programs are Caramanlis and Andreas Papandreou, although their political approaches are radically divergent at all points. Those like Mavros, Eliou and Garoufalias, who stayed in Greece, are resuming the political debate more or less where it was interrupted in April of 1967.

6. Programs do not win elections in Greece, and the results on Sunday will be more affected by the personality and style of party leadership, and the calibre of individual candidates, than by other considerations. Nevertheless, in an election where the old political reference points can no longer be relied on with absolute confidence and where both candidates and voters are reexamining the assumptions on which the old political system was based, the programs of the parties are being scrutinized more carefully and to the extent they are convincingly projected by party leaders may be more influential than ever before.

7. This is made more likely by the absence of campaign issues that clearly confer political advantage on one party or another. At first

glance it seems remarkable that an election taking place after ten years of political inertia should be so featureless. These explanations seem reasonable. The first derives from the sense of political euphoria that has existed in Greece since the return of Caramanlis, reducing the bitterness that characterized previous Greek elections just as it has reduced the significance of the issues. The second is the feeling prevalent among many Greeks that the elections represent a political threshold and that only when the door has been firmly closed behind them can they begin to make up their minds about other issues. Greek voters appreciate that very real and still unresolved questions of Junta punishment, Armed Forces stability and loyalties, and the divisive Cyprus problem, lurk in background and that prospect for effective restoration of Greece to political normality depends upon government that emerges from these elections to unusual degree. The last, but by no means the least significant explanation is that Caramanlis, who probably has the most to lose from divisive debate, has been supremely successful in disarming potentially dangerous issues like punishment of the Junta, Cyprus, the Crown and Greece's relations with the United States. In this as in other respects he has shown himself to be the most astute political leader in Greece and has reinforced his already imposing stature as a national leader. Many Greeks may vote for Caramanlis as a figure above politics in order finally to close those anomalous parentheses opened by the military coup of almost eight years ago. Next parliamentary elections seem more likely to precipitate heated clash of party policies among which voters will clearly make choice before casting their votes. November 17 should wipe the political slate clean and open the way to a fresh start for Greek political life.

8. Against this background, Embassy is providing in septel² its best estimates of probable results of Sunday's elections.

Kubisch

² In telegram 8235 from Athens, November 15, the Embassy estimated that Karamanlis would receive 45–50 percent of the votes cast, but remained uncertain whether Mavros or Papandreou would come in second. The Embassy considered Karamanlis' victory a foregone conclusion, owing to his recall from exile the previous July. The significance of the November 17 election was that it would mark a return to democracy, and only subsequent elections would determine the course of leadership in the years to come. (Ibid.)

30. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State¹

Athens, November 20, 1974, 1610Z.

8327. Subject: Greek Political Leadership—Andreas Papandreou.

1. Summary. In the 1974 Greek election Andreas Papandreou sustained deep and perhaps even mortal political wounds. With about 14% of the vote going for him, Papandreou would have a tolerable showing except for the fact that much of the balance of 86% of the vote was self-consciously cast against him.² Papandreou's frenzy in the final week of the campaign had the negative effect of driving undecided middle class voters toward Caramanlis. In the campaign, Papandreou tried to create the impression that he was the main alternative not only to Caramanlis, but to the political and social traditions of Greece itself. His defeat showed how unwilling the Greek people were to accept his vision of a socialist, nonaligned Greece, outlined as it was in the lurid language of class warfare and conspiracy.

Papandreou has the immediate task before him of sustaining his financing, his charisma and his liver. At the age of 56—and his father was 76 when he last won the premiership—he would appear still to have prospects, though, in view of his own weaknesses, not very bright ones. He first has to deal with the personal problems of his ambivalent personality, cope with the political and psychic drag of his American roots, and come up with a program to attract more middle class support. He is not likely to get good counsel either from the Left or Center, which resent the fact that his votes largely came out of their flanks, nor from his parliamentary base which at a dozen deputies is too small to discipline his dominant personality. End Summary.

2. Papandreou or simply "Andreas" as he is called by friend and enemy alike, has sounded his anti-American theme since 1964 with a brashness that strikes many as uncharitable if not psychotic. From US he gained his higher education (Harvard Ph.D. 1943), his wife, Margaret, his reputation earned at Minnesota, Northwestern and Berkeley,

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 84, Athens Embassy Files: Lot 78 F 134, Box 40, POL 15 GOVT 1974, July–December. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Ankara, Bonn, London, Nicosia, Ottawa, Stockholm, The Hague, USNATO, USUN, and Thessaloniki. Drafted by Gene Preston and Monteagle Stearns, who also approved, and cleared by Elizabeth Brown.

² In telegram 8304 from Athens, November 20, the Embassy reported the final election results: New Democracy (Karamanlis) 54.37 percent; Center Union (Mavros) 20.42 percent; PASOK (Papandreou) 13.58 percent; and United Left 9.45 percent. The remaining 2.18 percent did not receive enough votes for a seat in Parliament. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1974)

as a brilliant economist, and four children with dual citizenship. In 1967 the intervention of President Johnson freed Papandreou from junta imprisonment and possibly saved him from death. There are a number of alumni of the American Embassy who recall that Andreas and Margaret were charming and positive personalities on the Athens scene in the interim years 1959–63 when Papandreou was trying to determine his national identity and his political fortune. They also recall the tension that existed between Andreas and his father over the “Americanness” of his wife and children, and his own efforts, against his father’s wishes, to preserve his American citizenship. Even at the present advanced stage of his professional anti-Americanism, Papandreou is the only Greek politician who travels with American friends—the California liberals, Stanley and Betty Sheinbaum, and the economist Paul Sweazey, returned with Papandreou to help launch his campaign in Greece.

Papandreou has given back to America his citizenship which he voluntarily renounced early in 1964 on the eve of first standing for elected office in Greece. At the recent campaign rallies, his wife stood beside him, smiling benignly as cheerleaders led the “Out Americans” chanting. Even Greeks most critical of the United States and American foreign policy found this hard to understand or to condone. For those who view him as shamefully ungrateful to his adopted land, there is, possibly, sweet irony in the common accusation made even today, from the Extreme Right and Left, and all Greek humorists, that he is a life-long CIA double agent.

3. After Ioannides and Papadopoulos, Andreas Papandreou is probably the most disliked Greek around. Some of this hostility against him is a judgment not on Andreas but on his critics—their envy, jealousy, sense of personal betrayal, frustrated opportunism, ego drives—the usual complex of rages that attend and undermine all leading Greek politicians. But the national antipathy goes deeper than the merely petty. Evangelos Averoff-Tossitsas, whom most consider a gentleman and a moderate, not too long ago told the American Ambassador, “Andreas is the only man alive who I would kill with my own hands. He is neither a Greek nor a human being.” There is a consensus among the politically thoughtful that Andreas’ own degree of opportunism and his tendency to personalize issues strain even the liberal perimeters of Greek political invective. His socialism is viewed by many liberals not as a sincerely held and carefully reasoned philosophy of government but as an expedient strategy which tomorrow could be traded for communism, personal authoritarianism, or some other tactical facade for self-advancement. His susceptibility to the latest gossip, rumor, and personal flattery is perhaps inordinate even by Greek standards.

4. Papandreou’s personal following—and he has as fanatical supporters as any Greek alive—is based on certain achievements—real or

symbolic—in addition to the charisma of the name and the dextrous exploitation of popular resentments. He is genuinely admired, as he is feared, because he threatens the Establishment, notwithstanding his own roots in it and his personal proclivity for a luxurious standard of living. In the early nineteen sixties he was among the first in Greece to challenge the outmoded educational system and the economic distribution of wealth—again with his American experience more than true Marxism in the foreground of this thought. It is debated whether the economic boom of the junta years is more attributable to Andreas' blueprints for economic advance, which the junta largely inherited, or to Karamanlis' and even Markezinis' earlier achievements in the superstructure, but Andreas indisputably brought to Greece a professional talent for theoretical analysis and organization that was novel and needed. He was an early advocate of reorganizing the old-fashioned political party organizations, and his new group, PASOK, has shown some success in realizing progressive ideas and techniques of party work. Papandreou has shown certain personal strengths in the brief campaign just ended. He is not an innately great orator, as was his father, but then neither are the other national figures. In his rallies, he successfully established rapport with the crowd, which made his speeches more exciting and more dangerous than those of the other national figures. Under the right circumstances, Papandreou will say anything. On television and in smaller gatherings, he is particularly convincing and personable. He appears to have energy and made more campaign appearances than any other national candidate, even though he is supposed to have a weak liver derived from a too great fondness for Scotch over the years. In the early 1960's, Papandreou was the hero of the radical youth, but during the years of exile he lost some of his appeal by being exclusively a propagandist, not a resistance fighter. The rapid growth of the PASOK youth since his August 1974 return to Greece suggests he has worked effectively to reestablish his bona fides as a radical leader. At the same time, he tried to moderate in the early weeks of his return his more extreme slogans so as not to get too far in advance of the greatly enlarged middle and lower middle class. In the closing stages of his campaign, this reserve was abandoned, however, in favor of extreme attacks against Caramanlis and the old Center. Although the campaign was not based on issues, Papandreou went as far as any candidate in trying to focus public attention on knotty economic issues such as the Common Market. His vehement anti-Establishment views even had an echo among junvist apologists, one of whom said, "What Greece needs is an Andreas Papandreou committed to the West."

5. It is the matter of his uncertain political commitments and loyalties, not to mention his chameleon-like proclivities, that constitute the great divide between Papandreou and the public trust which he

lacks. Perhaps he will never be able to win that trust because he did, in fact, spend the first twenty-two years of his adult life in an alien land and still sees Greece through American eyes. In fact, Andreas has perhaps put his fortunes in an impossible squeeze. He is the expatriate whose repeated thunderings against his adopted land only serve to underscore his ambiguous loyalties; and he is the ever aging politician committed to wooing the young vote. The results of the November 17 election suggest that he has become a political exile in his own country.

Kubisch³

³ The Ambassador initialed next to his typed signature.

31. Memorandum From A. Denis Clift of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft)¹

Washington, January 3, 1975.

SUBJECT

Greek Homeporting Considerations

Since September 1972, the Navy has permanently homeported six destroyers in the Athens area under the terms of a technical agreement between the Hellenic and U.S. navies. These ships currently fill close to one-third of the Navy's destroyer commitment to NATO in the Mediterranean area. They are due for normal rotation and replacement on a phased schedule over the next six months.

The uncertain future of our bilateral arrangements with Greece, coupled with a variety of relatively minor problems encountered by the Navy in homeporting the ships in the Athens area, has prompted a recent U.S. decision to replace the first of these units with a destroyer deploying to the Mediterranean on a rotational basis, rather than with a permanent homeporter. Concerning the other ships, I have learned informally that there are two basic options under active consideration

¹ Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for Middle East and South Asia, Box 10, Greece 2. Confidential. Sent for action.

within the Department of Defense in regard to the possible termination of destroyer homeporting in Athens:

—Option one would terminate homeporting immediately and return the ships to the United States. NATO force commitments would be met by deploying units on a rotational basis. The reasons cited for this action are low crew morale, reduced personnel retention, and various operational/maintenance problems.

—Option two would maintain the present arrangement intact and terminate homeporting only at the request of the Greek government.

I am concerned that Defense may take further homeporting decisions on the basis of Navy operational/personnel/logistical considerations without adequate consideration of the long range foreign policy implications involved.

At this particularly critical time, when the United States and Greece are reviewing bilateral and NATO arrangements, precipitate action on homeporting might jeopardize Greek-US and Greek-NATO relations and have an adverse effect on our overall efforts in the Eastern Mediterranean. Accordingly, it is important that policy decisions on Greek homeporting be coordinated with the NSC. If you agree, a phone call to General Wickham, drawing on the points outlined above, would request the desired coordination.

Alternatively, you may wish to sign the memorandum to Wickham at Tab A² which would request coordination on Greek homeporting.

Recommendation

That you either telephone General Wickham or sign the memo to Wickham at Tab A requesting NSC coordination on Greek homeporting.³

Jan Lodal concurs.

ADC

² Not attached.

³ There is no indication as to whether Scowcroft approved either recommendation.

32. Minutes of Secretary of State Kissinger's Staff Meeting¹

Washington, January 13, 1975, 8:07–8:44 a.m.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Greece.]

Mr. Hartman: We sent you a memo a while back on how to handle the preparations for these negotiations,² and you suggested a NSSM. I'd like to suggest that we limit the NSSM to the one issue that I think requires that kind of an in-depth study—[1 line not declassified]—

Secretary Kissinger: No.

Mr. Hartman: —because we've got, as far as all the other base installations—

Secretary Kissinger: If we have [2 lines not declassified] will be leaked and we're going to be beaten to death in the Congress before the study is a third completed.

Mr. Hartman: Well then, we're going to have a very abbreviated study because the Greeks are going to be coming, in about two weeks, with their list.

Secretary Kissinger: All these studies are done in one afternoon, anyway. What does it mean—"study"? You don't have officials studying papers.

Mr. Hartman: Well, just to get the inventory of the installations; and some assessment of their relative strengths will take some time.

Secretary Kissinger: Are you telling me you can get ready for a negotiation but you can't get ready for an internal meeting?

Mr. Hartman: No. I'm just saying if we start on the base inventory—

Mr. Sisco: I want to sit down with the intelligence people.

Secretary Kissinger: The Pentagon wants to pull out of Greece, or it thinks if it throws half the bases away it can save the other half. I mean, we know what's going on. I believe for us to stampede out of there will just accelerate the whole process.

Those are the facts. We don't have to have a big study on that subject.

Mr. Sisco: I think it's easier to accomplish that informally and quickly.

Secretary Kissinger: I want it in the national security system; I do not want it informally. I do not want a treaty between State and De-

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Transcripts of Henry Kissinger's Staff Meetings, Entry 5177, Box 6, Secretary's Staff Meeting, January 13, 1975. Secret. Kissinger presided as Chairman and met with the principals of the Department or their designated alternates most mornings. These meetings generally took place in the morning.

² Reference is to U.S.–Greek negotiations on U.S. bases and facilities; the memorandum has not been further identified.

fense on this. This is a matter that has to go to the—I would not let that be used to bust this national security meeting, which is what the Pentagon wants.

Mr. Hartman: Then we've got to get moving on it very quickly.

Secretary Kissinger: Why? I mean, I just don't understand the reasoning, according to which you can be ready for a negotiation but not for a senior review group meeting.

Mr. Hartman: No. The strategy, as I understand it, was we were going to let Greece take the initiative.

Secretary Kissinger: All right.

Mr. Hartman: They will be coming to us very shortly.

Secretary Kissinger: And we can tell them we can take a week to think about it, if necessary.

Mr. Hartman: All right—if it's only a week.

Secretary Kissinger: Why can't we speed it up if it's in the process?

Mr. Hartman: Well, I think there's quite a bit of work—to straighten out the work for the facilities we now have.

Secretary Kissinger: Don't we need it for the negotiations too?

Mr. Hartman: We need it for the negotiations. For example, Averoff's office is already coming to us saying: "I think we can save your homeporting." Well, the question is: Do we want them to save our homeporting? Do we want to agree early with him on the limit of what we can do?

Secretary Kissinger: Fine; I agree with that. That ought to be determined. But why is it easier to determine that without a review group meeting?

Mr. Hartman: Well, we can have a review group meeting. But I think if you can get the NSSM off, say, in the next few days, we'll give you a draft.

Secretary Kissinger: Well, why is it I haven't seen a draft yet?

Mr. Hartman: Well, the normal way this is done is we haven't been suggesting drafts to you. I think you have in the White House; they're considering the NSSM.

Secretary Kissinger: Well, why don't you work on a draft—but just so that we don't get into too many review group meetings without my views being known, I do not favor [1½ lines not declassified] because I think it will send entirely the wrong signal. So, at any rate, at least I'd need a lot of convincing before I go along with that.

What do you think, Hal?

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: I think that part is fine.

Secretary Kissinger: I mean, if the Greeks push us out of Greece, [3 lines not declassified].

Mr. Hartman: Well, we have a legal issue that we're going to have to solve [*less than 1 line not declassified*]*—and that is that if we end up in these negotiations without a specific recommitment to the integrated NATO structure, then there's some question about whether our current agreement applies.*

Now, we may have to have a different kind of—

Secretary Kissinger: That is a different issue; and that is something that must, of course, be discussed.

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: That's an issue [*1 line not declassified*].

Mr. Hartman: Yes.

Secretary Kissinger: [*3 lines not declassified*] And if we do it, I think we must do it as part of a study in which the Turks participate. I don't think it's going to be easy to convince them that this has no political significance.

Mr. Sisco: I think we've got a reasonable chance of retaining much of what we got there now.

Secretary Kissinger: There are two separate problems: One is the base negotiation. The second is—you saw the conversation between Schlesinger and Kubisch—

Mr. Hartman: Yes.

Secretary Kissinger: —[*1 line not declassified*].

Mr. Hartman: Well, there are some technical reasons why you want to take some of the things that are there now out. I mean, if you look at why they're going to be used and how they're going to be used, it will make a lot of sense.

Secretary Kissinger: The whole thing doesn't make a helluva lot of sense. For that same reason, I don't want to start the process without a careful NATO consideration of it, because all the arguments that apply to Greece will apply to Western Europe and, the next thing you know, the signal of a general American withdrawal.

I admit they don't make too much sense, but they don't do damn much either, and I'm not saying they shouldn't be kept [*5½ lines not declassified*].

Mr. Hartman: We'll work it out.

Secretary Kissinger: But we can issue a NSSM today, and I think you can start an informal one—they'll arrive. Therefore, we have to go into it with the greatest care.

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: The NSSM ought to be on the broad subject.

Secretary Kissinger: No. The NSSM must be on the broad subject for the reason of my concern that I've expressed.

Mr. Hartman: O.K.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Greece.]

33. National Security Study Memorandum 215¹

Washington, January 16, 1975.

TO

The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of State
The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT

U.S. Security Policy Toward Greece

The President has directed that a comprehensive review of U.S. security policy toward Greece be undertaken. The study should identify U.S. interests, including those interests as they relate to NATO, and offer recommendations for U.S. policy aimed at their protection, particularly in the context of future U.S.-Greek negotiations on U.S. bases and facilities. The study should take into account such factors as:

- The nature of the U.S. military presence in Greece, and its relationship to specific U.S. security interests;
- The relative priority of U.S. bases and facilities in terms of their contributions to U.S. and NATO security;
- Homeporting, including the impact of termination on U.S.-Greek and Greek-NATO defense arrangements;
- Greek objectives regarding the U.S. presence in the country and specific U.S.-Greek bilateral agreements;
 - [*less than 1 line not declassified*];
- Greece's needs for economic and military assistance and possible U.S. initiatives to satisfy those needs;
- The impact of a resolution of the Cyprus crisis on U.S.-Greek relations;
- The impact of U.S.-Greek bases and facilities negotiations on overall Greek-NATO defense arrangements.

The President has directed that the study be undertaken by an NSC inter-agency group comprising representatives of the addressees of this memorandum and a representative of the NSC staff and under the

¹ Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 316, National Security Council, NSSMs. Secret. A copy was sent to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The proposal for a NSSM on policy toward Greece had first been suggested in June 1973. See Document 3. After several attempts at a draft, the need for a NSSM was deemed "OBE" on December 13, 1973, in the weeks after the internal coup in Greece. The drafts are in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1335, NSC Unfiled Material, 1973.

chairmanship of the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs. The study should be forwarded no later than February 7, 1975 for consideration by the Senior Review Group.

Henry A. Kissinger

34. Defense Intelligence Agency Intelligence Appraisal¹

DIAIAPPR 13–75

Washington, February 5, 1975.

GREECE–TURKEY: THE AEGEAN SEABED DISPUTE

Summary

The discovery of oil in the Aegean in January 1974 and an undemarcated seabed has resulted in overlapping claims of continental shelf rights by both Greece and Turkey. The Cyprus crisis preempted a possible conflict over the seabed issue last summer, but the problem has again surfaced as the principal point of contention between the two NATO allies. The Aegean issue is potentially more explosive than Cyprus since both Greek and Turkish national interests are deeply involved. Many Greek military officers believe a confrontation with Turkey in the Aegean is inevitable this summer and have prepared extensive defense plans for the Aegean islands as well as Greek Thrace. Athens views the islands as an integral part of the mainland and can be expected to defend them at all cost.

For its part, Turkey is determined to resume oil exploration in the Aegean this spring and can be expected to react firmly to Greek threats or military ventures undertaken to prevent such activity. If it could be agreed upon, the most feasible solution would be a joint exploration and exploitation agreement between the two countries.

Barring negotiations on the seabed issue, there is danger that an incident will escalate into a major confrontation as a result of misinterpretation or overreaction on the part of either side. Although the issue may be submitted to the International Court of Justice, prospects for a full settlement in the near future are not encouraging.

¹ Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, NSC Staff for Europe, Canada, and Ocean Affairs: Convenience Files, 1974–1977, Box 9, Greece, Greece 1975 1, NSC. Secret; No Foreign Dissem. Prepared by Robert P. Myers (DI-5). Two maps were attached but are not printed.

Background

The Treaty of Lausanne in 1923 defined the Greek-Turkish mainland boundary and ceded the eastern-most Aegean Islands to Greece and the Dodecanese Islands to Italy. Italy subsequently turned the Dodecanese Islands over to Greece in the 1947 Treaty of Paris.

Greece discovered oil off Thasos Island in January 1974. The size of the oil reserves has not been established, but estimates range up to 300,000 barrels per day. Greece's current national consumption runs about 200,000 barrels per day. As a result of the discovery and its own need to find new sources of energy, Turkey issued several oil exploration contracts that centered on areas previously selected by Greece, principally near the islands of Limnos, Lesbos, and Khios. The Turkish Government thereupon proposed that negotiations be undertaken regarding the seabed demarcation between the two countries, but Greece was unwilling to negotiate and took the position that sovereign rights are nonnegotiable.

Despite Greek threats to oppose exploration with force, Turkey began preliminary oil surveys in the Aegean in the spring of 1974. A Turkish navy hydrographic ship, the *Candarli*, conducted limited seismic surveys under cover of a naval exercise, and tensions heightened as both countries placed limited forces on alert. Greece refrained from taking any military action, claiming that any country could survey on the open seas but that actual explorative drilling would not be permitted in the disputed zone. The Aegean issue quickly abated with the Cyprus coup and the subsequent Turkish invasion.

Although the Cyprus conflict temporarily took the spotlight off the Aegean issue, animosities were increased between the two countries that have substantially lessened the possibility of a negotiated solution on the issue. Turkey now claims that Greece has violated the spirit and intent reached at Lausanne by fortifying several of the Aegean islands and by proposing an extension of its territorial waters from six to 12 nautical miles.

Political and Legal Aspects

The Greek legal position is based primarily on the 1958 Geneva Convention, which acknowledges that a coastal state has the sovereign right to explore and exploit natural and mineral resources on its continental shelf. Greece maintains that its mainland continental shelf rights are equally applicable to the Greek islands. Since the irregular and somewhat undefined continental shelf in the Aegean has not been demarcated, Greece claims that the islands are an extension of its own continental shelf and that the Turkish continental shelf drops off abruptly close to that country's mainland. The 1958 Geneva Convention states that in the absence of any negotiated agreement, the boundary should

be a median line, every point of which is equidistant from the territorial sea of each state. Since Greece, a signatory to this convention, views the islands as an integral part of the mainland, it believes the median line should be drawn between the mainland of Turkey and the easternmost Aegean islands.

Turkey did not sign the 1958 Geneva Convention and claims a continental shelf to a depth of 600 feet in accordance with the latest legal concepts regarding the Law of the Seas. This contour interval encompasses several of the Greek islands. Although Turkey accepts the concept of a six-nm territorial-waters limit surrounding the Greek islands, it rejects the idea of the islands maintaining individual continental shelves and regards the Greek islands in the eastern Aegean as a geological part of the Anatolian landmass of western Turkey. The Turks therefore claim the area outside the six-nm limit surrounding the Greek islands lies within their own continental shelf.

Ankara believes the Aegean should be divided by an equidistant line that uses only the respective mainland coastlines as basepoints but allows the Greek islands to retain their six-nm territorial waters limit. It will not accept the Greek position because that would leave Turkey virtually no Aegean area under its sovereignty. Ankara would therefore be deprived of any large economic gain should oil be discovered in the Aegean near its shores.

[Omitted here are comparison tables of Greek and Turkish Armed Forces.]

Political-Military Implications

Under the Ioannidis regime, the Greek armed forces took an extremely hard line in the 1974 Aegean dispute. As a result of the humiliation suffered over Cyprus, the present Greek Government will be forced to do likewise. Greek Prime Minister Karamanlis, however, is a sophisticated politician and, unlike his predecessor, can be expected to seek a political solution. If the Turks deny him this option though, he could not refuse to go to war over the issue that involves sovereignty, and remain in power. Many officers in the Greek armed forces believe that war with Turkey over the Aegean controversy is inescapable and that possession of the easternmost Aegean islands—not oil—is the real issue. They believe the Turks, because of their success on Cyprus, will force a confrontation to justify a military takeover of the islands.

Military inferiority, made manifest in the inability to defend Cyprus, has been one factor that has deterred Greece from war with Turkey. However, efforts are being made to improve Greek military capability as quickly as possible. Numerous arms acquisitions—jet aircraft, medium tanks, armored personnel carriers and antitank weapons—have been made since the Cyprus invasion, and many items are now beginning to

enter the Greek inventory. The army now believes it can successfully defend Greek Thrace and major Aegean islands.

[3 lines not declassified] Since last summer, the Greeks have fortified the Aegean islands and increased their military strength there and in Greek Thrace, and have conducted reconnaissance of potential areas of conflict. While it is not seeking a military confrontation with Turkey, Greece will fight for its claimed rights if peaceful efforts fail in negotiating some kind of settlement.

The Greek military can be expected to take an extremely nationalistic role and to overdramatize the possibility of war with Turkey. They believe fear of war would ease civilian pressures aimed at purging any lingering junta elements from their ranks. The military view such purges as detrimental to their ability to defend the homeland.

Last spring Turkey maintained a low profile in the Aegean dispute and described the controversy as an economic rather than political or military problem. Since the Cyprus invasion and as a direct result of the current impasse in forming a viable government, this is no longer the case. The Irmak government is not supported by the political parties and therefore is susceptible to statements made by them against it. Consequently, the government must respond to these statements in order to retain any vestige of power.

Recent charges by former Prime Minister Ecevit that Turkey was not safeguarding its rights in the Aegean prompted the Irmak government to announce its intentions to accelerate oil exploration. Even though the politicians are at odds over domestic and foreign issues, they are united when national interests are concerned.

The Turkish military, enjoying their victory on Cyprus, would welcome a Greek military action in the Aegean as they are only too eager to teach the Greeks another lesson. While there is no evidence of a Turkish military build up or intent to force a confrontation with Greece, selected air force and Jandarma units were swiftly placed on alert in reaction to recent aggressive statements made by the Greek Minister of Defense concerning the Aegean. Actions of this nature will most likely continue as each side reacts to statements and any military exercise that may be perceived as a threat.

Turkey is determined to explore for oil in the Aegean and will provide security with naval forces as required. Should military action be necessary, the Turks have contingency plans for invading the major Greek islands off the Turkish coast. The annexation of these islands would be a major Turkish objective in any military confrontation.

Prospects for a Settlement

The prospects for a settlement in the near future are not promising. Neither side is willing to grant concessions on what it considers

its legal rights and claims. Events on Cyprus have influenced the situation considerably and have aggravated age-old animosities. Prospects for a joint Cyprus-Aegean "package deal" in which each side would make offset concessions apparently is not now acceptable to Turkey. Any such deal would require some Turkish concessions in the Aegean since they are not expected to accede to Greek demands on Cyprus.

The Greeks recently proposed that the Aegean issue be taken to the International Court of Justice to which Turkey has agreed "in principle". Turkey has previously utilized court decisions to support its claim to the Aegean, but in recent months it has pressed for direct bilateral negotiations.

There are two principal approaches for resolving the Aegean dispute. One calls for a negotiated agreement involving adjudication and arbitration to determine the seabed boundaries. The other is a joint exploration and exploitation agreement for the disputed areas without attempting to delimit boundaries. The latter is viewed as most feasible since it is unlikely either will concede rights they already consider theirs.

Both countries are anxious to continue preliminary seismic and magnetometric surveys to determine the extent of oil reserves, but actual exploratory drilling will probably not take place until 1976. Should large reserves be found, each side will become more adamant in declaring its rights, thereby greatly increasing the possibility of a military confrontation.

Greece has previously balked at negotiations not only because of national pride but also because it firmly believes its position is fully supported by international law and the 1958 Geneva Convention.

Turkey has expressed a willingness to hold negotiations on the issue at any time but is not likely to make any substantial concessions, particularly under the aegis of its caretaker government. In the event negotiations are not undertaken there is the danger that either side will overreact to, or misinterpret the other's intentions, leading to an incident that could escalate into a major confrontation.

35. **Telegram From the Department of State to Secretary of State Kissinger, in Jerusalem¹**

Washington, February 13, 1975, 2003Z.

Tosec 201/33396. Following repeat Athens 1232 action SecState Feb 13. "Dept pass Defense and other addressees as appropriate including Dep Asst Secy Defense Bergold in Madrid. Subject: US-Greek Negotiations—Military Facilities. Ref: Athens 1196"²

"1. After a slow start, caused principally by lack of clear guidelines and preparation on the Greek side, our talks about bilateral military agreements and US facilities in Greece are beginning to come into focus. The Feb 12 meeting (reftel) provided clear insights into what the Greeks regard as key problem areas. As the Greek side indicated, the complaints they articulated yesterday may be supplemented by others as the discussions proceed, but there is little doubt at this stage that Greek discomfort is more political than functional and that the US facilities and operating procedures which trouble them most are, paradoxically, those which (A) are most conspicuous and (B) least conspicuous.

2. Thus US facilities at Hellenikon (Athenai) air field, Elefsis and, to a lesser extent, Soudha create problems for the Greek Govt because they are prominent and well publicized installations, two of which are located in the immediate vicinity of metropolitan Athens. The Greek negotiator stated unequivocally that the GOG intends to reassert its sovereignty over Hellenikon and the site of Elefsis, terminating homeporting in the process. The discussions seemed to indicate room for compromise on Hellenikon, but the Greeks were not particularly responsive on homeporting, although they acknowledged the importance of the Sixth Fleet's presence in the Eastern Mediterranean. In the case of inconspicuous, indeed virtually unknown, facilities operated by the US in Greece, [1 line not declassified] the problem for the Greeks is reversed. That is, it is the discreet nature of these facilities and the limited knowledge of them within the Greek Govt which makes Greek officials uncomfortable.

¹ Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Trip Briefing Books and Cables for Henry Kissinger, 1974-1976, Box 6, 2/10-2/18/75, TOSEC 22. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted and approved by R. Kuchel (S/S-O).

² Telegram 1196 from Athens, February 12, reported on the first day of the negotiations. The Greek side called for eliminating some U.S. facilities, terminating homeporting, revising privileges and immunities, and increasing Greek access to U.S. facilities. In turn, the U.S. side described the benefits of U.S. military bases and the presence of the Sixth Fleet to Greek security interests and expressed an understanding of the Greek desire to modify privileges and immunities as well as Greek access to U.S. facilities. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1975)

3. Characterizing the Greek sensitivities in this way suggests two lines of possible compromise. As far as Hellenikon is concerned, we believe there is a fair chance that the Greek Govt can be convinced that US facilities there, at least in part, serve their defense needs and should be retained. It will, however, be necessary to examine carefully ways in which marginal services at Hellenikon can be dispersed or relocated and ways in which Greek sovereignty can at least nominally be asserted over the facility by incorporating it into the Hellenic Air Force base at Hellenikon. Concerned Washington agencies should begin promptly to examine this problem so that we can formulate some alternative solutions to the Greek problem which do not create intolerable inconveniences for US. A similar approach may be possible in the case of Soudha, although we infer that the Greeks are less concerned about the American profile of Soudha than about the possibility persuading US to pay something for it in the form of expanded Hellenic Air Force facilities there. Although the Greeks were not encouraging about homeporting, we believe it might be possible to retain usage rights at the Elefsis pier for non-homeported units of the Sixth Fleet, although the homeporting arrangement would probably have to be considerably revised or replaced entirely.

4. Regarding the mosaic of inconspicuous but in many cases important facilities such as Tatoi, we believe that our approach should be double pronged. On the one hand, we will have to satisfy the Greeks that the basic functions of these facilities, most of which are communications assets of one kind or another, do not derogate Greek sovereignty or involve Greece in unacceptable risks with their neighbors, and, on the other hand, convince them that the facilities directly or indirectly serve Greek defense needs. The Greek officials with whom we are negotiating are suspicious of these facilities in part because they know so little about them. It should therefore be possible to satisfy the Greek Govt that the facilities serve a valid purpose and are covered by valid agreements without opening the doors wide or declassifying the facilities. In most cases it should be possible to pacify Greek anxieties by means of sanitized briefings and by visits to the installations by authorized Greek representatives.

5. The latter obligation is one which we cannot avoid and should not try to avoid. We expect that the Greek side will soon request a tour of US facilities. This could come within a matter of days, depending upon the sense of urgency felt by the Greeks. We will need prompt clearances from Washington from the agencies concerned to their Mission counterparts authorizing guided tours and briefings when requested. Any delay in responding to a Greek request would exacerbate Greek suspicions and unnecessarily complicate the negotiating process. For this reason we will need contingency clearances to conduct guided tours of certain classified facilities and component elements of the Mis-

sion early next week will send messages identifying the facilities which we think the Greeks will want to see and outlining the type of sanitized briefing we have in mind.

6. After three days of intensive talks, it is our tentative conclusion that the Greeks will seek changes in our operating relationship which are more than cosmetic but less than vital. It is encouraging that the Greek side does not challenge the basic assumption that bilateral military cooperation with the US is important for Greece and that, in the wider context of our regional responsibilities, an effective US military role is positive and stabilizing. We believe that assumption underlies the thinking not only of the Greek negotiating team but of the Greek Govt itself. Without it a true meshing of our interests would be impossible. With it there may still be difficult problems of detail but the eventual conclusion of our negotiations with the Greeks would be satisfactory both for us and for them. Kubisch"

Ingersoll

36. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Ford¹

Washington, February 27, 1975.

SUBJECT

Greek Bases Negotiations

The opening round of the U.S.-Greece bases negotiations was held in Athens during the week of February 10–14. The highlights of this first round are as follows:

—The Greek side defined three broad objectives for the negotiations: 1) to reduce—but not eliminate—the American military profile in Greece; 2) to up-date, consolidate and tighten existing bilateral defense arrangements; and 3) to monitor and control more directly U.S. military activities in Greece.

—[2 lines not declassified]

—The U.S. negotiating team maintained a "listening brief" in order to elicit initial Greek views. The U.S. side pointed out the important

¹ Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for Middle East and South Asia, Box 10, Greece 2. Secret. Sent for information. Ford initialed the memorandum, indicating that he saw it.

role that U.S. bases and facilities on Greek soil play in the defense of NATO and Greece.

—Embassy Athens evaluated the Greeks position as sufficiently forthcoming to provide for “an eventual conclusion—satisfactory to both sides,” although the talks are likely to be protracted and hard.

—The Greek team also made clear their need to conclude the negotiations in the form of “bilateral cooperation agreement, defining joint defense installations to remain in Greece . . . (to) be submitted to the vote of the Parliament.”

The talks are currently in recess and are tentatively scheduled to reconvene in mid March.

37. Telegram From the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft) to Secretary of State Kissinger¹

Washington, March 8, 1975, 0155Z.

Tohak 27. I have just seen Tosec 30 which recommends you order Defense to cancel the sale of Redeye missiles to Greece.² I disagree.

There is no question that it was outrageous of Defense to negotiate the sale without checking with State or with us, nevertheless, the State arguments for cancellation do not appear persuasive to me.

First of all, it will be taken by the Greeks to be a slap by us. They made the contract in good faith and have absolutely no reason to understand the circumstances or reasons for its cancellation at this late date.

In addition, the rationale for our earlier concern over sale of the Redeye has lost much of its logic. The Soviet SA-7 has been widely distributed by the Soviets including, directly or indirectly, to the Fedayeen. Besides, I know of no reason to think the weapon is more likely

¹ Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Trip Briefing Books and Cables for Henry Kissinger, 1974–1976, Box 7, 3/5–3/22/75, Tohak 2. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Sent to Borg, Adams, and Rodman for Kissinger with a request to deliver at the opening of business. Kissinger was in Egypt.

² In telegram Tosec 30, March 6, Hartman and Vest informed Sisco that the Department of Defense, without coordination with the Department of State, had authorized the sale of 1,000 Redeye missiles to Greece. The Department of State proposed canceling the sale on the grounds that sale of this type of missile had been strictly limited because of its adaptability to terrorist use and that its possible use in the Cyprus dispute would damage the fragile Greek-Turkish relationship. (Ibid.)

to get into irresponsible hands from Greece than from the other countries to which we have furnished it.

Possible Greek terrorism against Turkish commercial aircraft is, it seems to me, restrained not so much by an absence of the Redeye as by the possibility of retaliation either against Greek civil aircraft or the Greek population in Cyprus. In case of acquisition by the PLO, there are no such countervailing pressures.

Lastly, while it should not be governing, the sale is now at the point that Defense would have to pay for the entire contract plus cancellation charges. The Army does not need additional Redeye missiles. They could conceivably be sold elsewhere but where else would we be any better off than in Greece?³

I do believe it is worthwhile, however, to keep track of Redeye sales and I do concur that Defense should clear any such sales.

Warm regards.

³ Kubisch met with Averoff several times, including on April 15, in order to receive Greek assurances that the Redeye missiles would not be misused. (Telegram 2916 from Athens, April 15; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1975)

38. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Embassy in Greece¹

Washington, March 15, 1975, 1802Z.

58882. Subject: Greece and NATO.

1. At present, the allies are in a "holding pattern" on the Greek/NATO relationship, with the US and most other allies endorsing the view that the initiative on clarifying this relationship should be left to Greece. Greece appears to want to delay NATO negotiations until the US-Greek negotiations have moved further, or indeed been completed. We have come to the view, however, that it is appropriate to begin to move now to start the process of clarifying the Greek role in NATO, for the following reasons.

¹ Source: Department of State, Athens Embassy Files: Lot 96 F 335, Box 1, DEF 4-6, 1975 Greek Withdrawal. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Also sent Priority to London, Bonn, and USNMR SHAPE.

—US/Greek bilateral negotiations can make some progress, but are limited by the interconnection between the US bilateral role in Greece, and Greece's NATO ties. [10 lines not declassified] The alternative to recommitment of forces to NATO, bilateral US-Greek arrangements not tied to NATO, would pose serious problems with Congress, and would have global implications as a precedent. A second complex problem is posed by the fact that the NATO infrastructure program in Greece overlaps with US use of facilities there, as, for example, at the Souda Bay airfield, which is built with NATO funds. In sum, the bilateral negotiations with Greece can make progress on certain issues, but cannot be wrapped up completely unless and until the Greek NATO role is clarified.

—There is also the broad question of the type of bilateral arrangements we want in Greece, and the value we attach to US facilities there under various circumstances: if Greece is in NATO's military structure, or if it has withdrawn, or is in some intermediate category. We can only approach this question in more specific terms as we have more appreciation for the likely future Greek role in NATO.

—The major question of a new Greek relationship with NATO as a precedent for other allies.

2. In addition, there are internal pressures within the NATO context that are at work because of the ambiguous Greek role, including:

—Infrastructure—new projects for Greece are frozen and work on previously approved projects is being disputed by Turkey. More generally, the issue of existing infrastructure facilities in Greece will need resolution, and NATO claims against Greece are a possibility if a satisfactory resolution to the question of Greece's force commitment to NATO does not emerge.

—Turkey's concerns over its communications and radar/early warning links with NATO, which are subject to interruption by Greece. Turkey has asked for development of alternative channels, a costly and complex process.

—Allied command arrangements for southeastern Europe. The ambiguity concerning the Greek role was one factor in Turkey's decision to opt out of Wintex 75; the whole question is a central one for NATO military planners in planning southern flank defense.

—Overflight rights, including over the Aegean.

3. Approach to Greek/NATO negotiations.

Our approach to these negotiations would be to encourage Greece ultimately to resume the fullest possible role in NATO, at the same time seeking to avoid backing Greece prematurely into a corner that would make it formalize, under pressure, a low degree of participation, closing the door on further integration into NATO. The central issue in negotiations is likely to be the nature of the Greek force commitment to

NATO. The present NATO categories of "assignment" and "earmarking" involve, for Greece, some forces under NATO command, and some other forces earmarked to be placed under NATO commanders in certain contingency situations. We would of course prefer to see Greece come to restore its commitment under these categories. We recognize, however, that this may pose political problems for the Greek Government since Caramanlis has renounced precisely these categories. In this regard, the redefinition of force commitment categories currently under study in NATO may be helpful to the GOG. We will need a closer reading over time of the possibilities this recategorization exercise provides, as well as the effect of possible Greek force.

Commitments as a precedent for other allies. We will wish to impress, with other allies, on Greece the need for a satisfactory resolution to this question.

4. Timing considerations.

Greek domestic politics, Greece's relations with Turkey, and the Cyprus issue interact to place limits on how fast, and perhaps how far, Greece may be able to move in defining its role in NATO in the direction we desire. An acceptable new Greece/NATO relationship will not quickly be defined; we should be prepared for a slow, possibly groping process. During this period, for the reasons stated above, it may not be possible to bring our bilateral negotiations with Greece to a formal conclusion, although we would seek to make tangible progress on individual issues.

5. For USNATO: You should approach Luns, and drawing on paras 1, 2, 3, and 4 above, explain that we believe it time to move to clarification of the Greek role in NATO, making clear that we do not seek an adversary or unduly hasty process. You should indicate that we prefer that Greece take the initiative, though we believe that the process should be launched in any case in the next few weeks. You should also outline the idea of initial discussions between Greece and a small group of allies which Luns might convoke, pointing out that we recognize that a larger group, including Turkey and all other DPC members, would eventually have to take part in any decisions.

6. You are then authorized to approach, at your discretion, UK, FRG and Italian PermReps, as well as PermRep Dean De Staercke along the same lines indicating our preference for a small, informal meeting in the weeks ahead and suggesting that this idea be raised with Greeks by one or more of these PermReps.

7. Once the approaches in paras 5 and 6 have been undertaken, you should approach Greek PermRep Theodoropoulos along the following lines:

—We are interested in progress in US-Greek negotiations which began in February, and will continue to approach them with this goal.

However, we are increasingly aware that the interconnection between the Greek role in NATO and US-Greek bilateral defense arrangements is complex and pervasive. Thus, we cannot view the bilateral negotiations wholly in isolation from the Greek/NATO relationship, which in our view needs further clarification.

—Various aspects of US activities in Greece are tied in with activities funded by NATO infrastructure. It may be difficult to envisage new bilateral agreements or arrangements relating to NATO-funded facilities when the status of these is uncertain in NATO.

—[9 lines not declassified]

—More generally, we will be in a better position to evaluate the scope and nature of our bilateral defense ties with Greece when we have a clearer view of Greece's role in NATO. We cannot view our bilateral relationship with Greece or any other ally in isolation.

—We thus believe it is necessary to move toward clarifying the Greek role in NATO. We would prefer for Greece to take the initiative in this regard. We suggest, as earlier, that initial discussions could take place with Greece and a small group of allies—perhaps the UK, US, FRG, Italy, the Dean of PermReps, and Luns—so that they could be on an informal basis without commitment.

8. For Athens: You are authorized to make parallel presentation to GOG at level you deem appropriate once USNATO has undertaken approach to Theodoropoulos.

Ingersoll

39. Memorandum From A. Denis Clift of the National Security Council Staff to Secretary of State Kissinger¹

Washington, March 21, 1975.

SUBJECT

U.S. Security Policy Toward Greece

¹ Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, NSC Staff for Europe, Canada, and Ocean Affairs: Convenience Files, 1974–1977, Box 10, Greece, Greek Base Negotiations 1975 (3). Secret. Sent for action. Concurred in by Clint Granger and Jan Lodol of the NSC staff. There is no indication that Kissinger saw the memorandum.

In response to NSSM 215,² the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs has sent the President a review of U.S. security policy toward Greece, with emphasis on U.S. policy³ and [1 line not declassified]. The concerned agencies—State, Defense and CIA—have also submitted comments and recommendations on the NSSM response.⁴ An analytical summary of the response is at Tab II.⁵

By way of background, the Government of Greece, following announcement of Greece's plans for military withdrawal from NATO,⁶ requested that the United States enter into formal negotiations on the future of the U.S.-Greek security relationship, including the status of U.S. bases and facilities on Greek soil. The first round in these negotiations was held in mid-February at Athens;⁷ the second session will open on April 7, also at Athens.

During this same general period, [1½ lines not declassified] within the Departments of Defense and State.

The NSSM response, supported by agency comments and recommendations, affirms the U.S. objectives in bilateral negotiations of preserving intact the fundamentals of the U.S.-Greek security arrangement [less than 1 line not declassified] while encouraging Greece's return to full participation in NATO. At the same time, the study states that the U.S. should seek to regain full effective use of those U.S. facilities considered most important to U.S. security interests adding that if concessions are necessary to obtain Greek support for these principal U.S. objectives, the United States should agree to consolidation or reduction of facilities considered least essential to retain. State—while concurring in these objectives—adds that the negotiators must be provided maximum flexibility in order to safeguard U.S. interests while accommodating Greek needs.

As there is interagency consensus on U.S. objectives in the negotiations, I see no need for an SRG meeting. *At the same time, [2 lines not declassified] I believe it would be correct to have the President formally approve the U.S. position in a decision memorandum.*

² Document 33.

³ Sisco forwarded the paper on February 8. A copy is in the Ford Library, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-33, NSSM 215.

⁴ Colby relayed CIA's concurrence in a memorandum to Kissinger on February 20; Deputy Secretary of Defense Clements relayed the Department of Defense's concurrence in a February 22 memorandum; and Springsteen relayed the Department of State's concurrence in a memorandum to Scowcroft on March 7. (Ibid.)

⁵ Printed as Document 40.

⁶ See footnote 2, Document 20.

⁷ See Documents 35 and 36.

The memorandum for your signature to the President at Tab I⁸ would forward the NSSM response and related agency comments/recommendations, and your recommendation that the President approve the position on negotiations agreed to in the NSSM response. With the President's approval, the accompanying NSDM for your signature would so inform the agencies.

Recommendation

1. That you sign the memorandum for the President at Tab I.⁹
2. With the President's approval, that you sign the accompanying NSDM.¹⁰

⁸ Attached but not printed.

⁹ There is no indication that Kissinger signed the memorandum.

¹⁰ Printed as Document 43.

40. Paper Prepared by the National Security Council Staff¹

Washington, March 21, 1975.

ANALYTICAL SUMMARY

Response to NSSM 215—"U.S. Security Policy Toward Greece"

I. Introduction and Background

On August 14, 1974, the new Greek government under the leadership of Prime Minister Constantine Caramanlis announced its withdrawal from NATO's integrated military structure.² This decision, which was taken at the height of the Cyprus crisis, reflected the frustration of the newly installed Greek government and the people of Greece over being unable to assist militarily their brethren on the island and in seeing their NATO allies, particularly the United States, fail to forestall the Turkish action. In subsequent statements, the Greeks referred to a "new relationship with NATO" and the fact that the status of U.S. and NATO bases on Greek soil would have to be revised.

¹ Source: Ford Library, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-58, NSDM 291. Secret. Regarding the complete NSSM response, see footnote 3, Document 39.

² See footnote 2, Document 20.

At the request of the Greek government, a preliminary round of talks on the future of the US-Greek security relationship was held in Athens during the week of February 10–14.³ The second round in the consultations is scheduled to begin in Athens on April 7.

NSSM 215⁴ directed that a comprehensive review of U.S. security policy towards Greece be undertaken to identify U.S. interests and offer recommendations for U.S. policy aimed at their protection, particularly in the context of future US-Greek negotiations on U.S. bases and facilities. [2 lines not declassified] A study has been completed by an ad hoc interagency group chaired by State. The study is summarized below with NSC staff comments in parentheses. Formal agency comments/recommendations were submitted separately and are incorporated in this summary.⁵

In format, the study is introduced by a brief overview of the development of our bilateral security relationship with Greece, together with an analytical discussion of Greece's decision to withdraw from NATO's military arm and a brief look at the various factors expected to influence Greece's approach to negotiations (pp 1–5). [6 lines not declassified]. Greece's security relationship with NATO is examined in detail, including the legal and institutional aspects of Greece's withdrawal decision and the value of Greece and NATO of the Greece-NATO association (pp 19–25 and Annex H). Finally, the study takes up the legal problems relating to U.S. facilities and forces, specifically the bilateral Status of Forces Agreement which regulates our day-to-day relations with the Greeks on most military matters (pp 25–28 and Annexes D and E).

Against this background, the study lists some six likely assumptions underlying Greece's approach to negotiations both with the United States and Greece. These assumptions can be summarized as follows: 1) to reduce the American military profile in Greece; 2) [1 line not declassified]; 3) to update, consolidate and tighten current bilateral agreements, and; 4) to assert Greek sovereignty by monitoring and controlling more directly U.S. military activities in Greece (pp 29–31). The study then identifies U.S. policy objectives in the US-Greek and Greek-NATO negotiations: 1) preservation of the fundamentals of the US-Greek security relationship intact; 2) [less than 1 line not declassified]; 3) return of Greece to full participation in NATO's integrated military structure, and; 4) as a concessionary measure if raised first by the Greek side, reduction or consolidation of certain bases/facilities identified in the study

³ See Documents 35 and 36.

⁴ Document 33.

⁵ See footnote 4, Document 39.

as least essential to retain (pp 32–33). Policy options to attain these objectives are presented on pages 34–41; [*1 line not declassified*].

(Our security relationship with Greece is of relatively longstanding, dating from March 1947 when the Truman Doctrine was promulgated and when the U.S. began to take over from the UK the responsibility for protecting and preserving Western interests in Greece. Since that time, the U.S. has invested nearly \$4 billion in economic and military assistance to the Greek government.)

(Though the Communist guerrilla war ended in 1949, the Soviet-bloc threat to Greece's independence remained, and in 1952 we led the way for the admission of Greece to NATO. Under the NATO aegis, we subsequently concluded agreements providing for the establishment of both U.S. and NATO security facilities in Greece.)

The study specifically identifies U.S. security interests in some five major bilateral bases/facilities, as well as three major NATO installations where there is a significant U.S. stake.

(The study points out (correctly, we believe) that in the past decade, for a number of reasons, the Greeks have come to believe that foreign bases/facilities on their soil serve US/NATO rather than Greek defense interests. More than any other factor in recent years, the Greek military junta's strong support of United States and NATO security interests in the Eastern Mediterranean has worked to produce a change in the Greek attitude towards the US/NATO presence in their country. Thus, the study points out that even if the events of last summer had not occurred on Cyprus, it seems likely that the Greeks would have eventually sought to alter the nature of their security relationship with both the United States and NATO.)

II. Likely Assumptions Underlying Greece's Approach to Negotiations With the U.S. and NATO

Greece has asked for negotiations to revise the US-Greek security relationship. A preliminary round of talks on this subject was held in Athens during the week of February 10–14; the second round will open on April 7. The study makes six basic assumptions—generally borne out by the first round of talks—about the Greek approach to the negotiations:

—First, the Greek Government is firmly committed to a policy of close alliance with the West, particularly the United States.

—Second, the Greeks will seek an overall reduction both in the number of U.S. military personnel stationed in Greece and in the number of facilities.

—Third, the Greeks will also seek to alter the general agreements under which the United States operates in Greece, specifically, the Military Facilities Agreement of 1953 and the bilateral Status of Forces Agreement of 1956.

—Fourth, the Greeks will endeavor to ensure that all American bases/facilities in Greece be clearly seen by the public as serving the defense needs of both Greece and the United States.

—Fifth, the Greeks will move cautiously on the NATO front in the next few months, and that the outcome of the bilateral talks will shape their approach to NATO.

—[2 lines not declassified].

The study provides a detailed discussion of factors which might have an influence on the outcome of the negotiations. These include domestic pressures on Prime Minister Caramanlis, the Cyprus situation, Greek-Turkish relations in general, future levels of U.S. economic and military assistance, and the attitude of NATO nations (some of which are anxious to clarify Greece's status in the Alliance), and Congressional reactions.

III. U.S. Objectives and Alternatives Approaches to the Negotiations

U.S. objectives in the US-Greek and Greek-NATO negotiations are necessarily conservative. We will want to conduct the negotiations in such a way as to help the Greek Government handle its perceived domestic problem while preserving the fundamentals of the US-Greek security relationship and while encouraging Greece's return to full participation in NATO. We will want to regain full effective use of the facilities we consider most important, and we will want to consider consolidating or reducing facilities we consider least essential to retain.

The study presents five alternative approaches to the negotiations:

—*One would be a reactive, time-buying approach* which would allow the Greeks to set the pace in the negotiations and which would hopefully lead them to see the advantages in maintaining the status quo in their relations with the U.S. and NATO. Under this option, we would (a) play for time on any Greek request for a reduction in the number of U.S. facilities, (b) be willing to make concessions on the status of forces issue, but maintain the NATO SOFA as the baseline below which we would not go, and (c) [1 line not declassified].

—*A second would involve the U.S. taking the initiative by offering to cede at an early stage homeporting and other non-essential activities and to propose a memorandum of understanding incorporating changes desired by the Greeks in our Status of Forces Agreement.*

—*A third approach, essentially time-buying, would entail trying to deflect the negotiations away from discussion of specific U.S. facilities directly into status of forces issues.*

—*A fourth alternative* [2 lines not declassified].

—*A fifth alternative* [1 line not declassified].

Defense believes that the study adequately addresses U.S. policy and policy options with regard to Greece with the exception of the fourth and fifth alternatives listed above [12 lines not declassified]

[1 paragraph (5 lines) not declassified]

IV. [*less than 1 line not declassified*]

[*9 paragraphs (53½ lines) not declassified*]

It is for the above reasons that we are now pressing for the beginning of discussions between Greece and NATO on the nature of the future relationship.

V. [*1 line not declassified*]

The study divides U.S. and NATO facilities in Greece into three basic categories:

- most essential to retain;
- desirable to retain; and
- least essential to retain.

Those in the first category include Athenai AFB near Athens; the Souda Bay complex in Crete; [*1 line not declassified*]; and the NATO Missile Firing Installation on Crete. In the second category are the NATO Air Weapons Training Center at Timbakum, Crete; personnel support activities at Athenai AFB; and air facilities at Larissa. The last category includes homeporting and various communications sites throughout Crete.

VI. *Greece and NATO*

A central issue in Greece-NATO negotiations will be whether Greece participates in NATO's integrated military structure and if so the nature of its force commitment to NATO.

Based on its statements and pattern of participation in NATO to date, Greece probably expects to be able to tailor a relationship with NATO in which it retains major benefits of membership but refrains from official commitment of its forces to NATO, possibly eliminates or alters the status of certain NATO-funded facilities, and calls into question the NATO Status of Forces Agreement governing Greece as well as other Allies.

The study points out that Athens may well wish to see how bilateral negotiations with the U.S. go before making decisions on its strategy for dealing with NATO. Thus the outcome of the US-Greek bilateral consultations will likely shape the results of the Greece-NATO negotiations.

Among NATO-related arrangements and facilities, the study indicates that Greece places importance on the following:

- [*1 line not declassified*];
- participation in the NATO intelligence and communication system;
- continued participation in NATO's infrastructure program;
- membership in the NATO Military Committee;
- participation in the full range of NATO planning; and

—retention of specific facilities such as airfields, naval bases, command and control facilities, and certain NATO training sites.

The paper provides a complete discussion of the legal and institutional arrangements governing Greece's participation in NATO, as well as an analysis of contrasting Allied views on Greece's continued participation in NATO military/defense activities.

41. Memorandum From A. Denis Cliff of the National Security Council Staff to Secretary of State Kissinger¹

Washington, April 3, 1975.

SUBJECT

US-Greek Base Negotiations

We are now approaching the second round of US-Greek base talks, scheduled to begin in Athens on April 7.

State, without White House clearance, has sent the message at Tab A² to Embassy Athens, providing guidance for the talks.

NSSM 215, U.S. Security Policy Toward Greece,³ was issued to ensure that preparations for the talks would go forward in the NSC system, this bearing in mind such contentious interagency issues as homeporting [*1 line not declassified*].

The NSSM response⁴ worked a very useful effect in that it brought DOD around and led to interagency agreement [*2½ lines not declassified*].

The NSSM response also reached the conclusion that, despite the internal U.S. Navy decision to give up homeporting as soon as possible, this "concession" to the Greeks should be in return for meaningful Greek concessions. This quid pro quo approach has been weakened in the instructions at Tab A; Navy clearly plans to give up homeporting in this round, concessions or not.

¹ Source: Ford Library, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-33, NSSM 215. Secret. Sent for action.

² Attached but not printed.

³ Document 33.

⁴ See Document 40.

The approach the U.S. Government is taking in these talks—[*less than 1 line not declassified*] to U.S.-Greek and Greek-NATO linkages, to homeporting—involves interagency policy issues that should be confirmed in a decision memorandum. I recommend that action be taken on Log #1737, March 21, 1975, which forwarded the NSSM 215 response together with a proposed NSDM.⁵

Recommendation

That action be taken on the NSDM forwarded with NSC Log #1737.⁶

⁵ Document 39.

⁶ The NSDM was issued on April 8; see Document 43.

42. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Colby to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, April 4, 1975.

SUBJECT

Intelligence Alert Memorandum: Possible Conflict in the Aegean

1. As the attached roundup indicates,² Greek-Turkish tension over the Aegean is at a dangerous level.

2. We continue to believe that both governments, in their rational calculations, want to avoid the dangerous and essentially unpredictable situation of large-scale hostilities over this issue. Indeed, we would estimate that the chances are against either side deliberately deciding to initiate war.

3. What is equally important, we think that each government credits the other with a desire to avoid serious conflict over this issue. At the same time, each government is aware of political limitations on the other at home, of the fact that there are some hawks on the other side, and that rational calculations may not always prove controlling.

¹ Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Trip Briefing Books and Cables for Henry Kissinger, 1974–1976, Box 8, 4/4–4/7/75, Tohak 2. Secret.

² Attached but not printed.

4. Indeed, there may be some sentiment in Turkey for launching a pre-emptive strike against Greece—before the Turkish military capability declines too far as a result of Turkey’s inability to obtain armaments. We do not think this reasoning prevails in the Turkish government. However, it cannot be entirely discounted as a factor. In any case, the Turks are concerned about Greek reinforcements of certain Aegean Islands, and some days ago made a formal *démarche* to the signatories of the 1947 Paris Treaty pointing out these violations.

5. Meanwhile, the readiness of both sides to play “chicken,” to keep testing each other’s resolve—e.g., by Turkish overflights of the islands and Greek shooting at the overflights—could easily bring them into explosive confrontation in which neither side felt strong enough to back down.

6. The Intelligence Community is keeping this situation under close review. The US missions in Athens, Ankara, Istanbul, and Nicosia are fully alert, and NSA has alerted units that could pick up reflections of unusual military activity. A roundup of Greek forces on the Aegean Islands, requested by the Embassy in Ankara, is being prepared in CIA and DIA. The attached current intelligence roundup gives the highlights of the situation at the moment.

7. This memorandum has been discussed with offices in CIA, DIA, State/INR and NSA, and they are in agreement.

W.E. Colby

43. National Security Decision Memorandum 291¹

Washington, April 8, 1975.

TO

The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of State
The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT

U.S. Security Policy Toward Greece

¹ Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 315, National Security Council, NSDM, NSDM 7/74–11/76. Secret. A copy was sent to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The President has considered the response to NSSM 215 on U.S. security policy toward Greece submitted by the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs on February 8, together with the formal agency comments and recommendations relating thereto.²

The President has confirmed that negotiations should proceed with Greece relating to U.S. bases and facilities in Greece and the bilateral Status of Forces Agreements, with the understanding that the following guidelines will shape the U.S. position:

—The principal U.S. objective in the negotiations is to preserve to the extent possible the existing U.S. security arrangements with Greece while encouraging Greece's return to full participation in NATO. The United States should seek to regain full effective use of those U.S. facilities considered most important to U.S. security interests. If concessions are necessary to obtain Greek agreement to these U.S. principal objectives, the United States may agree to consolidation or reduction of facilities considered least essential to retain.

—[5 lines not declassified]

—In response to Greek initiative and in return for Greek support of principal U.S. objectives, the United States may agree to the termination of homeporting.

—The United States considers the NATO Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) as the limiting framework for any agreement on the alteration of the status, privileges and immunities of U.S. forces in Greece.

In approving the U.S. position for these negotiations, the President recognizes the interconnection between U.S.-Greek security relations and Greece's NATO ties, and again emphasizes the importance attached to full Greek participation in NATO.

The President has directed that the senior U.S. negotiator should submit a report on the results of these negotiations, including such ad referendum agreements as may be developed, for his review as soon as possible.³

Henry A. Kissinger

² See Document 40 and footnote 4 thereto.

³ These instructions were sent in telegram 182835 to Athens, April 11. (Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for Middle East and South Asia, 1974–1977, Box 10, Greece, Exdis from Secretary of State)

44. Memorandum From A. Denis Clift of the National Security Council Staff to Secretary of State Kissinger¹

Washington, April 10, 1975.

SUBJECT

Possibility of Greek-Turkish Conflict in the Aegean

With the memorandum at Tab A,² the Director of Central Intelligence has submitted an addendum to his April 4 intelligence alert memorandum concerning the possibility of Greek-Turkish conflict in the Aegean (NSC Log #2101).³ The addendum provides an assessment of the Greek reinforcement of certain islands in the Aegean area:

—Greek forces in the Aegean are concentrated on six of the major islands lying in close proximity to the Turkish mainland—Limnos, Lesbos, Chios, Samos, Kos and Rhodes, with surveillance units deployed to several of the smaller islands as well.

—The increase in the number and capability of the Greek military forces on the islands has been substantial over the past few months and is continuing. Ten infantry battalions were deployed to the islands in February. Additionally, five fighter aircraft were moved to Limnos in March. This marks the first time that combat aircraft have been actually based on the islands.

The Director's assessment coincides closely with the information we have been receiving on this subject. In a recent conversation with our ambassador in Athens (cable at Tab B)⁴ *Greek Foreign Ministry Political Affairs Director Tzounis openly admitted that Greece has been reinforcing the islands in violation of several international treaties.* The official stated that the treaty restrictions on militarization of these islands were to "insure the maintenance of peace." He added that Greece had acted "only in response to Turkish threats", and that Greece could not leave the islands defenseless in view of present circumstances.

¹ Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for Middle East and South Asia, 1974–1977, Box 10, Greece 3. Secret. Sent for information. A notation on the memorandum indicates Kissinger saw it.

² Attached but not printed.

³ Document 42.

⁴ Not attached; most likely a reference a telegram 2693 from Athens, April 7. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1975)

45. National Security Study Memorandum 222¹

Washington, April 22, 1975.

TO

The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of State
The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT

U.S. and Allied Security Policy in Southern Europe

The President has directed a review of U.S. and Allied security policy in Southern Europe and along NATO's southern tier over the near- and mid-term. The study should examine the viability and effectiveness of U.S. and Allied security aims, arrangements, forces and bases in light of changes in the area, and should develop and assess U.S. and Allied near- and mid-term options.

The framework for the study should encompass:

- Overall U.S. interests in the region, including the U.S. political, military and economic relationship with NATO, the EC, and Western European states;
- U.S. security aims vis-à-vis the Soviets in the region; and
- U.S. interests vis-à-vis the Balkan states.

The study should consider inter alia:

- Present and potential changes in the area that bear on U.S. and Allied security policy, including domestic political developments and changes in external policies in Southern Europe, the evolution of Soviet capabilities, trends in Allied forces in the area, and the impact of economic factors, including energy, on the region;
- The political and military implications of changes in Southern European membership or participation in NATO;
- The consequences of elimination or curtailment of U.S. and Allied bases and facilities in the area (taking into account the Azores study being carried out in response to NSSM 221);²
- Prospects for an increased Allied and Western European political and military role in the area;
- The implications of new military and intelligence capabilities and technologies for U.S. force and base structure in the area.

¹ Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 316, National Security Council, NSSMs. Secret; Exdis. A copy was sent to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

² The response to NSSM 221, "U.S. Security Interests in the Azores," is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. E-15, Documents on Europe, 1973–1976.

The study should assume continuation of the current policy line in base negotiations with Portugal, Spain, and Greece and postulate a range of outcomes for purposes of analysis.

The study should be prepared on a priority, need-to-know basis by an NSC Ad Hoc Group composed of representatives of the addressees, the JCS and the NSC staff, and chaired by the representative of the Department of State. The completed study should be transmitted no later than May 28, 1975, for consideration by the NSC Senior Review Group.

Henry A. Kissinger

46. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Ford¹

Washington, April 29, 1975.

SUBJECT

U.S. Economic and Military Assistance to Greece

In your April message to the Congress,² you indicated—in the context of your broader remarks on Turkey, Greece and Cyprus—that we were consulting with Greece on economic and military assistance programs and that proposals would be submitted to Congress in the near future.

This memorandum reviews the current status of US-Greek consultations on economic and military assistance.

In early January, the Greek Government formally requested U.S. assistance for 1975 in the following specific areas:

- Military assistance.
- Economic assistance.
- Financing of capital equipment, raw materials and agricultural products through Export-Import Bank, Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC), and other agencies.

¹ Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for Middle East and South Asia, 1974–1977, Box 10, Greece 3. Confidential. Sent for information. A notation on the memorandum indicates the President saw it.

² The text of the “Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress Reporting on United States Foreign Policy,” April 10, is in *Public Papers: Ford, 1975*, pp. 459–473.

—Influence on international organizations such as the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to increase their lending to Greece.

So far, we have been able to be helpful in the following ways:

—Chairman Casey of the Export-Import Bank visited Greece in mid-April to explore the possibility of expanding Eximbank activity in Greece.

—We are supporting the IBRD's plan to approve loans to Greece this year approximating \$135 million. (Loans amounted to about \$40 million last year.)

—The IMF is prepared for increased Greek borrowing under the oil facility.

—We are planning to reschedule all of the principal and interest payments due this year for direct military credits (about \$10 million).

—We are also planning additional Foreign Military Sales (FMS) credit of \$15 million for FY 1975 beyond the present \$71 million program.

—We are continuing to explore the possibility of renewed CCC credit to Greece. The amount will depend on market conditions.

Prime Minister Caramanlis has made it clear that the Greek Government is primarily interested in substantial amounts of military assistance. This is motivated in great part by Caramanlis' desire to recoup military losses suffered during last summer's Cyprus crisis and to bring Greek forces up to par with those of Turkey. To this end, the Greek military has recently submitted a list of equipment amounting to about \$800 million to be spread out over a number of years. The Greeks have expressed the hope that the equipment would be provided primarily under grant aid rather than some form of outright purchase. We have told Caramanlis that there would be difficulties in providing grant military aid in the amount envisaged, particularly in view of the state of the U.S. economy and considering our military aid commitments world wide. We have made clear the additional problem of providing grant military aid to Greece while Turkey—a fellow NATO ally—is subject to an embargo on arms supplies. The Greeks have carefully separated the economic/military assistance request from the ongoing base negotiations. Approval of a program that substantially meets Greek requirements would have favorable impact on the base negotiations and facilitate efforts to encourage Greece to return to full participation in NATO.

State is tentatively planning a FY 1976 program for Greece in the range of \$65 million in grant military assistance, in addition to the \$90 million in FMS credits already planned. They are also considering the possibility of increasing FMS credit for Greece to the point where a total program of combined grant and credit would amount to approximately \$175 million. (By comparison, the proposal for Turkey in FY 1976 is \$180 million, including \$63 million in grant military assistance.)

The precise legislative strategy for handling Greece's stated economic and military aid requirements is under study. Both the option adopted and the timing involved will be influenced by other issues, including Congressional action on the Turkish aid cut-off, the pace and success of the Cyprus negotiations, the Aegean dispute between Greece and Turkey, and the outlook for our base discussions with Greece.

While continuing to seek substantial economic and military assistance from the United States, Prime Minister Caramanlis has been active on other fronts as well. Reports from Athens state that Caramanlis was successful in obtaining "substantial" economic and military aid from France during a recent trip to Paris. Unconfirmed press reports indicate that the assistance may range as high as \$800 million in long-term, low interest loans with a French pledge to speed up deliveries of modern weapons for Greek forces.

47. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Ford¹

Washington, May 6, 1975.

SUBJECT

U.S.-Greek Bases Negotiations—Round Two

The second round of the U.S.-Greek bases negotiations was held in Athens during the period April 7-29. *This memorandum reviews the status of the negotiations to date.*

Background. During the first round in the negotiations in February, the Greek government requested an adjustment in their security relationship with the United States along the following lines:

- Termination of homeporting;
- Closing out of all U.S. operations at Athenai (sometimes called Hellenikon) Air Force Base near Athens;
- “Hellenization” of all remaining U.S. facilities in Greece, including Greek participation to some degree in U.S. communications operations;
- Revision of the bilateral Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) to bring it in line with the NATO SOFA;

¹ Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for Middle East and South Asia, 1974-1977, Box 10, Greece 4. Secret. Sent for information. A notation on the memorandum indicates the President saw it.

—General improvements at the Souda Bay, Crete, base in return for continued U.S. Navy use of the airfield there, and;
—[1 line not declassified].

The Second Round. Our principal objectives in the second round were to:

—Obtain Greek agreement to continue the U.S. presence at Athenai Air Force Base, with the fewest possible changes in current activities;
—Use the termination of homeporting as a quid for Greek support of principal U.S. objectives;
—Hold the line on the SOFA issue as much as possible, while expressing our intention to be forthcoming in certain selected areas, and;
—Avoid bilateral negotiation of issues which touch on the Greek-NATO relationship such as [less than 1 line not declassified] installations built with NATO funds, steering such talks into the NATO forum.

Substantial progress was made toward achieving principal U.S. objectives:

—The Greek government agreed to allow a continued U.S. presence at Athenai Air Force Base (a principal U.S. objective in the negotiations) in exchange for the termination of homeporting by the U.S. Specifically, the United States will retain “essential” operations at Athenai (logistics flights, [2 lines not declassified]), while giving up certain non-essential support functions. Additionally, to meet Greek political needs, the base will be “Hellenized”, i.e., given the “cosmetic” appearance of a Greek rather than American facility.

—Action on the status of forces issue was confined to technical “working group” meetings designed to establish a framework for further discussions.

—The Greeks were informed that further progress in the bilateral negotiations will depend in large part on early clarification of Greece’s future role in NATO. The Greeks expressed their full understanding of this point, but indicated their desire to move cautiously to avoid inflaming volatile Greek public opinion on the NATO issue.

Outlook. Future negotiating sessions will focus on:

—Reaching agreement on the status of forces issue;
—Determining the degree of Greek participation in U.S. communications operations;
—Working out the details associated with continued U.S. access to and “Hellenization” of Athenai Air Force Base;
—Arranging for the U.S. Navy’s periodic use of the pier facilities near Athens vacated as a result of the termination of homeporting;
—Elimination, reduction or consolidation of certain other U.S. facilities considered “least essential” to retain from our standpoint, and;
—Financial compensation for the residual value of U.S. facilities turned over to the Greeks as a result of the negotiations.

The talks are currently in recess. A date for resumption has not been decided.

In the United States, Congressional and press reaction to the joint communiqué issued at the close of this round in the negotiations—particularly the termination of homeporting—was favorable, citing the beginning of a “new and more mature U.S.-Greek relationship.” In Greece, the public expression of views has been curtailed by the effects of a newspaper strike, but observers believe that Prime Minister Karamanlis’ image has been strengthened in relation to his parliamentary opposition on the left.

48. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Greece¹

Washington, May 27, 1975, 2349Z.

123252. Subject: US-Greek Base Negotiations: Planning for the Future. Ref: Athens 3370.²

1. During round two of the US-Greek base negotiations, we explored numerous aspects of future American-Greek defense cooperation. Our efforts in the months ahead need to be directed primarily toward: (a) consolidating the bilateral understandings already reached, through discussions among experts on both sides, leading to arrangements which can later be endorsed at the political level and (b) insuring that the future Greek-NATO relationship is clarified in a manner which provides for fullest possible Greek participation in the integrated military command structure. Our new bilateral arrangements with Greece should be consistent with and complement the Greek-NATO relationship.

2. We endorse Embassy Athens recommendation (reftel) that no date be considered now for a third plenary round of bilateral negotiations, but we recognize we may have to revise our planning if Caramanlis and Bitsios push for an early third round when they meet the President and the Secretary in Brussels. Our preference is to postpone such a round until well on into the fall and after issues have been resolved at the subgroup level. By that time, Greeks [garble] which are

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 84, Athens Embassy Files: Lot 78 F 160, Box 60, DEF 15, Bases and Installations 1975. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Repeated Priority to USNATO, USNMR SHAPE, USDEL MC, USCINCEUR, CINCUSNAVEUR, CINCUSAFE, and CINCLANT.

² Dated May 1. (Ibid.)

only now beginning (USNATO 2634),³ should have proceeded to the point where key issues have been delineated and possible avenues of resolution identified, [*1½ lines not declassified*] Greek eligibility for infrastructure funds.

3. As the Embassy appreciates and as we informed the Greeks, considerable time is needed by Washington agencies to develop and staff proposals we plan to make on various issues and the Greek proposals for technical training and shared-use at facilities. A tentative work program and timetable for joint planning purposes is set out below:

A. Tatoi: we understand that a decision on this subject cannot be delayed until round three and, as indicated in State 109638,⁴ we are prepared to discuss this issue directly with GOG, while investigating alternative sites in the weeks ahead. A decision on this subject should be possible by early June.

B. Homeporting: specific proposals for future US use of the pier at Elefsis and other residual homeporting facilities are being developed by DOD. These will be ready for presentation to the Greeks in further technical level discussions in Athens by early June.

C. Hellenikon Air Base: a comprehensive package of proposals to substantially reduce US personnel and visibility at Hellenikon is being developed by DOD. After this work is completed, a small team will be prepared to return to Athens to present this package in subgroup discussions with the Greeks. If an agreement can be reached in the subgroup it could then be confirmed at the Calogeras–Stearns level. Thereafter, the US team would return to Washington and initiate action to draft an implementing technical agreement. We do not desire to implement visible changes at the airbase until after subgroup agreement is confirmed by Calogeras–Stearns. Changes, however, could be initiated before the formal technical agreement has been completed and signed if the Greeks feel the domestic political situation requires such action. We appreciate that pressures may be heavy to move ahead quickly on Hellenikon, but we would prefer to have the Greeks approach us to resume subgroup meetings rather than initiate action ourselves to fix the date. We hope to complete preparations for further subgroup discussions by late June. However, a delay until early or mid-July would facilitate extensive staffing on this complex issue.

D. Telecommunications: we are breaking down this issue into the same three categories discussed in round two—[*less than 1 line not declassified*] defense communications system at other sites. After staffing

³ Dated May 12. (*Ibid.*, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1975)

⁴ Dated May 10. (*Ibid.*)

is completed in Washington, we would be prepared to discuss these topics one by one in Athens, preferably after work on the Hellenikon subgroup is finished. This would suggest that telecommunications issues should be addressed some time in late July or August. We would prefer to leave to Greek initiative the calling of future subgroup meetings on this subject.

E. SOFA: a draft revision of existing Greek-US SOFA agreements is now under preparation in DOD, a process which will not be completed until mid-summer. It will embody specific alternatives discussed in Athens at the subgroup level. It would be helpful to check with Economides and others in the Foreign Ministry to determine when they would prefer to resume bilateral SOFA discussions with us.

F. Umbrella Agreement: we are putting off until further progress has been made bilaterally and in NATO the decision whether we will accommodate the Greek proposal for an umbrella agreement. For internal purposes only, we are putting together a counterdraft to the Greek text received in round two. We would plan to seek comments from addressees and DOD on the merit of this redraft. We wish to avoid discussion of this matter with the Greeks at the moment; and to look at this question once more when the Greek-NATO relationship is fully clarified.

4. Other Subjects: we will continue over the summer to examine those facilities in Greece deemed "least essential to maintain" in NSSM 215.⁵ Although some of these facilities were mentioned to the Greek side in round two, we should avoid referring to these discussions even in the context of a trade-off—for example, for Tatoi. Least essential should not be read as not essential and it appears that interested US agencies who fund and manage these facilities do not agree that they are available as trade-offs without a detailed evaluation of what we would obtain in return.

5. Comments by Embassy Athens and USNATO on the above time schedule would be welcome.

Ingersoll

⁵ Document 33.

49. Intelligence Note Prepared in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research¹

INR IN-109

Washington, May 28, 1975.

GREECE AND TURKEY: MORE ARMS FROM WESTERN EUROPE

The unresolved Cyprus and Aegean islands disputes have motivated both Greece and Turkey to look increasingly to Western Europe for military equipment. Although the US has been their major supplier, Ankara and Athens alike must have serious doubts as to how long this situation will last—the former because of the Congressional embargo on US arms to Turkey; the latter, though able to buy US military supplies, because it feels the need to diversify its sources.

Even if Greece and Turkey are successful in their accelerated efforts to acquire arms from non-US sources, they are not likely to fulfill their long-term requirements. Their arms purchasing efforts in Western Europe are essentially emergency stopgap measures at a time when, in their perception, there is the possibility of armed conflict between them. To some extent, of course, Athens and Ankara may see their arms moves as demonstrating to Washington a certain ability to do with something less than complete reliance on the US.

But neither the Greeks nor the Turks probably want to go so far as to establish what in effect would constitute multiple supply systems for their armed forces. Such major diversification would

- substantially add to existing maintenance and logistics problems;
- require new training programs;
- involve some restructuring of their armed forces;
- create undue delays in deliveries since the production systems of few if any countries other than the US and the USSR are geared to provide arms in a timely fashion and in the amounts and type required.

Under these circumstances, there would be a net reduction in the operational capabilities of their armed forces and a net increase in the cost effectiveness of their supply and backup systems.

West German Arms Transfers Resumed. Bonn recently has resumed arms shipments to both Greece and Turkey that had been suspended in August 1974 shortly after Turkish military operations were launched in Cyprus. The German action, under consideration for some months,

¹ Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, NSC Staff for Europe, Canada, and Ocean Affairs: Convenience Files, 1974–1977, Box 26, Turkey, Turkey 1975 2 NSC. Secret; No Foreign Dissem. Prepared by Louis G. Sarris (INR).

followed the Bundestag's approval in mid-April of \$25.9 million² each for Greece and Turkey for surplus military equipment in the form of grant aid. The materiel list for each country includes small patrol boats, Cobra SS-11 anti-tank rockets, jet aircraft,³ ammunition, spare parts, uniforms, engineering equipment, trucks, and medical supplies.

Embassy Bonn has been informed that some of the German equipment has already reached Turkey and that deliveries to Greece should arrive during the month. While the Greeks have not yet formally accepted all items on the German list, it is expected that they will do so very soon. German officials have also suggested that both Athens and Ankara may in time receive the M-48 tank when it is replaced by the Leopard, both German-produced items.

Ankara: More German and Italian Arms. Next to the United States, West Germany is Turkey's major arms supplier. Total military deliveries to Ankara since 1964, when Bonn first began providing arms, amounted by 1974 to almost \$245 million, with another \$175 million in commitments still unfulfilled; about 80 percent of the total value of the military agreements with Ankara have been grant aid. Deliveries during 1973 and 1974 amounted to about \$25 million each year, the lowest for any period since 1970. The bulk of the German arms to Turkey has been ground forces equipment, largely small arms, artillery, mortars, trucks, and radios. However, Ankara has also received a number of aircraft, mainly 158 F-84 jet fighters, and several coastal patrol boats (including nine Jaguar Class) and two 1,000-ton (Type 209) submarines.

The Cyprus and Aegean islands disputes with Greece since mid-1974 have accelerated Ankara's efforts to procure additional military equipment from Germany, primarily to strengthen Turkish naval capabilities. During October 1974, Turkey signed three agreements with Germany, valued at \$105 million and covering the purchase of 21 Jaguar patrol craft and two additional 1,000-ton submarines. None of these items has been delivered thus far during 1975.

For its air force requirements, Turkey turned to Italy, Ankara's third largest arms supplier; since the mid-1960s, there have been some \$139 million in agreements and \$52 million in deliveries. During the latter part of 1974, Turkey signed two agreements with Italy, valued at approximately \$86 million, for the purchase of 18 F-104 fighters (including

² Converted from 60 million marks at the average March 1975 exchange rate of 2.319 marks to the dollar. [Footnote is in the original.]

³ Two TF-104 trainers for Turkey and 33 T-33 trainers for Greece; only 22 of the latter are flyable. Since both types of aircraft are of U.S. origin, Bonn cannot legally turn the TF-104s over to Turkey until US restrictions have been lifted. [Footnote is in the original.]

spare parts and training) and 20 AB–204B helicopters. The sale of the fighters, around \$75 million, reportedly is being financed by Libya; nine were delivered during 1974 and seven during 1975 before the US arms cutoff last February.⁴ Ankara apparently is continuing to negotiate for additional Italian arms and as recently as last April had submitted a shopping list for a wide array of equipment, most of which, if not all, reportedly would be purchased for cash. This tends to suggest financing by third parties, presumably Arab countries.

Athens: More French and German Arms. Until last year, Germany had been Greece's principal secondary source for military equipment—approximately \$111 million in agreements since 1963, virtually all of which was delivered by 1972. In contrast to Turkey, less than 10 percent of the arms agreements has been grant aid. The major German deliveries included 69 F–84F fighters, 60 M–47 tanks and tank recovery vehicles, 40 Noratlas aircraft transports, four 1,000-ton (Type 209) submarines, and Cobra and Milan anti-tank missiles.

During the first quarter of 1975, Greece signed a \$43 million agreement with Bonn for the purchase of at least 40 20 mm. AAA guns. There are no additional details on this accord. Athens reportedly is also interested in procuring additional submarines from Bonn.

Greece appears to be turning increasingly to France, heretofore Athens' third largest arms supplier. From 1965 through 1972, France had provided Greece with some \$56 million in military equipment—mainly 60 AMX–30 tanks, 50 Exocet guided-missile naval craft, and 4 Combattante II guided-missile control boats. There were no French arms deliveries to Greece in 1973 and virtually none in 1974. However, during the first half of last year, even before the Cyprus crisis erupted, Athens signed at least four arms agreements with Paris, valued at more than \$350 million, to cover the purchase of 40 Mirage F–1 fighters, 250 AMX–10 and AMX–30 tanks, and 4 Combattante III guided-missile boats. These agreements raise total French arms commitments to Greece to more than \$400 million, all in the form of cash or credit sales.

Despite increased Greek interest in French arms, none of the 1974 agreements has yet resulted in new deliveries from France. While there are conflicting reports as to the reasons for the delays, the 1974 contracts are cash sales, even though payments with interest are extended over several years, and the Karamanlis government almost certainly would feel strained to meet financial obligations of this size from its

⁴ Although both the F–104 and the AB–204B are of U.S. origin, special licensing arrangements for the latter permit its third-country export to Turkey without US approval. [Footnote is in the original.]

own resources. Easing of the 7.5 percent interest rate on the accords, extensions of longer term credit, or even a foreign loan would help activate deliveries, but there is no evidence that any of these is about to occur. In short, Greece's efforts to increase its inventory of French military hardware has proceeded little beyond the contractual stage.

50. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Brussels, May 29, 1975, 9:30–10:45 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Greek:

Prime Minister Caramanlis
 Foreign Minister Bitsios
 Ambassador John Tzounis
 Ambassador Molyviatis, Office of the Presidency

U.S.:

The President
 Secretary of State Kissinger
 Lieutenant General Scowcroft
 Assistant Secretary for European Affairs Hartman

President: (The first few remarks were made during the picture taking and I did not hear them all.) We want very much to be helpful on the Middle East. I am looking forward to my meeting with Sadat.

Caramanlis: That is very important.

President: There is a great interest in Greek affairs in the United States and I am very pleased to have this meeting. We have many good citizens who came from Greece. You know they have a large organization called AHEPA.

Secretary: Yes and they are very passionate too.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Records of Henry Kissinger, 1973–1977, Entry 5403, Box 23, Classified External Memoranda of Conversations, May–December 1975. Secret; Nodis. The meeting was held in Ambassador Firestone's residence. Ford and Kissinger were in Brussels for a meeting of the North Atlantic Council. An undated White House briefing paper by Kissinger is in the Ford Library, National Security Adviser, NSC Staff for Europe, Canada, and Ocean Affairs: Convenience Files, 1974–1977, Box 69, Ford Trips File, May–June 1975 European Trip-NATO 3. An undated Department of State background paper is *ibid.*, Trip Briefing Books and Cables for President Ford, 1974–76, Box 8, Presidential Trip Files, Briefing Book—NATO Background. Another undated Department bilateral briefing paper is *ibid.*, Briefing Book—NATO Bilaterals 3.

President: They are all good American citizens and traditionally they have been leaders in their community.²

Caramanlis: Yes, there is a new generation now and I understand you have as many as two million.

President: No, I think there are three million. One of them had a great influence on my life when I worked in a restaurant in my hometown.

Secretary: I was saying to your Foreign Minister that he is the toughest negotiator.

President: Mr. Prime Minister, we have been greatly impressed and we are favorably inclined toward you and what you are trying to do in Greece. We think that you have had a major success in your elections and, indeed, I am envious of your majority. It is our strongly held belief and feeling that there should be a democratic development in Greece. This is what Americans wanted and we were very pleased by the return of democracy to Greece. We hope and trust that we will be able to work together both in our bilateral relations and in your region and the world.

Caramanlis: Mr. President, I would like to thank you too for meeting me at this critical time. I would also like to thank you for the trouble and time which you have taken and the offers of help which you have made. In times when we have to face such large problems the help of friends such as the United States is very much valued. We are establishing a democracy but it needs consolidation. To do so we must solve the current problems. The dictatorship left many unpleasant situations but I can assure you that in a year or so Greece will be a healthy democracy. We have solved the problem of the return of parliamentary democracy, we have solved the problem of the Monarchy and this next week we will have a constitution. There will be no abnormality remaining. I must tell you in all frankness that I have been able to do much of this because the people have put their trust in me. Beyond these successes we have also been able to re-establish discipline in the Army but for all of this trust to be justified there must be success in dealing with our many problems. If not, the confidence in me will erode in time. And this is particularly true of the Greek-Turkish problems, the Cyprus situation and the economy. Now, Mr. President, how do you wish to proceed?

President: We greatly admire all that you have accomplished in restoring democracy to Greece and in restoring order and authority. It

² Ford, Kissinger, and Scowcroft met with AHEPA leaders on April 25, 12:45–1:25 p.m. (Memorandum of conversation; Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, Box 11, 4/25/75)

is a tribute to your great leadership. We too recognize that if the moment is not seized when problems can be solved then the solution is impossible. I would like to discuss Cyprus and Greek-Turkish relations and how we can be helpful to you.

Caramanlis: Let me begin by discussing recent history. Before my return to power there was a coup in Cyprus caused by the Greek Junta and they got rid of Makarios. The Turks claimed to act as a guarantor power which they said gave them the right to restore the legitimate regime and protect the Turkish population. The guarantee as written into the London and Zurich Agreements provides that it is for the restoration of legitimacy and the protection of territorial integrity. Legitimacy was restored in three days after the invasion. I came back and took over the government of Greece and Clerides took over in Nicosia. After that there was no reason to remain on Cyprus. The purpose of the guarantee was achieved. But they are still there. Several weeks later they occupied 40 percent of the island. I remember those days very well because your Foreign Minister woke me up at four o'clock in the morning. There was no shred of excuse for the second Turkish move. You don't just create strategic plans overnight. The military operation must have been planned for some time. The occupation of 40 percent of the island follows very closely a military plan known as Attila. This proves premeditation. Two hundred thousand refugees were created by this move. You can say it is not huge but the total population of the island is only half a million. They also took in the 40 percent the largest area in resources. On August 14 I faced an explosion in my Army and among the population. I went to the General Staff Headquarters and they demanded that I act. There was pressure for a declaration of war. Naturally everyone felt humiliated but I took the unpopular decision to tell the people to be quiet and trust me. I said that we would get help from our friends to find the solution. In that dramatic moment I had three choices: first, go to war; second, withdraw from politics once again or, third, withdraw from the military side of NATO. I chose the third alternative as the least painful. That is the story of Cyprus. It is very difficult to prove something that is self-evident but the Turks are in the wrong. The Greeks have shown moderation in spite of everything that has happened. We still show moderation. For a long time the Turks have asked for a geographic federal solution. In our view there should have been a return to the London and Zurich Agreements but we have accepted a geographic federation on two conditions: first, that the territory controlled by the Turks be in relation to the percent of their population and, second, that the solution allow for a return of refugees. This would be an honorable and reasonable solution but the Turks continually want to present us with *fait accompli*. What should we do?

President: We think we should proceed from the assumption of the facts as they are.

Caramanlis: Before you comment, let me finish my explanation. Beyond Cyprus we have the problems in the Aegean. We are in favor of the status quo which has existed since 1913. But the Turks are continually creating problems about the continental shelf, about air corridors and, in fact, they want to split the Aegean Sea which would mean that many of our islands would be in a Turkish sea. We have proposed taking the matter to the ICJ but the Turks, while accepting this in principle, refused in Rome to draw up the documents which would refer the case to the ICJ. I must tell you that if all of these matters are not solved and they are prolonged they could lead to war and that should not be excluded. In both countries tempers are running very high and it would be a shame if war were to break out under the noses of our Allies. I have done and will do all that I can to avoid war but we need to return to a comprehensive approach which will contribute to averting this danger. Again I cannot and will not indicate how you can help. That is something you must decide for yourselves.

President: The two most important questions are Cyprus and the Aegean. We would like to contribute to a solution of these problems. We feel certain developments in that area are unfortunate for NATO and they have created tremendous problems in the United States. Something must be done. We have a reflection of this in our Congress where aid to Turkey has been cut off. We feel that that action has been harmful to our influence with the Turks and our ability to get concessions from the Turks. We were able to reverse the action in the Senate and it is possible we will be able to change views in the House. It is my feeling that if Congress retains the limitation our influence will be lessened. Therefore, we have held many consultations with Congressmen. We have told them that we need additional time to clear up this festering unhealthy situation in NATO. We have told them how harmful it is if something is not done and that we are approaching the time when the Turkish authorities may close U.S. military bases which will be harmful in terms of our overall defense. We have said that it is time for Congress to act and the sooner the better. We are encouraged by the talks going on in Vienna between the two communities and we hope that progress will be achieved. But I must say that our leverage is lessened as long as the embargo on Turkish aid remains.

Secretary: May I add a word, Mr. President, on the Turkish political situation. This is my assessment of the domestic problem. Caglayangil wants a settlement. Demirel basically wants a settlement but he is very fearful that Erbakan will break up his coalition if he moves toward a settlement. I have told the President, Mr. Prime Minister, that I am ready to form a government in Turkey because I have talked to all the politicians. I have seen the heads of all the parties and I have told them all that now is the time to settle this matter. The key is Ecevit. If you and he were the Prime Ministers dealing with this prob-

lem I am convinced it will be settled. In opposition, however, Ecevit will use this issue to try and break up the coalition. I had a long talk with him in Ankara.³ I know him well. He used to be a student of mine.

Caramanlis: That's why we Greeks suspected you were pro Turk.

Secretary: Demirel is afraid to lose his majority. If he had your majority he would probably favor a quick settlement but Demirel needs the restoration of American aid so that he can show that he has achieved something. To help him we are prepared to take a public position against what Ecevit is saying in the right circumstances. I have told Ecevit directly that he should not wish to take responsibility for leaving this problem unsolved and causing a dangerous situation to develop. There are two issues: There is a growing nationalism against the United States and there is an historical antipathy against the Greeks. But let me give you my assessment. Now is the time for a rapid move toward a settlement. We have already convinced the Turks first that they are going to have to give up some territory and, second, that the central government has to have some power. We do not believe that you can get the territory back down to 18 percent even though what you say is just. But there has to be a contraction of what the Turks now hold. We have never explored the question of percentages but it must be considerably less than 40 percent. The trouble is that the Turks now have an alibi to do nothing because of the aid embargo. Demirel is scared of Ecevit.

Caramanlis: I understand all this but what you seem to be saying is that because of these ridiculous internal problems we, the Greeks, must pay. This is crazy and unreasonable that we should have to pay blackmail. Now let me talk about aid. I know that you have discussed this with the Foreign Minister indirectly.⁴ Aid can be used in two ways in this situation: first, as a threat . . .

Secretary: Yes, that would have been the best way.

Caramanlis: Or you can cut off the aid and say that you will resume it when reasonable progress has been made. We tried the first for months and no result was achieved. Now we are trying the second and we still have no result. The Turks are not acting in good faith. They are unreasonable. I have not taken a position. If I were to say something in public

³ See Document 226 and footnote 3 thereto.

⁴ On April 16 Springsteen sent a memorandum to Snowcroft reporting on the status of the Greek request for aid, initiated on January 4 when Kubisch met with the Greek Ministers of Economic Coordination, Defense, and Foreign Affairs in Athens. Greece remained primarily interested in grant military assistance, which was problematic owing to its problems with Turkey over Cyprus and the Aegean. (Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for Middle East and South Asia, 1974-77, Box 10, Greece 3)

I would have to disapprove restoring aid to fit public opinion in my country. We cannot shout from the housetops that we want aid restored to Turkey. Despite these pressures I have made no public statement.

President: I understand your position completely but we must have a change in this action. There is little or no chance to make progress in the negotiations while the embargo lasts. Historically, as you know, I have always given full support to close U.S.-Greek ties. I have a personal feeling about the history and future of Greece and I support you. But if we don't get a solution to this problem it will make all of our tasks more difficult. I have done my utmost to get American Greeks to change their minds. Once the cut-off is lifted then I can judiciously handle the timing and the amount of aid given to Turkey. But the Turks will not move until we have removed the embargo. It will complicate our bases and Western security. I hope negotiations can be seen to be making progress in order to get the Congress to move but I appreciate your public position.

Caramanlis: I understand. I do not wish to become involved in U.S. internal politics. Even if the aid ban is lifted, I do not believe the Turks will be more reasonable. Their internal difficulties will continue. Therefore, the problem will not be any different.

Secretary: I agree with you that if aid is resumed it will still be difficult to get a settlement but if it is not, it will be impossible. Also let me emphasize what the President just said to you that if aid is restored the Administration can restrict its flow (Bitsios explains in Greek). Even with aid restored it is going to be very very difficult to get a solution but now the Turks have the alibi and they do not fear pressure. We wish to assure you of our desire to be helpful and we recognize that the only solution is to get the Turks to make solutions.

President: If the Congressional aid ban is removed, then it will be up to me. I have the flexibility. It will be up to the Executive Branch to decide.

Secretary: This fellow Erbakan [*less than 1 line not declassified*]. He will do something to try and prevent a negotiation. That is why it is very important to neutralize Ecevit. Without Ecevit no settlement is possible.

Caramanlis: Your conclusion is disappointing. Instead of asking concessions from the Turks you seem to be asking why the Greeks won't pay.

Secretary: The Turks must give up three things: first, territory; second, a federal government with real powers; and, third, some refugee return. There are no concessions from the Greeks on those items.

Caramanlis: I don't see much light here. In any case, I will see Demirel myself on Saturday. I have a solution soon on the way and if it is not an honorable and just solution, there can be no viable peace on Cyprus. We are just buying future trouble.

Secretary: It is not in our interest to do anything to weaken the Prime Minister.

Caramanlis: Nor do I wish to weaken myself. If the solution is unjust, it is not viable. You should know that from history.

Secretary: What should we say to the Turks?

Caramanlis: It is difficult to say. I told you how I see the situation and perhaps you and the Foreign Minister can discuss this further tomorrow.⁵

President: We would certainly not advocate an unjust solution but a continuation of this problem is worse. We are in favor of an honorable solution but we would very much appreciate it if you could indicate to us how we can be helpful. A suggestion of what we might say and we would be happy to do it. This is in our mutual Western interest.

Caramanlis: This is a case of the two sides having difficulty and the third party giving a suggestion to the wrong one. The Turks are at fault. Therefore, it is up to the Turks for moral and political reasons to come forward with a proposal. They are the ones that should be pressured. We are ready to defend our interests and we will fight if we have to. This is a question of national pride but I am trying to block it. How long can we go on feeling humiliated? There is great pressure to react. I have tried to be moderate in order to facilitate a solution. Ask the Turks what their intentions are. If there is a war Turkey will be the first victim because they will open the way to the Soviets. We will not fall to the blackmail of Turkey. When people feel humiliated the Army is very pro-Caramanlis although there is beginning to be some criticism. I may be forced to reconsider the policies of my country. The most helpful thing you can do is to say to the Turks what you have already said to us but say it publicly that the United States will not tolerate military action.

Secretary: We have already said this privately. If there is any move in the Aegean, there will be total American opposition.

Caramanlis: The Turks moved on to Cyprus as a guarantor. We too are guarantors and I have the right to send troops there. You should say publicly that you will not allow any action that could lead to war. You should say publicly that you will help avoid war. This will make the Turks more reasonable.

President: We oppose any military operation and we will make a maximum effort to avert a war. We will work to avoid such a situation from arising, but if I'm to be able to put pressure on Turkey then I must get the aid restored. I am confident that if the limitation is removed it will help in the negotiations. We oppose military action in the Aegean.

⁵ Ford and Kissinger met with Demirel and Caglayangil later the same morning; see Document 227.

That is our position. There is some question as to whether we should say that publicly but the policy is clear and we would oppose military action whether by Turkey or any other party. This is the same position we have taken in the Middle East where we have opposed military action. We believe that a stalemate leads to the temptation to use force.

Caramanlis: What should we do. My experience I have used to give you my advice on what you could do to create hope but you must make the final judgment. If you say something in public it will not provoke a reaction but instead create a better climate. It will urge moderation and it will also state that the United States will not allow any side to take military action.

Secretary: I am going to be briefing the press, perhaps we can plant a question and I can respond along the lines the Prime Minister has suggested.

Caramanlis: In order to avoid any misunderstanding let me speak in total and sincere frankness. I do not believe in hiding my thoughts and avoiding substance. What I am recommending is not to protect Greece when I ask you to make this statement. If it comes to a question of protecting Greece I will protect Greece through our own actions. But I am asking for a statement like this only to make the Turks more reasonable.

Secretary: If there is a danger of war, we would totally oppose military action.

Caramanlis: This will relieve the Turks of their threats. If the Turks act in any way that is provocative this will help.

President: I think we can handle this in answering a press question and the Secretary will do this.⁶

Secretary: What I would say is that we would strongly oppose military action by either side in this conflict.

Caramanlis: Or any action that could lead to a deterioration.

President: We can respond in this way. This hopefully will be helpful. We can make this clear just as we did in the Middle East.

Caramanlis: Let me explain our attitude toward NATO. We were forced to withdraw from the military part of the Alliance. It gave us no pleasure to do so. There was no other way. We can only change this when the reasons for this action have been removed. The causes must

⁶ In telegram Secto 02047 from Brussels, May 30, Kissinger relayed the text of his press conference of May 29. In his prepared statement, he said about Greek-Turkish tensions: "We believe that while these negotiations are going on, neither side should take any military actions or make any military threat or take any steps that could lead to military action, and we have expressed that conviction to the parties concerned." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1975)

be lifted. If I return to the military part of the Alliance before the problem is solved and we later get into a conflict what will happen to the Alliance then. First we must restore normality. I have explained the problems. I have not told you how they can be settled but we hope that you will do your best to help.

President: We want Greece back in the Alliance.

Caramanlis: I am for the Alliance. I am the most pro-Western politician in my country.

Secretary: We've always admired your great statesmanship.

Caramanlis: This has even been detrimental to my political fortunes.

President: If we can help we will do what we can. We will do all that we can. We want the Cyprus problem solved and we want the Greeks back in NATO.

51. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Helsinki, July 30, 1975, 1 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Greece:

Prime Minister Caramanlis
Foreign Minister Bitsios
Chef de Cabinet Molyviatos

U.S.:

The President
The Secretary of State
Mr. Arthur A. Hartman, Assistant Secretary for European Affairs

There was a brief discussion in the garden of the President's previous stops and then of his future travel plans including his plans to meet with the Japanese Prime Minister.

Caramanlis: I was in Romania a short time ago and I thought of inviting the Romanians to join us at the NATO Summit.

The Secretary: Yes, they and the Chinese are the best allies of NATO and the Common Market.

¹ Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, Box 14, CSCE, 7/26-8/4/75. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Hartman. The meeting was held at the Ambassador's residence. Ford and Kissinger were in Helsinki for CSCE talks.

The President: Aren't the Albanians here?

The Secretary: No and that's because they follow the Chinese line.

Bitsios: Yes, they think all of this is a conspiracy.

Caramanlis: I am going to be making separate visits to Bulgaria and Yugoslavia as well as Romania.

The President: I understand that Romania and particularly Bucharest was very lively in the pre-war period.

Bitsios: Yes, they called it the Paris of the East.

The Secretary: That's because it was decadent.

The President: Do they still have very much oil?

Caramanlis: I think about half of it is gone.

Molyviatos: We have very warm relations with Bulgaria now.

The Secretary: That was not true historically.

Caramanlis: Yes, this is the first time.

The Secretary: In times past the Bulgarians wanted an outlet to the Aegean and thought they should have a piece of Greece.

Bitsios: The Bulgarians are annoyed with the Yugoslavs because of the Macedonian minority question.

Caramanlis: We could have better relations with Bulgaria than Turkey. What we need is a new equilibrium.

The President: What do you think is going to happen in Yugoslavia after Tito?

Caramanlis: I think it is going to be very difficult. There are three possibilities. The Russians may take control. It may split up. Or, because of the strength of the Army, it may remain unified and have the same independence. It is a big preoccupation for us. One of the reasons we want to restore good relations with Turkey is so that we will not have that problem when the transition occurs in Yugoslavia.

The Secretary: If the Turkish situation is improved then you feel you can play a helpful role in the Balkans.

The President: Who is the emerging leader in Yugoslavia?

Caramanlis: It is difficult to say but I think they have a 50–50 chance of maintaining their unity and independence.

The President: It would not be healthy if the Soviets move in.

Caramanlis: If the Russians move in, then Yugoslavia would cooperate with Bulgaria. That is why our relations with Turkey are important.

The Secretary: Yes.

Caramanlis: Our relations with Yugoslavia are good.

The Secretary: The reason that the civil war in Greece ended was because Yugoslavia closed the borders.

Bitsios: Yes, that is true.

Caramanlis: There were two reasons—the Truman Doctrine and Tito closed the borders.

The President: We all owe Tito a lot. I can remember when I was in Congress some of my colleagues questioned giving military aid to Tito but it was the right thing to do because it helped in Greece and in the Mediterranean generally.

Bitsios: Are your relations with Yugoslavia good?

The President: Yes.

The Secretary: There are only occasional press attacks due to their non-aligned position.

The President: Who is the Foreign Minister?

The Secretary: Minic.

Bitsios: There are rumours that he may head the collective leadership after Tito.

The President: What do you think of Portugal today?

Caramanlis: I think it is hopeless.

The Secretary: That is my view.

The President: Do you think that they should stay in NATO if they are Communists?

Caramanlis: There may be a civil war there. It depends on the conservatives.

Bitsios: It is also bad for Spain.

The President: I noted that the Workers' Associations in Spain have voted and they have chosen either liberal or Communist leadership.

The Secretary: Yes.

Caramanlis: The Portuguese situation has a dangerous effect in Spain and Italy. In my view when situations develop that are bad they need immediate measures to correct them.

The Secretary: You're right. We have wasted a year on Portugal mainly because the West Europeans said there was no problem.

Caramanlis: In the case of Portugal, Cyprus and Arab oil, we now have a big problem which creates hostility but if these crises are dealt with quickly they usually can be solved and we can avoid confrontation.

The Secretary: It is a pity that we were not able to make progress on Cyprus in December. You were ready but then Ecevit's resignation and our own domestic problem delayed a solution plus the vested interests in Turkey.

Caramanlis: The situation is now worse than Brussels. You will recall that I expressed our position on Cyprus. The responsibility for lack of progress rests with Turkey. This is dangerous. We are realistic. If

there is no progress there will be even greater danger and even outside the area of Cyprus.

The Secretary: Have you seen that Demirel will see Brezhnev?

Caramanlis: Yes, they have given credits to Turkey.

The President: I think about \$500 million.

The Secretary: Our tragedy is that our influence has been reduced and we never had a chance to use it.

The President: I am sure you know, Mr. Prime Minister, that I am extremely disappointed by the vote in the Congress last week.² I had personally put my prestige on the line. I saw 325 Members of the House. I was convinced and I am convinced that a continuation of the embargo is a handicap to a Cyprus solution, undermines NATO, is no help to Greece, and involves the closing of U.S. bases which are deeply connected with U.S. national security. We made a fair and proper presentation. But we lost. And I am afraid that all the circumstances I foresaw will take place. Our leverage is not zero; it is negative. The closing of the bases is extremely serious. If the Turks maintain their adamant attitude on Cyprus it will certainly delay a solution and also lead to problems in the Aegean. Frankly I must tell you, Mr. Prime Minister, there were people in your Embassy who were actively opposing my efforts to obtain House action. A letter was sent by your Embassy (the President shows the letter) saying that Administration statements were in error.

The Secretary: Statements which I had not made.

The President: That letter was publicly distributed on the floor of the House and it was very damaging. Your Embassy bypassed established channels. If they thought that a statement of that kind had been made they should have asked the Secretary whether or not it was true before making any public comment. There were large numbers of people from your Embassy in the galleries who by their presence gave an unfavorable atmosphere. I can tell you what we have been trying to do—we want to help solve the problem but I must tell you in a friendly and firm way that I do not believe the activities of your Embassy were the proper way for your Government to act.

² On May 19 the Senate passed S.846, 41–40, which permitted resumption of most military aid to Turkey. On July 16 the House Foreign Affairs Committee reported a substantially revised S.846 to the House. The amended version sought to answer the concerns of Turkish aid opponents. It still prohibited direct military aid grants but allowed for “1) the shipment of arms contracted for with the United States before the embargo went into effect, 2) cash sales of arms on the commercial market, and 3) future U.S. government sales and credits for NATO-related items.” On July 24 the House voted 206–223 to reject the amended version of S.846, despite intensive lobbying by the White House. The following day Turkey ordered the cessation of operations at the 27 U.S. bases on its territory. (*Congress and the Nation, 1973–1976, Vol. IV, pp. 866–867*)

Caramanlis: As Prime Minister of the Greek Government I had knowledge of the statement. All during this time I have tried not to take a position although I have been under extreme pressure from the press in Athens to state publicly that the Greek Government is against lifting the embargo. In spite of this pressure I resisted but when I was informed by Members of your Congress that the impression was being given that the Greek Government favored lifting the embargo, I was obliged to issue a denial because if it was believed in Greece that I favored the lifting of the embargo there would be strong public opposition to me in Greece.

The Secretary: If you had come to us, we would have issued a public denial. Our case did not rest on Greek support and we never said that that was the position of your Government.

Caramanlis: A man by the name of George Christopher who was the Mayor of San Francisco mailed a letter in which he purported to quote me and I denied that this was a quotation from me.

Hartman: Your Embassy said that no one had the right to speak for you but they did not really deny the quotation.

The Secretary: It is clear but we never said that you favored the lifting of the embargo.

The President: I have understood that the Greek Government was not going to take a stand. We have always said that we could be more effective in helping Greece and moving toward a peaceful settlement on Cyprus if the embargo were lifted.

Caramanlis: You should not think that you will have more influence. But I don't want to connect these issues. It is up to you to decide on arms but in my view your leverage will not be increased by a lifting of the embargo because, after all, you have tried both—lifting the embargo and continuing arms shipments and both have failed. In my view the way to achieve progress is to discreetly get commitments from the Turks so that their pride is not involved and then lift the embargo contingent on their taking action later. I understand that they do not wish to make concessions under pressure and that is why you would have to get their discreet agreement.

The Secretary: That is a reasonable solution but the trouble is it could not be kept secret because we would have to tell the Congress and they would make it public. This was the President's own personal position and he felt that there would be a moral obligation for the Turks to make progress and he told them in Brussels that if progress was not made it would lead to an enormous effect on Turkish-U.S. relations which we would initiate.³ In fact, I cautioned the President that he might be promising more than he could deliver.

³ See Document 227.

Caramanlis: It was not for me to say how you handled your Turkish relations. But whether we wish it or not those relations are linked with Cyprus. All the issues involved are linked and if a solution is not found, we will continue to have problems.

The President: There is no question about that.

Caramanlis: I have the impression that this situation has not been handled right. We all know how to arrive at a solution to this small problem and a solution exists—it is not like the Middle East—but all the same if a solution is found all the dangers will automatically disappear. After all it is a rather small question. I have adopted a position. I am willing to satisfy Turkish demands. I have accepted a geographic federation. I am prepared to accept two zones but on condition that enough territory is returned so that their percentage is roughly equivalent or in some relation to their population. It can be 1 or 2 or 3 percent more than the 18 percent of their position. This would facilitate the return of refugees. I am willing to give the Turks whatever federal powers they want. I can impose such a solution now. I am strong enough in Athens and I can control Makarios.

The Secretary: If you can, you are the only one.

Caramanlis: If the Turks do not move now in a few months it may not be possible. You must convince the Turks.

The President: We want your good Government to continue and to prosper. We favor very strongly the Caramanlis government in Greece and we are very apprehensive of the festering of this Cyprus problem and its potential effect on you. We want to help. Just this morning I received a message that the Congress is going to try for another bipartisan compromise and this has my full support. If it fails and they must act by Friday things will be much worse five weeks from now when Congress returns.⁴ We are going to try and outside parties could help to reverse the narrow defeat. After all, we only lost by a vote of 206 to 223. Until the last few seconds of the vote I thought we had won. But I must tell you that my dear friends in AHEPA have been very difficult. They have been misinformed. They are a fine people but they have to be told of the dire circumstances that will follow if this next effort fails. If we go through five weeks with nothing happening the situation will be worse. This is not a partisan effort. After the vote both

⁴ Turkey's response to the defeat of S.846 prompted the White House to revive the bill. On July 31 the Senate voted 47–46 to pass a new bill, S.2230, which contained language that partially lifted the embargo that the House had rejected. Though due to adjourn for summer recess, the House awaited the Senate action on the new bill, but proved unable to act on it prior to the recess because of parliamentary delays by opponents of the bill. Further action had to wait until September and October. (*Congress and the Nation, 1973–1976*, Vol. IV, pp. 866–867)

Senators Scott and Mansfield condemned the House action. But we have a chance to rescue that situation and this is a last effort. You are a judge of what you can do but you must also know that you can never tell what kind of backlash there could be. If this situation deteriorates further, the American people will want to blame someone for the effects on our national security. You will have to decide what role you can play. Maybe none.

Caramanlis: My Government cannot help the American Government, and speak in favor of supporting the enemy. That would be political suicide.

The Secretary: Brademas and Sarbanes say that they have a way of clearing their statements with Bitsios but you know, Mr. Foreign Minister, that every proposal we have made we have cleared with you and that we have tried to use our pressure to obtain Turkish concessions. We think, Mr. Prime Minister, that you have exercised great statesmanship. But then the Greeks come to us and say that they hear that the State Department is anti-Greek. They say that we are not doing enough.

Bitsios: I will see to it that the word is spread that you are helping.

The Secretary: I am afraid that this has become a personal issue for some people. The Congressmen say that they have a source in the Prime Minister's office who says that we are not doing anything to help with the Turks and that in fact we might be colluding with the Turks in order to produce a stalemate.

Caramanlis: That is gossip and it is just not true. If I have to say something to the American Government I will do so directly. I don't wish to say anything about large States but it is absolutely essential for a small State that it speak sincerely and honestly.

The President: Mr. Prime Minister, you told me in Brussels⁵ that you were concerned about the Aegean and that you wanted to keep that situation quiet. I spoke very firmly to Demirel about this as you asked me to. If we are able to get the embargo lifted I asked him do I have your assurance that you will negotiate on Cyprus in a meaningful way. He gave me that assurance and we were firm with him. That is why I am personally disappointed. John Brademas is a friend of mine but he keeps saying that we are not pressing Turkey and he is doing things which, in my view, are totally undermining my ability to influence Turkey.

Bitsios: I have always praised the efforts of your Secretary of State. I have mentioned his trip to Ankara but it is the Turks who have been negative. I can deny categorically stories that you are not doing anything.

⁵ See Document 50.

Caramanlis: I certainly do not agree with such statements.

The Secretary: We think that the Turks are shortsighted. We know that it is essential for the Turks to make significant concessions. The only thing which I see as a major obstacle is the percentage of territory required to negotiate a solution. And if I may say so—and I have tremendous admiration for the Prime Minister personally—all of your terms seem to be reasonable. Turkey had an opportunity to achieve a settlement and with the exception of some tactical errors we may have made last August each new negative factor was used by the Turks as another excuse to delay.

Caramanlis: As you know, we have taken the initiative to try to deal with the Aegean problem. We did not think it was an issue but we agreed to refer the matter to the Court at The Hague. The Ministers agreed to meet in Rome to discuss such a referral but the Turks said that they were not ready. One or two months have passed and they say they may not be ready until September.

The Secretary: They may want to wait until they get through their Senate elections in October.

Caramanlis: Do you think in view of the fact that your Congress has acted the way it has this is the moment when perhaps the Europeans can take an initiative?

The President: We would welcome a fresh approach and if the EC-Nine wish to do something, we would certainly welcome it and the sooner the better. We would have no objection.

The Secretary: As a matter of fact, we told Prime Minister Wilson at breakfast this morning that if the Europeans wish to make an effort we considered it to be in our interests and we would support it.

Caramanlis: The Europeans do not have the same possibilities that you do.

The President: We have no pride of authorship. We want the problem solved.

The Secretary: The difficulty is that you have acted in a statesman-like way but the Turks have responded to domestic and local considerations. We thought that if we could give Demirel a victory by fall that he got aid restored when Ecevit had lost it that he could then be strong enough to make concessions. The President took a large domestic risk but as you may know the Greek-American community is not known for its dispassionate analysis. We all know that they expect more out of these negotiations than is possible.

Caramanlis: You have the same problem with the Jews.

The President: Yes, that is right. We have two problems.

The Secretary: To have both the Jews and the Greeks against you is really too much. But I can say that the Greeks are more charming.

Caramanlis: All of this springs from a small question. Why can't we go to the heart of the matter?

The Secretary: Concretely I must say, Mr. President, that our influence has suffered to the detriment of Greece and of us. If the Turks move toward the Soviets it would be a strategic setback but I don't think that they will go very far in that direction.

Caramanlis: Not even if you push them.

The Secretary: But they can go toward the radical Arabs—Iraq and Libya—where the money is.

Caramanlis: Libya has invited me to come on a visit.

The Secretary: The central question is really up to the Turks. From what you have said it is clear that the refugee question depends on the percentage of area. You say that the percentage of territory should be roughly equivalent to the population.

Caramanlis: Slightly more.

The Secretary: In my view that is not possible and, therefore, let me get at the heart of matter. When we were in Ankara in March the Turks told us privately that they might come down to something like 33 percent from 40. I know that that is too high and what we must now do is to narrow the range. At some point couldn't we or the Europeans put forward a percentage which neither party could itself suggest but which both would accept. This percentage would be higher than 18 but much lower than 40. Then maybe both of you could accept it.

Caramanlis: A true solution to this problem must be honest and satisfactory. It cannot be imposed for long if it is not viable. Otherwise, you are just buying future troubles. The solution must be permanent and just.

The President: I can say with all honesty that the Secretary and I have spent as much time on this problem as we have on the Middle East and we are glad to make this effort. In fact, my efforts on Cyprus are harmful to me from a domestic political point of view. My AHEPA friends think that I have double-crossed them but I have continued to try to help even though this is a political liability. If the Europeans want to take an initiative I would welcome it.

Caramanlis: But they can't replace you Americans.

The President: We would welcome their leadership and we will continue to try to be helpful if the parties want us to be helpful.

The Secretary: Both sides have to want us to be helpful.

Caramanlis: The position I have adopted could greatly facilitate finding a solution to this problem. I adopted it in the full knowledge that I have a responsibility for peace, toward the West and toward the Alliance. The moment I adopted this position, others opposed it and it is indeed against my own popularity. You must understand that Greece

feels humiliated and that many demand war. I have not responded to Turkish provocations. I have not spoken from a balcony saying that Americans should stop aid to Turkey but I have done all of this in the full knowledge that I wished to avoid dire consequences. If I were to try to do more I would have a problem in Greece itself. The position I have adopted could solve this problem for the future.

The President: We recognize that you represent the best Greek Government possible and we strongly support you. We want to work together constructively. If the parties want us to, we will help but we are stymied at the present time. We would welcome a European initiative and I will say so to my European colleagues. We will stay in the wings but remain willing to help. Maybe we will be fortunate this week in achieving a modified lifting of the embargo. If not, I can assure you that we will try even with our hands tied.

Caramanlis: You must take into consideration that Turkish policy is against their own best interests.

The President: And they seem to be getting help from the wrong people.

52. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State¹

Athens, August 29, 1975, 1600Z.

6619. Subj: Commutation of Death Sentences: Additional Consideration Underlying Prime Minister's Decision. Ref: Athens 6618.²

1. During conversation with DCM today, MFA's DirGen of Political Affairs John Tzounis (PROTECT) suggested a reason for the speed with which Caramanlis commuted sentences of junta leaders which has not been mentioned in polemics between government and opposition (reftel). Tzounis said that in his personal opinion Caramanlis was worried lest Greek elements and civilian supporters of junta make pub-

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 84, Athens Embassy Files: Lot 78 F 160, Box 63, POL 23, International Security, 1975. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Drafted by Monteagle Stearns and cleared by George Barbis (POL).

² Telegram 6618 from Athens, August 29, reported that the commutation of death sentences of three junta leaders, including Papadopoulos, by the Greek Government remained a "hot issue" in Greek political circles. (Ibid.)

lic appeal to Prime Minister to commute sentences. Had this happened Caramanlis would have been in a difficult position. Any subsequent decision to commute sentences would have been criticized by the opposition as an indication that GOG was bending before military and juntaist pressure. Prime Minister would in fact have been forced to permit executions to take place simply to avoid creating impression that junta leaders were being spared because they enjoyed widespread support in the Greek military and among the public at large. Only by acting with utmost speed could Caramanlis make absolutely clear that he was acting independently on the basis of his and the government's best judgment and not under pressure.

2. Under the circumstances and despite the obvious risks, Tzounis believed that Caramanlis had made the right decision and that the political furor touched off by the commutations would die down without inflicting permanent damage on the government.

3. *Comment:* Tzounis is close to the Prime Minister and, while we do not know whether he is privy to Caramanlis' thinking on this subject, we consider his explanation of the factors underlying the commutation to be extremely persuasive.

Kubisch³

³ The Ambassador initialed above his typed signature.

53. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Embassy in Greece¹

Washington, October 4, 1975, 0032Z.

236950. Subject: Greek-NATO Negotiations. Ref: a) USNATO 5148 DTG 201410Z Sep 75, b) USNATO 5077 DTG 181005Z Sep 75, c) USNATO 5330 DTG 301933Z Sep 75, d) USNATO 2286 DTG 241807Z Apr 75 (Notal), e) USNATO 2635 DTG 121835Z May 75 (Notal).² London pass to Mr. Hartman.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 84, Athens Embassy Files: Lot 96 F 335, Box 1, DEF 4-6, 1975 Greek Withdrawal. Secret; Priority. Repeated Priority to all NATO capitals, Nicosia, USNMR SHAPE, USCINCEUR, and USDOCOSOUTH.

² None printed. (All *ibid.*)

1. We share disappointment expressed by other allies about overly general nature of Greece's statement on its defense relations with NATO (ref b).³ Looking ahead to the process of continuing Greek-NATO discussions on this subject (ref c),⁴ following are considerations which are presented as a general frame of reference for addressee posts.

2. We are well aware of the obstacles in the present political environment to rapid progress on the Greece/NATO relationship. Accordingly, we are not optimistic that Greece will wish to cooperate in the rapid resolution of outstanding issues with NATO, and we recognize that there are probably limits on how fast US and others can force the pace, at least in the near future.

3. At the same time, we want to leave no misunderstanding with Greece or other allies about our strong view that Greece should resume its full responsibilities as a NATO member, and that productive discussions on this important subject should move forward. In the US view, the quality and integrity of the alliance must be preserved on the basis of unqualified participation, not on the basis of partial membership or special arrangements. In the specific case of Greece, our bilateral defense arrangements [*less than 1 line not declassified*] are intimately linked to the Greek role in NATO.

4. Further, we appreciate Turkey's concerns with major questions posed by ambiguous Greek role in NATO, including early warning, communications, and problems of command and control in southeastern Europe. These problems would be best worked out in cooperation with Greece, and through Greece's return to the NATO military structure. They are, however, questions that cannot be postponed indefinitely, and Greece should be kept aware of this fact. We are encouraged that Greece, in its September 17 statement, said that practical military arrangements in these areas can and will be found.

5. Against this background, we believe the US suggestion (ref a) that an open-ended ad hoc group under the DPC address the Greek-NATO relationship is a positive one, providing a forum which will keep Greece aware of US and allied views, and permit movement toward resolution of issues, while at the same time allowing greater flexibility than the more formal DPC framework. Similarly, we believe the suggestion (ref a) by the chairman of NATO's Military Committee that, in

³ As reported in telegram 5148, during the September 17 meeting of the NAC, the Greek representative described the background of the Greek decision to change its relationship with NATO and his country's sense that it had to look out for itself, without the help of allies, against a menace from within the alliance.

⁴ As reported in telegram 5330, Luns met with the Greek representative who had stated that Greece would offer proposals in October for the evolution of its military relationship with NATO as a basis for negotiations.

parallel with the work of this ad hoc group, SACEUR/SHAPE work privately with Greece on specific military problems, is also positive. Conceptually, we can divide major problems in the Greece-NATO military relationship into two categories. One focuses on the commitment of Greek forces to NATO. The other relates to NATO's requirements for an orderly defense structure in southeastern Europe, including questions of command and control, early warning, and communications, as underscored by Turkey. To the extent that NATO, through SACEUR, can develop with Greece a more satisfactory pattern of provisional arrangements in both categories, while at the same time exploring avenues for future progress and resolution, we believe these problems can be eased for a time. The US will of course wish to be kept well informed of the status of the Greece-SACEUR discussions.

6. Mission may draw on paras. 3-5 as appropriate with Luns, Greek Delegation, and other allies. Mission may also point out that Greece some time ago presented a paper on its future NATO relationship which was informally discussed with a small group of allies (refs. c and d). We are disappointed that results of these discussions were not reflected in the Greek presentation September 17. Athens should also find occasion to outline these views to GOG, including especially that portion of para. 3 on US-Greek bilateral defense relationships.

Kissinger

54. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, October 17, 1975, 10:25-10:47 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

President Ford
Amb. Jack B. Kubisch, U.S. Ambassador to Greece
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs

The President: It is good to see you again. How are things in Greece?

¹ Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 282, Memoranda of Conversations, Presidential File, October 1975. Secret; Nodis. The meeting was held in the White House Oval Office.

Kubisch: Much better than a year ago. We have a good government now. Karamanlis asked me to bring this letter. [He hands the President the letter, Tab A.]² It is warm and friendly, but you can see how touchy and proud the Greeks are. He misunderstood one point about linking aid with going back into NATO. We have straightened it out.

The President: How are we doing on the aid negotiations?

Kissinger: Okay. We have offered a \$30 million development loan. He wanted 100. We have now raised it to \$65 million.

The President: Agriculture came in and asked for—how much?

Scowcroft: \$250 million in economic aid.

Kissinger: Our total now comes to \$225.

Scowcroft: But that is not on the same basis.

Kissinger: True. There is no way we can give them that much. They are really not entitled to economic aid.

[Discussion of aid budget submission.]

The President: You know what a problem we had getting the embargo lifted. Do you think the Greeks will negotiate?

Kubisch: By all means. They just want to get it out of the way. Cyprus is 500 miles away and is solely an emotional problem. They want it out of the way and will concede any reasonable terms. If there is no settlement, the prospect of a war in the Aegean is high, and the Greeks can't afford that.

The President: How about the refugees?

Kissinger: Solving the territorial issue will solve most of that. The big problem will be Makarios and the weak central government. The best would be to get Makarios to sign it.

Kubisch: That is right. Unless Makarios blesses it, the Greeks won't accept it. Karamanlis thinks if we can do something within 60 days or so, he has enough leverage to force him to agree.

The President: Give the Prime Minister my best wishes.

Kubisch: If Cyprus is settled and the bilateral things get settled, it would be good to cap it with a Karamanlis visit here.

The President: It would be good politics here also. Maybe next summer.

Kissinger: All it takes is good will. There is little to settle.

² Attached but not printed. All brackets are in the original.

55. Interagency Intelligence Memorandum¹

DCI/NIO 2282-75

Washington, October 24, 1975.

[Omitted here is the table of contents.]

GREECE UNDER CARAMANLIS**Note**

This paper focuses on Greek internal problems, with some consideration of foreign policy issues, particularly as they affect domestic politics.

Précis

Caramanlis has moved quickly to consolidate his political base in the 15 months since he was called back from 11 years of self-imposed exile to lead a country momentarily shattered by the junta's disastrous move against Makarios and the subsequent Turkish move onto Cyprus. He has sought to depoliticize the military, transform Greece into a stable democracy, and end the country's international isolation brought on by seven years of military rule. Caramanlis has made progress on all fronts and the *short-term* prospects for his government are much more favorable than seemed possible when he took over.

Enjoying considerable popularity and unprecedented control of parliament, Caramanlis has no serious challenger either in his own New Democracy party or within the weak and divided political opposition.

In an effort to reform the Greek political system, Caramanlis has secured the passage of a new constitution designed to eliminate some of the traditional shortcomings of democratic governments in Greece. (The new system, which provides for a sharing of power between president and prime minister, will not be put to a real test, however, so long as Caramanlis remains in complete control.) He has given all political forces, including the Communists, the right to compete freely in the political marketplace, but he will remain sensitive to the military's concern for maintaining order and will come down hard against anarchical manifestations.

¹ Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry, Job 80-M00165A, Box 17, Greece. Secret. A note on the first page reads: "This memorandum, prepared under the auspices of the National Intelligence Officer for Western Europe, was drafted by CIA/OCI with contributions from DIA and State. It was reviewed and endorsed by a working group of analysts from CIA, DIA, State/INR, and the services, chaired by a representative of INR."

Most military officers see Caramanlis as the politician best able to govern Greece. Nevertheless, he must continue to cope with a continuing—albeit reduced—threat from those in the military who could become so alarmed over political developments and/or fearful for their own future that they would try to remove him.

With the help of some talented economists and international financial assistance from those anxious to bolster Greek democracy, Caramanlis has the means to weather short-term problems caused by the present unfavorable international economic conditions and the junta's mismanagement of the economy. Structural reforms will be necessary for sound and steady economic growth.

Caramanlis has moved adroitly to contain strong anti-US and anti-NATO sentiment among Greeks arising from the Turkish invasion of Cyprus and resentment of the junta's relations with the US. His formula for partial withdrawal from NATO and renegotiation of US bases has gone far to assuage nationalist sentiment, without irretrievably alienating the defense support which is indispensable to Greece.

Caramanlis' handling of the Cyprus and Aegean issues will have an important bearing on whether his domestic and broader foreign policy objectives can be carried out, and could even affect his tenure. While he has shown flexibility on the Cyprus issue, he sees himself boxed in by Turkish intransigence with little further room for maneuver. Should the Turks show a willingness to compromise—particularly on the territorial question—he would probably press Makarios to reciprocate. Caramanlis has less flexibility on the Aegean issue, which involves the question of Greek sovereignty and Athens could well be drawn into a military confrontation should the Turks again make probes in contested areas.

The *longer-term* prospects for political stability in Greece, particularly after Caramanlis, are not as promising. His departure may well lead to increased factionalization of his party composed as it is of at least three groups and a similar number of potential heirs. This could eventually split the party. In such circumstances, the opposition may become more aggressive. Greece might then experience another period of political instability, although much will depend on the state of the economy and relations with Turkey. Should the politics of confrontation and mob violence again overshadow parliamentary due process, the military may again feel compelled to intervene either openly or from behind the scenes, unless a political alignment that is able to prevail over the left and right extremes again emerges.

Discussion

Caramanlis and the New Order in Greece

1. Greece has made a remarkably smooth transition from military rule to parliametary democracy over the past year. Most of the

credit goes to 69-year old Prime Minister Caramanlis, who has outmaneuvered his domestic opponents and skillfully begun to institutionalize his predominance. There is at present no serious challenge to his authority from either the extreme left or right; even the once highly politicized army seems for the most part to accept his leadership. There is also no successor in sight who could command comparable popular support and this could spell trouble for Greek democracy once Caramanlis departs the political scene.

2. Caramanlis returned to Greece following 11 years of self-imposed exile during which he formulated plans for reforming the Greek political system. He hoped to make it capable of sustaining a democratic rule without succumbing to the anarchy and disorder that prompted the military to intervene in 1967. He has pursued this objective first by consolidating his own political base, and then embarking upon a series of institutional changes which he hopes will eventually transform Greece into a stable and progressive democracy along West European lines.

3. The first stage in Caramanlis' carefully orchestrated plan to solidify his political base was the holding of parliamentary elections last November, about four months after the Cyprus crisis led the junta to call him back to Greece. His party received almost 55 percent of the vote in the elections, which showed his own popularity, his mastery of electoral dynamics, and the weakness of his opposition. Helped by the crisis atmosphere of the period, Caramanlis imposed on his colleagues a complex system of reinforced proportional representation under which he could have won a slim majority in parliament even if he had gotten only 41 percent of the popular vote. But with his overwhelming victory, Caramanlis' New Democracy party now has unprecedented control of parliament, holding 216 seats out of 300.

4. Caramanlis has used this control to push through a new constitution providing for a strong executive. The opposition objected to the substantial powers granted the presidency under the constitution but succeeded only in partially whittling down these powers. The opposition boycotted the final vote on the constitution but let it be known that the boycott did not imply a denial of the validity of the constitution.

5. Caramanlis created a strong presidency to balance the prime ministry and to provide the additional element of stability and continuity the former monarchy was supposed to provide but often did not. He turned the presidency over to a hand-picked candidate, Constantine Tsatsos, a long-standing follower and personal friend not likely to challenge his authority as prime minister. His critics describe this arrangement as designing a lion's costume to be worn by a mouse. In any case, the new system is not likely to be put to a real test as long as Caramanlis remains in control.

6. Believing that no one else has his capabilities for governing Greece, Caramanlis was clearly unwilling to give up the day to day control of party and government affairs he enjoys as prime minister, at least for the time being. In addition, the appointment of someone other than himself as prime minister and party head might have exacerbated factionalism and possibly even have split the New Democracy party. Over time, Caramanlis will doubtless work to build up the party's organization and articulate an ideology, in order to step up to the presidency while continuing to run the party through a trusted associate.

Political Parties: An Overview

7. Political parties in Greece have traditionally been extensions of prominent personalities. Political leaders relate to party members and supporters through an informal system of clientelism—personal ties and mutual obligations among constituents, party members, party leaders, and the bureaucracy. Programs and principles are relatively unimportant. The development of modern political parties based on programs rather than personalities was further complicated by the suspension of political life during the seven years of military rule. More fundamentally, however, their evolution has been stunted by the firm grip of tradition and the continued emphasis by Greeks on individual relationships as the key to political institutions.

8. Caramanlis' New Democracy fits the typical mold. It is a congeries of diverse interests held together by loyalty to Caramanlis. The party consists of former members of the conservative National Radical Union led by Caramanlis between 1955–1963—minus some of its more extreme rightist elements—along with a considerable number of younger men with more liberal and progressive ideas. It includes center-right, rightist, and monarchist elements and draws its support from the upper class, the propertied middle class, and the countryside, particularly the Peloponnese. The party has little formal organizational structure. Its program reflects a vaguely defined conservatism with some liberal and progressive overtones.

9. Caramanlis' commanding stature has so far served to foster an unusually high degree of party discipline that has enabled him to get his way in parliament. Although the monarchists in his party resented his calculated neutrality in the referendum in December 1974 (in which 69 percent of the electorate rejected the return of the King), they did honor his request that they avoid campaigning on the King's behalf. The entire party voted in favor of the new constitution and only four members opposed the election of Constantine Tsatsos to the presidency. Some of Caramanlis' institutional reforms also contribute to party cohesiveness. The constitution prohibits deputies from changing their party affiliation during their term without resigning their seats in parliament. This provision will discourage the party switching and frac-

tionalization that was the bane of previous Greek parliaments. The weak and divided state of the political opposition also helps Caramanlis enact his programs.

The Opposition

10. *The Center Union–New Forces*, with 20 percent of the vote in the November election and 61 parliamentary seats, forms the principal opposition. Headed by George Mavros, it consists of the Center Union Party (founded by George Papandreou in the mid-1950s) and a group of outstanding younger men (headed by John Pesmazoglou) who distinguished themselves by their opposition to the junta. The party has half-heartedly attempted to pass itself off as a socialist party, although it is basically centrist and includes center-right elements. Indeed, it is difficult to distinguish it ideologically from the New Democracy. Mavros and Pesmazoglou served in Caramanlis' transitional government last fall, and the party has suffered from its lack of an individual identity. Its sources of support are less clear-cut than those of the New Democracy, but its strength is especially high among the urban intelligentsia and the salaried middle class. The party is also strong in Crete and parts of northern Greece. Center Union–New Forces is as poorly organized as New Democracy, but it lacks the leadership Caramanlis gives to his party. An effort is under way, however, to convene a party congress later this year or early next year to outline a program and devise a party apparatus. The reform-minded Pesmazoglou has been leading the effort to make it a modern political party.

11. *The Panhellenic Socialist Movement* of Andreas Papandreou received only 13.5 percent of the votes in the last election, finishing third, and now has 15 parliamentary seats. Papandreou's party consists of elements from his father's Center Union and some figures active in the resistance against the junta. The party draws its support from elements of the urban intelligentsia, from part of the working class, and from students. Papandreou's radical Marxist rhetoric, along with the widely held belief that it was his machinations and antics in the 1960s that helped provoke the military intervention, have served to dampen his appeal. Papandreou's party has also been beset by ideological and personality differences. To meet this challenge he dissolved the central committee and is seeking to rebuild the party from the grass roots. Except for the municipal elections last spring, Papandreou has refused to cooperate with any of the other opposition parties, but he is shrewd enough to do so if and when he thinks it will help him. A fiery orator with a magnetic personality, he could again play a leading role in the personalistic politics of Greece.

12. The Communist opposition in Greece has been weakened by its fractionalization during the seven years of military rule. Greek Communism is now represented by (1) the pro-Soviet *Communist Party of*

the Exterior led by Harilaos Florakis, (2) the independent, nationalist minded *Communist Party of the Interior* led by Babis Drakopoulos, and (3) the former Communist front *United Democratic Left* led by Ilias Il-iou. The three parties, though bitter competitors, did unite temporarily to contest the parliamentary elections, but they received only 9.5 percent of the vote and eight seats. All three parties are anxious to appear respectable and are quick to condemn violence as well as the inflammatory rhetoric of Papandreou. Although the “exterior” party is better organized and heavily financed by the Soviets, the other two parties are more dynamic and seem to have been more successful in recruiting younger converts. The legalization of the Communist parties by Caramanlis has enabled them to make some gains within the labor movement, the press, and among students, but their constant in-fighting reduces their effectiveness as an opposition force. Prospects for growth in the longer term are improving with the trend toward urbanization and industrialization, but the Communists have yet to demonstrate that they will be a major force in Greece.

Manipulating the Opposition

13. Caramanlis has shown great skill in dealing with the political opposition, taking care not to alienate any important group. Recognizing that there is little his opponents can do to hurt him, he has assumed an “above politics” approach and is slow to respond to the attacks against his government. Although he briefs George Mavros regularly, he generally ignores the other opposition leaders. The Prime Minister also manipulates the opposition press, flattering it with his confidences in return for press cooperation in presenting the issues in a favorable light.

14. Caramanlis has preempted many of the opposition’s favorite issues with “old pro” dexterity. His announcement last summer that Greece was withdrawing from the military wing of NATO—although he did not follow it up with serious action—took the steam out of that issue as did his decision to renegotiate the status of US bases. His legalization of the Communist parties removed another long-standing complaint from that quarter. His limited purge of junta leaders and supporters from the government and the military has partially defused that issue. Caramanlis remains vulnerable to criticism from the right for doing too much against the junta and from the left for doing too little, but so far he has walked the tightrope between them quite deftly.

15. Within his own government, Caramanlis has reportedly accused some of his ministers of inefficiency; a minor reshuffle of the cabinet could take place soon. [14 lines not declassified]

The Military

16. Despite the wide support for Caramanlis and his unassailable position in the parliament, the military remains, at least in an indirect

sense, a strong constraining factor. Caramanlis has to cope with the continuing—albeit reduced—threat that elements in the military could become so alarmed over political developments or fearful of their own future that they would try to remove him.

17. Under the junta, there was a continuing effort during the seven years of power to weed out “politically unreliable” elements in the armed forces. Military divisions from this period have continued: those who support the monarchy, the “hard-liners” who were at the forefront of the revolution, those who were generally in sympathy with the goals of the revolution, and those who opposed the revolution and thought the military should return to the barracks. There were, in addition, factions within the pro-revolutionary officers along lines of personal allegiance as well as ideology. Many of these on the losing side were retired or forced out of service soon after 1967, including most of the senior officers and many of the supporters of the King. And after November 1973, the hard-line supporters of General Ioannides dominated the armed forces.

18. Upon his return to power Caramanlis was confronted with a military establishment thoroughly screened and purged of active anti-junta elements, and he has since been working to redress this situation. In the past year almost all of the key, hard-core junta supporters have been retired or separated from the military, or are being tried for various crimes against the state. Furthermore, numerous officers who were retired by the junta during its tenure because of their political and anti-junta beliefs have been reinstated. Partly as a result of this manipulation, most officers now support Caramanlis and are willing to allow him his way.

19. Although political stability has been regained under Caramanlis, and this is a very important factor to the military, there is concern in some circles that he has excessively appeased leftist elements. The legalization of Communist parties, the growth of the leftist movement, and the return of the detested Andreas Papandreou—all developments since Caramanlis’ return—have spurred continuing military concern over liberalizing political trends. The military would not accept or permit a leftist government to take office. A deterioration of law and order brought on by student or leftist agitation could also provoke serious coup plotting in Athens. However, most of the restiveness that is now evident seems based more on fear for individual careers than anything else.

20. Plotting has been endemic in the Greek armed forces. Some senior officers who harbor memories of the Greek civil war are standing in the wings. They see themselves as ready, with the military organization and ability, to save the motherland if that becomes necessary. Also, there still remain a few highly politicized junior officers

commissioned during the junta years, who are ripe for exploitation by coup plotters. Many of these would probably be responsive to Ioannides, who is serving a life term for his role in the 1967 coup and awaiting trial for masterminding the 1974 coup against Cypriot President Makarios. There is no evidence that Ioannides has given them the green light, but he is not likely to accept a lifetime of incarceration without some effort, however risky, to regain his freedom.

21. Defense Minister Averoff has been Caramanlis' "bridge builder" to the armed forces. He has counseled the Prime Minister to go slow in rooting out junta supporters to avoid alarming the officer corps. At the same time, he has repeatedly assured the officers that their personal careers are secure and that only key figures of the junta will be punished. In this regard, both Averoff and Caramanlis were infuriated by recent newspaper stories questioning the government's failure to act against several active duty officers named by the papers as having collaborated with the junta. Averoff has voiced his concern that attacks of this type could stir new unrest in the military. Caramanlis' awareness that there is a continuing current of unrest in the armed forces was demonstrated by the government's rapid move to commute the death sentences handed down to former junta leaders Papadopoulos, Pattakos, and Makarezos. It was doubtless Averoff who counseled Caramanlis to take this action, and both of them will be closely watching military restiveness.

Students and Labor

22. On the volatile university scene, the government is proceeding cautiously. It is anxious to avoid violent confrontation with students that could snowball and force it to choose between alienating either the military by tolerating agitation or the political opposition and the broader electorate by using repressive tactics. In an effort to follow a middle course, Caramanlis has acquiesced in some "dejuntization" in the universities: the abolition of decrees that put universities under strict government control and the suspension of suspected pro-junta professors pending an investigation of their performance and activities during the junta period. The government has also promised to look into student grievances on educational reform. Meanwhile, an effort is being made to halt the growing domination of the student movement by an extreme leftist minority. The government has ruled, for example, that all students must participate in school elections.

23. Labor unrest also has the potential to force Caramanlis into the unpalatable choice between leniency or repression. The laws that brought the trade unions under strict government control have been abolished, and the new constitution confirms the right to strike except for political motives. Upper-level union officials appointed by the junta have been removed from their posts, and special courts have nomi-

nated their temporary successors. The labor movement will be in a state of flux until the completion of the elections for union, federation, and confederation officers next year. The government's relations with labor will certainly be affected by the results, especially since Papandreou and the Communists are making a determined effort to get their supporters elected to union posts. Caramanlis is now working on a law to prevent leftist domination of the labor movement, but labor will continue to be a difficult problem area for the government for a long time to come.

The Economy

24. On the economic front, the Caramanlis government is grappling with stagnation, inflation, and a serious balance-of-payments problem as a result of junta mismanagement of the economy and adverse world-wide economic developments. Real gross national product declined two percent in 1974. Prices rose at less than half the previous year's rate but by year end had still climbed 13.5 percent over December 1973. The government did well to hold the current account deficit to about \$1.2 billion in light of skyrocketing oil prices, a decrease in invisible earnings from tourism and worker remittances, and greatly expanded defense outlays.

25. At first inclined to give priority to fighting inflation, the Caramanlis government opted for a policy of mild stimulation aiming at a growth rate of 2 to 4 percent this year. Most indicators now suggest that real growth in GNP will be in that range. The government also seems likely to meet its goal of holding inflation under 15 percent. The balance-of-payments deficit has replaced stagnation as Greece's most serious economic problem, with Greek officials now estimating they will have to borrow some \$500 to \$600 million to finance the deficit. Prospects for such borrowing are favorable in the coming months as North American and European states and financial institutions are sympathetic to bolstering Greek democracy. Borrowing may become more difficult later next year because of balance-of-payments and debt-servicing problems.

26. Structural reforms are necessary to place the economy on the path to sound and steady growth, especially in view of Greek ambition to become a full member of the EC and compete effectively with the other members. Some key elements for the modernization of the Greek economy include the fostering of larger, more efficient enterprises, application of modern technology, a greater emphasis on export trade, a consolidation of the fragmented agricultural sector to increase farm income and output, and exploitation of the country's energy sources. The government's recently revealed outline of its five-year economic development plan addresses itself to these problems. But it will take more sustained effort than the amorphous New Democracy seems likely to provide to make much progress toward solving them.

Problems with Turkey: Cyprus and the Aegean

27. Caramanlis' handling of the Cyprus and Aegean issues, and Turkey's response, will have an important bearing on whether his domestic and broader foreign policy objectives can be carried out; indeed, his performance could also affect his very tenure in office. Caramanlis is faced with a dilemma over the Cyprus situation. Personally, he favors an agreement with Turkey over the island. But because of national honor and fear his government might not survive, he will not accede to what he considers a humiliating settlement. Caramanlis would require some flexibility from Turkey on the territorial question and on the return of Greek Cypriot refugees. While he has not been willing to get out in front of Greek Cypriot negotiator Clerides, Caramanlis privately accepts the tradeoff of bizonality and a weak central government in exchange for Turkish concessions on territory and refugees. He has even said that he will press Makarios to accept these terms.

28. Caramanlis is pessimistic that the Turks will respond adequately to the Greeks, and probably feels that he has little further room for maneuver. Therefore, rather than offer another Greek concession at this time, which likely would erode his popular support in Greece, he expects the US to try to persuade Turkey to be forthcoming.

29. Caramanlis sees greater potential danger in the Aegean problem. Provocative Turkish actions here could force his hand in ways that he would prefer to avoid, including military action. This issue involves Greek sovereignty in such a direct way that he has very little scope for compromise. If he does not maintain a tough posture, he is sure to be attacked by his domestic opposition.

The US and NATO

30. In dealing with the US and NATO, Caramanlis also is on the horns of a dilemma. He realizes that Greek security interests require continued close ties with his allies. But he recognizes at the same time that too close association with his allies could hurt him politically at this time because of anti-American sentiment arising out of the Cyprus crisis. While he has considerable flexibility in handling this problem, he is unlikely to move boldly because of these constraints. Caramanlis, in his treatment of the issue, has moved adroitly to contain nationalist public sentiment and to prevent it from driving a wedge between Greece and the West.

Prospects

31. The *short-term* prospects for the Caramanlis government are good. With the support of a solid majority of the electorate and an overwhelming majority in parliament, Caramanlis is in a strong enough political position to provide the country with forceful and dynamic leadership on domestic issues. His domestic and foreign policies to date

have served only to confirm the support of those who voted for him, while the behavior of his New Democracy colleagues in parliament thus far suggests they will continue to accord him their loyalty as he moves to make his imprint on Greece.

32. Nonetheless, Caramanlis will continue to face numerous problems:

—Plotting in the military; a desperate move against the government cannot be entirely ruled out, though Caramanlis seems likely to continue to command the guarded support of most Greek officers, who see him as the politician most capable of ruling Greece.

—Extremist rhetoric is gradually re-emerging on the part of his civilian political opponents. They are, however, weak and divided, and recognize there is some validity in the slogan “Caramanlis or the tanks.”

—Students and labor unions, many under extreme leftist influence, are increasingly prone to agitation. Caramanlis is more concerned about provoking the military by seeming to tolerate anarchy than about alienating the left by infringing on their democratic freedoms. Thus he would probably move quickly to quell disorder from this quarter.

—Deterioration of the economic situation could also trigger dissent. But present trends are favorable, and Caramanlis is likely to enjoy further economic success thanks to the help of a group of talented economists and international financial assistance.

33. The *longer-term* prospects for stable, progressive, and democratic rule for Greece are less promising. This is particularly true after the Caramanlis era ends—whether through death, electoral defeat, or another self-imposed exile. Despite his efforts, Caramanlis is unlikely to be able to overcome the social and cultural traditions which militate against turning the New Democracy into a modern political party. Increased factionalization of the party into center-right, rightist, and royalist wings seems likely and this could eventually split the party. In this situation, a scramble to fill the political vacuum when Caramanlis departs is all but inevitable. The New Democracy itself contains at least three potential heirs: Minister of Coordination Papaligouras, Minister to the Prime Minister Rallis, and Defense Minister Averoff. The accession of any one of these could alienate the others. As the New Democracy’s cohesion thus erodes and as it loses popular support—as it is likely to do in any event—the kind of political paralysis that helped bring the military to power in 1967 could recur, unless a new alignment of center-left and/or center-right forces capable of overshadowing the left and right extremes comes into being.

56. Paper Prepared in Response to National Security Study Memorandum 222¹

Washington, December 15, 1975.

U.S. AND ALLIED SECURITY POLICY IN SOUTHERN EUROPE

[Omitted here is a table of contents.]

Summary

US policy toward Southern Europe since 1947 has succeeded in minimizing Soviet influence in the region and gaining a paramount position for the US and NATO throughout the Mediterranean area. We enjoy a complex of military facilities and bases which contributes to our role in the Middle East [*less than 1 line not declassified*] as well as to the security of Southern Europe itself. US presence and influence have helped keep Communists and neutralists out of power in most countries of the area and thus contributed to the strengthening of their ties with the rest of Western Europe.

It would be in the US interest to maintain these positions. But a number of developments now raise questions about how, to what extent and at what costs, US/NATO positions can be maintained. Relaxation of cold war tensions, changes in the East-West military balance, and the disappearance of regimes that cooperated closely with the US are all contributing to a diminution of US influence in the area and a possible increase in that of the Soviet Union. We face pressures to reduce our base and force structure, a desire by some allies to dilute their participation in NATO, and growing influence on or even presence in the governments of some NATO members of Communists or others who are hostile to the Alliance.

None of this should be overstated. There are political factors which will impel at least some of these countries to move closer to Western Europe. Moreover, there is considerable flexibility in the Western military position in the Mediterranean. We may be able to compensate for the relative diminution of our presence by technological developments (e.g., in airlift, or aerial refueling), more selective use of remaining US forces and bases, and more reliance on other Allied forces. Moscow is not likely to achieve a military edge in the area.

¹ Source: Ford Library, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-35, NSSM 222. Secret; Exdis. The paper was forward to the Departments of State and Defense and the CIA for agency comment on December 24. (Ibid.) NSSM 222 is Document 45.

Country Assessments

—Moderate forces in *Portugal* have won a second chance with the formation of a government with minimal Communist participation. But the unity of the forces supporting it, military and civilian, is fragile and it faces formidable economic and social problems and determined leftist opponents. The situation remains fluid and confused. One possible outcome could be a military-dominated, authoritarian government which would embrace at least the rhetoric of a non-aligned foreign policy and want a scaling down of Portugal's already modest participation in NATO. We do not, however, expect a Portuguese move into the Soviet orbit. Many military men, as well as leaders of moderate political parties, look to Socialist governments and parties in Western Europe for assistance.

—Post-Franco *Spain* will see a very precarious attempt at "controlled liberalization." A reasonably successful political evolution would permit Spain to draw closer to its West European neighbors but at some cost to US influence, since democratic elements will want to make gestures of reducing ties to the US and so to Spain's dictatorial past. A reassertion of conservative and/or military rule, by prolonging Spain's isolation from Europe, would make the US tie seem more valuable. But even a rightist regime might try to hold the line against change at home by striking nationalist foreign policy poses that would affect Spanish relations with the US as well as with Western Europe.

—At least for the near term *Italy*, for all its political turmoil, is the least likely country of the Southern area to call into doubt its ties to the West or to be tempted by any sort of radical nationalism or Mediterranean non-alignment. Nonetheless, continued political instability and the growing influence of the Communist Party will inhibit Italy's effectiveness as a NATO ally. While we foresee no near term threat to present US military arrangements, it probably would not be possible to transfer there major facilities lost elsewhere in the area. In general, Italian politicians will be reluctant to accommodate any new NATO initiatives which might be at all controversial at home.

—The change of government in *Greece* has significantly improved that country's relations with Western Europe, but dealings with the US will remain troubled unless and until a Cyprus settlement is reached. Karamanlis will need some further reduction in the US military presence beyond those already agreed in order to blunt criticism of those who urge a complete break. But he will continue to maintain as much of a de facto military role in the Alliance as the domestic political traffic will bear. Indeed, Athens' desire not to be further isolated in the event of serious deterioration of Greek-Turkish relations will put a limit to erosion of its ties with the US.

—US relations with *Turkey* were soured by the stalemate over military sales and aid and will probably never return to their former

degree of cordiality. Ankara, however, sees its long-term political, economic, and security interests with the West, and the Turkish political elite is committed to national development along Western lines. Turkey has looked first to its NATO allies in Europe to offset its growing isolation and to obtain military equipment and spare parts. But some kind of accommodation with the USSR and limited arms purchases cannot be ruled out.

—*Malta* will need some economic support to replace UK/US base rental fees in March of 1979. For all his neutralist, anti-super power convictions, the erratic Dom Mintoff will bargain hard for economic advantage. Thus, he might agree to Soviet non-use of Malta, or possibly to continued Western military use of the island. He will threaten, as part of this bargaining, to accept Soviet or Libyan overtures.

—Developments in post-Tito *Yugoslavia* could have an important impact on NATO's southern flank. We are relatively sanguine about the outcome—because we believe Moscow sees more to gain from détente than from an overt move to reestablish Soviet hegemony and because the Yugoslav military would move in to cope with an externally or internally generated threat to the country's integrity and independence. But a precipitous unravelling of the Western position in Southern Europe might change Moscow's perception of the risks of meddling in Yugoslav affairs. And a collapse of Yugoslav independence could demoralize moderates in neighboring states who would be sensitive to the advance of Soviet power nearer their borders.

The *Soviet Union* probably has no grand design for Southern Europe. Moscow can wait with some patience for events which it may think are moving in its general interests, at least in the sense that any diminution in US influence, or in the anti-Communist coherence of the region, is a gain for Soviet policy. Moreover, a more activist Soviet policy to woo one party (e.g., Turkey) would only offend others (e.g., Greece). We cannot of course rule out the possibility that Soviet leaders will be overcome by enthusiasm for some opportunity for rapid and dramatic Communist gains and in the process perhaps revive a sense of unity and purpose among other NATO states in the region. But neither can we depend on Moscow to do that job for us. Instead, Moscow is likely to continue the relatively good behavior which aims to foster the impression that no European state has anything to fear if it adopts a more equivocal posture vis-à-vis the US or if the local Communist influence grows.

US Interests

For the foreseeable future, minimum US interests in Southern Europe include the following:

—Prevent the Mediterranean power balance from shifting to Soviet advantage;

—Contribute to maintaining the confidence and sense of security of pro-Western elements in Southern Europe, preventing further political unraveling there which could in turn make Central Europeans feel exposed and threatened.

—Keep enough political influence with the Southern European governments at least to prevent their acting against our vital interests (e.g., with radical Arab states or the Soviets) even if we cannot win their active support to the degree we would wish.

—[3 lines not declassified]

—Preserve sufficient US access to Southern Europe and the Mediterranean to maintain a positive psychological impact on the Middle East situation, however restricted our actual use of the individual facilities in case of an Arab-Israeli war.

Issues and Options

In trying to keep enough of a military and political presence in Southern Europe to serve these purposes, we face the complex problems of defining the kind of role we wish to play in Southern Europe and the Mediterranean in light of impinging circumstances on the one hand, the availability of required resources and feasible policies on the other. Specific issues include these:

—How can we manage our relations with each of the countries concerned in order to preserve as much US influence as possible?

—Should we promote the development of closer political, economic, and military links between the Southern European states and the rest of Western Europe, even at some cost to US political influence and economic interests and perhaps to our military position?

—Should we allow partial NATO membership by others besides France, or continued NATO membership by governments with Communist members, or should we insist, instead, on a more cohesive if smaller Alliance?

—Should we hold out for our present base and operating rights, reducing them only when a host government insists, or should we seize the initiative by proposing some cutbacks ourselves or working to increase the military role in the area of other allies?

This last issue includes a large number of others. There are arguments for and against such propositions as these:

—Withdrawing nuclear ballistic missile submarines from the area would not significantly degrade our strategic capability because the equivalent capability can be provided elsewhere;

—The Southern flank countries already have lost much of their value to us as a resupply route to the Middle East in times of emergency;

—There is little likelihood of Soviet military aggression against any of the Southern flank countries independent of a general NATO-Warsaw Pact conflict;

—US military facilities in the countries of the region have become more of a source of friction in our dealings with them, or an instrument for their blackmail of us, than a contribution to broader NATO defense interests;

—Technological progress may make it possible for the US to satisfy its own purely military needs in the area—naval and air access and intelligence gathering—with less reliance on foreign bases.

Our possible responses to all these questions can be grouped under a number of broad “strategies.” Should we adjust to and hopefully ride out present trends in Southern Europe, accepting a diminution of our role? Should we try to compensate for this by drawing other West European powers more deeply into the region’s affairs? Or by possibly accepting quite a different definition of NATO membership and its purpose? Or should we try to control events by making clear our determination to resist unfavorable trends, bargaining hard against any reduction in military rights, and rejecting partial members of NATO or members with governments judged to be incompatible with the nature of the Alliance?

A. Bilateral Relations

There are a number of steps Washington can take to influence events in individual countries. We can continue encouraging West Europeans to take the lead in supporting Portuguese moderates and in making that support conditional on Portugal’s remaining on the democratic path. We should continue to avoid anything which leftist forces could portray as a US or NATO “attack” on Portugal or its revolution.

In Spain, we can let our military contacts know our general support for a pluralistic system as being in Spain’s best interests and step up our own relations with democratic oppositionists as well as with moderates in the regime. We also should continue to support and plan for Spain’s closer integration with the West. In Spain, as in Portugal, European political parties and labor unions are in a better position than we to strengthen contacts with and give support to democratic forces. We should encourage them to take the lead in doing so.

In Italy the most important thing we can do to strengthen democratic forces is help the country out of its economic difficulties. We also can emphasize our support for Christian Democratic-Socialist alliances as the best means to that end, and our continued opposition to Communist participation in the national government.

The best, and perhaps only, way to improve our position in both Greece and Turkey is to help find some resolution of the Cypriot issue and help keep Greek-Turkish disputes over the Aegean from leading to conflict between them. In the meantime, while showing willingness to renegotiate American military arrangements with both, we should take every opportunity to remind each of the value to itself of those arrangements and of a firm, effective Alliance.

B. The Southern Flank and the EC

We could try to reinsure against a diminution in the US role in Southern Europe by anchoring these countries more firmly to their

neighbors in Northern and Central Europe. Military “devolution” would mean trying to get the French and Italians, and also perhaps the Germans and others, to play a larger role in their own defense and so establish more balanced and durable security arrangements for the area within the NATO system. It could also include at least token multilateralization of some US military facilities in order to put them under NATO sponsorship and so make them more palatable to local political opinion. Political-economic “devolution” would mean supporting close association with or full membership in the European Community for the states of Southern Europe.

The possible risk in this policy is that it might accelerate the loosening of ties with the US without providing anything viable and effective to replace them. The prospect of being able to develop European ties might make it easier for wavering Allies—Greece is an obvious example—to rationalize, and justify to conservative opinion at home, decisions to reduce military links with the US. And France—most eager of the European Community partners to draw Southern Europe into the Community’s orbit—would be pleased to become a major if not the chief military arms supplier and external political influence in the region. On the other hand, most Europeans would use whatever influence they might acquire over Southern Europe defense policies to urge good behavior within NATO, even while possibly competing with the US for economic access to the region.

Realistically, “devolution” could at best supplement and possibly compensate for declining US influence in Southern Europe, not provide a substitute for it. No combination of European states will be able to take on the bulk of our present military role. [*1½ lines not declassified*] Leaders of Italy, Greece and Turkey are well aware of their exposure to the power and proximity of the USSR. Their continued desire for some visible US military presence (perhaps in NATO rather than specifically US facilities) should put a limit on both the erosion of our role in the area and the growth of West European or indeed Soviet influence.

C. The Alliance: Institutional Integrity

1. A Jagged Alliance?

We probably could force other Allies to accept the expulsion of members who opt for only partial participation (e.g., Greece), but at considerable cost to harmony in what was left of the Alliance. Moreover, expulsion would likely lead to the loss of all US military installations in the country concerned and of whatever US influence remained, as well as foreclose the possibility of some (e.g., Greece) eventually returning to full membership.

Allowing partial Alliance membership, on the other hand, would tend to undermine its effectiveness and coherence and encourage others to opt for the political and strategic advantages of NATO

membership while contributing little or nothing to its conventional military arm. It might also undermine public support in the US for an alliance in which we seemed to be carrying the burdens while others enjoyed the benefits at small cost.

2. *Communists in NATO?*

This dike already has been breached to a degree, with Iceland in the past and Portugal at the moment. But the risk to NATO's secrets is considerable, and the erosion of its ideological contour could be dangerous to its public image and support, in the US and abroad. Clearcut US opposition to NATO membership for governments which include Communists might at least stiffen the resistance of Christian Democrats and even Socialists in Italy to PCI participation in that government.

But adopting such a policy would require a clear decision that we would prefer a shrunken, more ideologically cohesive alliance, even in cases where Communists are not the controlling members of their government and not necessarily permanent ones. This policy would almost certainly require us to relinquish military facilities which we might have been able to keep and would encounter stiff opposition from other NATO members. Recent events in Portugal suggest the value of a less clearcut approach in cases short of Communist takeover: isolating such a government from sensitive alliance activity until the situation improves—or is lost.

D. *Base Structure*

Rather than holding out for our present base and operating rights and negotiating reductions only as they are forced on us, we might seize the initiative by ourselves proposing cutbacks of marginal, politically vulnerable or technologically obsolescent facilities. We might actually improve our chances of keeping essential facilities by helping pro-US governments accommodate domestic pressures for a visible reduction in our presence. This policy might be accompanied by—or even conditioned on—a correlative transfer of some degree of US defense responsibilities to other Allies.

On the other hand, we would be risking the loss of facilities which we might otherwise have kept while stimulating demands for more “victories” by local politicians over Washington. Further, giving up even marginal facilities before we have to might signal to some that the US was disengaging from the area or downgrading its importance. Certainly this policy would need to be implemented with a careful assessment of its effect on each individual local political situation, as well as on the likely reactions of the Soviets, West Europeans and Middle Easterners.

[Omitted here are portions of Section I unrelated to Greece and Turkey.]

Greece

The Greek government is now in safe and sensible hands and presents us with little problem of Communist or neutralist influence at this time. Nevertheless, it is negotiating to reduce the US presence at existing installations in Greece and in principle has taken the country out of NATO's military system. The negotiations will bring significant reductions in the US presence in Greece. When and whether Greece will return to NATO integration is likely to be tied to progress on Cyprus and relations with Turkey. This question confronts the Alliance with its most direct structural challenge since de Gaulle set the example in 1966.

The Karamanlis government does not question the wisdom of Greek alignment with the West nor the need of a special relationship with the US. But domestic political considerations deriving from the Greek-Turkish dispute have led it to seek a lower US profile in Greece and a greater degree of influence over US activities there. Agreement was reached in late April to end homeporting in Greece for five destroyers of the US Sixth fleet. This will reduce the number of US personnel in Greece by about 3,000 out of an estimated total of 13,000 military and dependents. It was also agreed that the US would close down its air base at Hellenikon near Athens, while retaining some essential facilities there on an expanded Greek base.

The Greek government will probably seek further reductions in the size of the US military presence and modifications in the bilateral Status of Forces Agreement in an effort to blunt criticism from those in the country who favor a complete cut in Greek security ties with the US and NATO. We believe that the government will seek to maintain security ties with the US at a reduced level [*1 line not declassified*]. Greek-NATO negotiations began in September.

Other than withdrawal of forces from NATO command, the Greek Government has made no move to implement its August 1974 decision to withdraw from the military arm of NATO. The official statements about the withdrawal contrast sharply with continuing Greek participation in most of NATO's defense-related activities. Greece's participation in the NATO Military Committee and most subordinate headquarters remains essentially the same as before, although Greece abstains from activities of the Defense Planning Committee (DPC). The Greeks are still searching for ways to maintain a maximum de facto military role in the Alliance. They appear willing to undertake to commit forces to NATO in the event of a clear threat of aggression but are hesitant to discuss the central issue of force commitments in peacetime.

Their inhibitions in this matter flow from the same source as their initial decision to reduce their ties to both NATO and the US, namely, the Greek-Turkish dispute over Cyprus. Greek frustration at their own impotence in the face of Turkish action in Cyprus led them to try to

exert pressure on Turkey by way of the US and NATO. Their lack of success has, so far, stood in the way of their retracing these steps. US-Greek and NATO-Greek relations will continue to hinge on progress on Cyprus and relations with Turkey. Should Greek relations with Turkey improve with respect to Cyprus, the political pressure on Karamanlis would be reduced, though whether even then he could resume full NATO participation is uncertain. But even if relations with Turkey should seriously deteriorate, the Greeks would not want to cut themselves off from the US. There thus seems to be a limit on how far Karamanlis is likely to go in weakening ties to the US.

The prospects for a negotiated settlement on Cyprus are questionable. Greece is anxious to cut its losses and remove Cyprus as a constant point of friction with Turkey but it is not likely to negotiate in place of the Greek Cypriots, or to accept a Turkish zone far out of proportion to the Turkish Cypriot population. It is possible, however, that the Greeks may strongly press the Greek Cypriots to make a deal if the Turks appear willing to accept a reasonable territorial offer. Makarios, for his part, prefers to “make do” in a truncated Greek Cyprus rather than to legitimize Turkish aggression in return for marginal concessions. And the Turkish government, though it wants eventual international recognition of the new situation in Cyprus and rapprochement with Greece, is weak and must proceed with caution, particularly with respect to territorial questions, bizonal arrangements and the degree to which the Turkish minority should share power—the issues which remain the key to progress.

In short, the best we can hope for now is continuation of the present state of relative peace on Cyprus, coupled with continuing efforts through intercommunal talks to move toward a negotiated settlement. Insofar as Cyprus and Greek-Turkish relations are concerned, this situation does not cause intolerable problems in Greece for the US. But, while failure to achieve a negotiated settlement may be tolerated by Greece, it will retain a destabilizing potential for internal Greek and Greek Cypriot politics, remain a sore point in US-Greek relations, and complicate our effort to bring Greece back into full Alliance participation.

The Aegean problem could again have an equally destabilizing potential in the sense that more important national interests are involved in the long run, though the governments are now more disposed to a calm approach. Since October 1973, when the Greeks discovered oil off the island of Thasos, Greece and Turkey have been bitterly divided by a range of interlocking issues relating to control of the Aegean Sea. The core issue has to do with overlapping claims, based on the complicated geography of the area, to the resources on and beneath the Aegean’s continental shelf. Most of the other issues currently troubling Greek-Turkish relations concern the continental shelf dispute either directly

or tangentially. For example, there is already a dispute over the control of air traffic over the Aegean. Moreover, the Greeks favor an international standard for territorial waters of 12 miles, while Turkey argues that a 12-mile rule in the Aegean would give it access to its own Aegean ports only on Greek suffrage. Finally, Greece, arguing that the Turkish intervention in Cyprus and Turkish attitudes toward the Aegean show Turkey's hostility to Greece, has militarized the Dodecanese Islands in contravention of the Treaty of Paris of 1947 and another group of three islands near the Turkish coast in contravention of the Treaty of Lausanne of 1923. Turkey, in turn, has made reconnaissance flights over several of these Greek islands despite treaty provisions prohibiting military overflights. It has also initiated the creation of a new Army, focussed totally toward the Aegean islands.

The Greeks are satisfied with the status quo in the Aegean. The Turks, who will not permit Athens to make the Aegean a Greek lake, are insisting that improved relations can come about only through give-and-take negotiations involving some splitting of the differences on all the issues. The continental shelf issue is now stalled. The Greeks state that both countries concurred in recent bilateral meetings to refer the question to the International Court of Justice, while the Turks insist that these meetings also called for prior Greek-Turkish negotiations to identify areas of agreement and disagreement. The issue still has the potential of sparking a clash between these two allies, with all the consequences that would imply for their domestic regimes and their foreign orientations.

As Karamanlis' honeymoon period gradually comes to an end he may become less able to undertake bold strokes toward a settlement with the Turks on Cyprus or the Aegean issues. The prospects, then, are at best for an extended period in which Greece and Turkey cautiously explore, by fits and starts, areas of accommodation. Although the civilian and military leadership in both Greece and Turkey will want to avoid it, periodic tension and the possibility of an armed conflict will persist. For that reason, Greek unhappiness with the US for not bringing more pressure to bear on Turkey will also persist, and so will the continuing threat of a further deterioration of US-Greek and Greek-NATO relations.

In the longer term, Greek ties with the US and NATO will be greatly affected by Karamanlis' ability to solidify his political base and develop political structures that will survive his passing from the scene. With an overwhelming parliamentary majority, he has the political force to make needed changes in Greek political life, as evidenced by the adoption of a constitution providing for a strong president. But the left, which won only 22 per cent of the vote in the last election, may do better the next time when memories—and fears—of the junta are not so fresh. Karamanlis' objective is to strengthen his base and pick up support from those who are alienated from his conservative policies without alarming the right and especially the army.

Recent Greek political history does not encourage excessive optimism as to Karamanlis' chances of establishing what would be the best (though not the only) framework for taking care of our own policy interests in Greece: a stable, democratic political system that will maintain a pro-Western foreign policy even in the face of continuing frustrations with respect to Turkey. Greece has a breathing space but not yet a long-term answer to its political and institutional problems. The same is true, therefore, for US-Greek relations.

Turkey

Turkey's ties to the US have become severely strained by the Turks' resentment over the US arms embargo. Despite Congressional easing of the embargo in early October, US military assistance has become an issue in partisan political debate. The Turkish Government, claiming that the US abrogated the bilateral Defense Cooperation Agreement by imposing the embargo, has initiated negotiations to draft a new Agreement. In addition to wanting to control US activities in Turkey, the Turks are also seeking guaranteed access to US arms. The future of US-Turkish relations will depend, in large part, on the outcome of these negotiations.

At the best, the Turks will not in the future allow themselves to depend upon the US as completely as in the past, particularly with respect to military equipment. The need for spare parts to keep their military machine rolling has demonstrated to them the value of diversifying sources of supply. Western Europe is Turkey's first choice as a supplemental source of equipment. But the Turks know that the European Allies cannot take care of all their needs. If Turkey is able to satisfy its basic military needs through the pipeline aid it now receives from the US, from whatever FY 1976 security assistance Congress approves, and additionally from its West European allies, its current close ties with NATO will most likely be maintained. If Turkey cannot maintain its military strength at a satisfactory level by depending upon these sources, it could intensify its search for arms and for financial assistance in procuring arms from Iran and the Arab world. Ankara might then also seek a political stance more independent of the Alliance than heretofore. Even some kind of eventual accommodation with the Soviets is not to be ruled out, including possible purchase of military support equipment and a non-aggression pact.

In addition to the motives for possible adjustments in Turkey's foreign policy described above, pressures from the religious-based National Salvation Party and extremist groups for a closer alignment with the Moslem world might intensify. Differences and prejudices engrained by time will be difficult to overcome, however, and without strong Arab inducements—in the shape of substantial financial assistance—no lasting relationship is likely to develop. Even such inducements would be unlikely to sway the Turkish political elite from their

long-standing commitment to economic and social development along Western lines.

The two major Turkish parties recognize that their country's long-term political, economic, and security interests lie with the West. They would like to remove the major irritant to continued cooperation with the West by achieving a rapprochement with Greece. However, the persistence of weak government in Ankara compounds the problem of reaching a settlement on Cyprus. Even at the best, however, the Turks will want their continued relationship with the US to be on a different basis than before. They want less dependence on the US as a source of military supplies and greater control over US facilities in Turkey.

[Omitted here are portions of Section I unrelated to Greece and Turkey.]

II. Conclusions

These conclusions can be drawn from the foregoing analysis:

1) Despite the growth of the Soviet fleet, pressure on the NATO base structure and other constraints, the military balance of power in the Mediterranean still rests with the West.

2) The US has some flexibility in responding to political pressures on its base structure and can accept certain operating, tenure or occupation restrictions on its bases in individual countries without markedly reducing its objectives in the area and its ability to implement them. Compensations for base losses can be effected in certain cases but would entail military, economic or political costs. Opportunities exist for some relocation of US facilities from areas under political pressure, such as CONUS basing of SSBN's. Additionally, some operational flexibility could be achieved [2 lines not declassified]. New systems over the next five years provide alternatives for airlift and certain intelligence capabilities not dependent on location. On the other hand, the prospects for devolution of current US military missions in the Mediterranean to our Allies are limited by weaknesses in Allied capabilities, political constraints which would also act upon them, and the fact that certain of our roles can be performed only by the US.

3) The political environment we face in Southern Europe is ambiguous and in flux. In some respects the US and NATO position continues to have strong foundations. Several of the countries continue to feel a need for alliance with the US against a too powerful and too near Soviet Union. Détente has weakened but by no means destroyed this factor, nor is it likely to. Some governments also value the US tie as an element in their domestic stability.

4) There are, in fact, some prospects for improvement in the Western position. These include the possibility of closer ties between

post-Franco Spain and NATO and of a reduction in the Greek-Turkish tension which is the main immediate source of US and NATO difficulties with both countries. Another stabilizing factor would be the increase of Western European influence in the area. Neither the European Community nor its members is going to be in a position to take over the major US stabilizing role in the Southern European area for the foreseeable future. But both the EC and its members can contribute to the orderly evolution of the area by means of the economic assistance they can provide and the political influence which, in varying degrees, they possess. US-European coordination of policy toward the Southern countries should thus be a major goal if the leverage we have among us is to be applied most effectively.

5) Nevertheless, US influence is in decline in all of the area countries, in different degrees and for different reasons. Decline, of course, does not mean disappearance (US influence may still remain very considerable even if it is reduced as compared to the height of the cold war), nor is it necessarily balanced by an increase of Soviet influence. But the US will have to modify some of its policies with respect to both bilateral and multilateral relations if it is to maintain even an adequate (i.e., less than desirable) level of influence in countries it has hitherto largely been able to take for granted.

6) One consequence of this change will be that US access to the military facilities which underpin its and NATO's position in the Mediterranean will be under continuing pressure for the long-term. It is not possible to say with any certainty just which installations will be affected, to what extent, or when, once we get past the present round of negotiations. Planning for these future contingencies must be hypothetical, whether it is a question of seeking to modify or terminate certain missions, devolve them on our allies or relocate certain facilities to places outside the five countries (none of which is likely, in any case, to accept more US facilities than it now has). The timing and extent of US military cutbacks will, in turn, have a bearing on the internal stability and foreign policies of all the countries whose stability and policies are affected, however intangibly, by the US military presence.

7) A second consequence will be that NATO risks becoming an increasingly jagged alliance in the Southern flank, with Portugal, Greece and possibly others joining France in a less-than-full type of membership, while Spain, on the other hand, might be assimilated to the Alliance but also, possibly, in a less-than-full relationship. At a minimum, through emphasis on particular national problems, and through an emotional and self-centered approach to NATO's activities on the part of these Southern European states, the institutional integrity and effectiveness of NATO will suffer. The US may face a choice between a shrunken but relatively homogeneous alliance from which half-

members have been dropped and a more irregular alliance including Southern flank countries (and perhaps others to whom they will set an example) in a variety of membership relationships.

8) A third consequence is the problem of governments in some of these countries which include Communists or others who are hostile to NATO. Such an alliance would be very different, in homogeneity and ideological contour, from what it has been since its inception. The US choice would be between ejecting such members (at some point to be determined when Communists et al enter or come to dominate certain governments) or putting up with them (perhaps with limits on their participation in Alliance affairs) for as long as they continue to want to maintain membership.

9) The Soviet response to this situation has been cautious and is likely to remain so, at least while the main thrust of its foreign policy is toward détente with the US. Negative developments in the six countries are not mainly the work of the USSR, but it will exploit them when it can do so with minimal risk to its relations with the US. Nevertheless, if the USSR is able to reassert its influence in Yugoslavia after Tito's passing, it will be in a good position to exert political pressure further afield (though a success of that sort could also have counterproductive results for the USSR).

[Omitted here are Section III, "Issues and Options," Section IV, "Strategies," and two Annexes.]

57. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State¹

Athens, December 24, 1975, 1337Z.

10150. For the Secretary. Subject: Death of Richard S. Welch: Some Preliminary Comments. Refs: Athens 10112, 10113 and 10116.²

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 84, Athens Embassy Files: Lot 78 F 160, Box 63, POL 23-8, Assassination of Richard Welch. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by George Barbis (POL), cleared by Monteagle Stearns (DCM) and R. Estes (OSA), and approved by Kubisch.

² Telegrams 10112, 10113, and 10116 from Athens, December 23, reported the shooting of Welch outside his home upon returning from a reception at the Ambassador's residence, the Embassy's confirmation of Welch's death, and the Greek Government's statement. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1975)

1. The assassination last night of Dick Welch has sent a sharp shock wave through our Embassy and the American community in Greece. As of late this morning December 24, we still have no hard information as to who committed this terrible crime and why.

2. The Greek Government has been cooperative and vigorous in initiating an extensive investigation and is making a major effort to apprehend those responsible. In addition, senior Greek officials have informed me that additional security measures have been undertaken for the protection of U.S. officials in Greece.

3. During the night I spoke repeatedly by telephone with Minister of Coordination Papaligouras (the senior Minister in Athens at the present time in view of Caramanlis' absence in Corfu), Defense Minister Averoff and Foreign Minister Bitsios. Averoff also personally came to the Embassy during the night on instructions from the Prime Minister to convey officially the regrets of the Greek Government over this tragic event and to assure me that the Greek Government was taking all appropriate action to get to the bottom of it. In addition, President Tsatsos abruptly terminated an official dinner last night and sent his Diplomatic Counselor to see me to convey his personal and official regrets. Prime Minister Caramanlis also personally called me from Corfu early this morning for the same purpose.

4. Despite the shock and sadness we all feel here over Dick's death, the Embassy is of course open today and functioning as normally as possible although I have ordered that certain additional security measures be taken. We are also flying the flag at half mast for today. We have received innumerable calls and visits from Greeks and representatives of other Governments expressing their sympathy and abhorrence over this event.

5. Although we do not as yet have any firm clues as to who the perpetrators of this crime are or why they did it, the environment in which we operate here certainly has played a part. You are undoubtedly aware that we continue to be subject to attacks and criticism in the press—although somewhat more muted now—and there has been a renewed upsurge lately of virulent anti-CIA stories, based mostly on news stories filed from Washington. This was given a special impetus last month when the English language *Athens News* published a list of alleged CIA officials in Athens (Athens 9252).³ Dick Welch was named as the CIA Station Chief here in this and other stories that followed, which also gave his home address. Some papers also printed pictures of his residence.

³ Dated November 26. (Ibid.)

6. In addition to this general atmosphere of animosity toward the CIA there are, of course, numerous groups in Greece, including Greek Cypriot students, refugees and others, who have particularly strong feelings about the alleged activities and responsibilities of the CIA in connection with the Junta and the subsequent Cyprus tragedy. It is too early to say whether the assassins came from these or any other Greek Cypriot or Greek group of either extreme. Hopefully the investigation being conducted by the Greek police authorities will reveal the identity of those responsible quickly. I intend to see that they spare no effort.

7. By septels we are reporting Greek press reaction to the assassination⁴ and information regarding the family's desires for returning the remains to the U.S. including funeral arrangements.⁵ Mrs. Welch has remained at her residence and is bearing up extraordinarily well under the circumstances and with considerable courage. Dick's seventy-five year old father, Colonel Patrick Welch, is also bearing up relatively well. Mr. Welch's three children, who are at present in England, have already been notified of their father's death.

Kubisch⁶

⁴ Telegrams 10144 and 10171 from Athens, December 24. (Ibid., RG 84, Athens Embassy Files: Lot 78 F 160, Box 63, POL 23-8, Assassination of Richard Welch)

⁵ Telegram 10184 from Athens, December 28. (Ibid.)

⁶ The Ambassador initialed above his typed signature.

58. Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency¹

Washington, December 24, 1975.

SUBJECT

Assassination of Senior US Embassy Official in Athens

Possible Perpetrators

1. Although we do not yet know the identities or the affiliation of the assassins, various individuals and groups do seem to stand out as possible suspects. These range from the extreme left to the extreme right and their home base could be Greece, Cyprus or elsewhere.

¹ Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry, Job 80-M00165A, Box 17, Death of Richard Welch. Secret; Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals.

2. The perpetrators of the assassination may well have been extreme leftist Greek youths, possibly associated with the violence-prone splinter groups of the far left. These have been implicated in other violent activities such as the storming of the US Embassy last April on the anniversary of the military takeover in 1967. Four members of the Revolutionary Communist Movement of Greece were recently convicted for their role in the attack on the embassy. Such groups, which reportedly have fraternal ties to Palestinian students in Greece and possibly to elements of the Palestinian Liberation Organization, roundly condemn the traditional communist left as bourgeois and opportunist.

3. It is in fact unlikely that the country's three main Communist parties, which have condemned violence and seem more interested in improving their respectability, were involved. Even extreme leftist Andreas Papandreou is probably shrewd enough to see the folly in such actions despite his shrill anti-American and anti-CIA rhetoric, although he may not have total control over his numerous youthful followers. Any of the main leftist parties, especially the Moscow-backed Communist Party of the Exterior, could have been responsible for the recent revelation of the identities of alleged CIA case officers in Greece however.

4. There is an outside chance the assassins were right-wing provocateurs. In light of the revelations of the names of the alleged CIA employees, rightist elements may have considered this an opportune time to act in the belief that blame would be heaped on the left.

5. Alternatively, the assassins could have been Greek Cypriots. Various reports have confirmed the existence of extremist groups on the left and right in Cyprus whose avowed aim is to attack Turkish as well as British and American targets. Extreme leftist Vassos Lyssarides, himself the object of an assassination attempt, is one of the most vocal propagators of anti-American and anti-CIA rhetoric. There may also be a connection between this most recent shooting and the earlier assassinations of the Turkish ambassadors to Austria and France. The assassins of the Turkish ambassadors have never been identified, although speculation has centered on Greeks or Greek Cypriots as well as on Armenians or Turkish dissidents.

Motives

6. Virulent anti-Americanism and a corresponding desire to rid Greece and Cyprus of US influences are the most likely motives behind the assassination. It was probably also an act of revenge, stemming from a belief that the US has been the principal obstacle to the realization of leftist aspirations going as far back as the Greek Civil War in the 1940s when massive US assistance prevented a communist takeover. Many Greeks also believe that the US installed and sustained the military juntas that ruled Greece between 1967 and 1974 and are convinced that the US engineered or at least could have prevented the

Turkish invasion of Cyprus. Greek anger has been fueled by the revelations of the junta's use of torture on a large scale against leftists as well as by the stories of CIA involvement in Greece and Cyprus emanating from the US press and the Congressional hearings.

7. In the event the assassination was rightist-inspired, the aim of the right would clearly be to force the government to abandon its policy of toleration toward the left that it has viewed with such alarm.

Political Implications

8. The assassination will increase the level of recriminations between the left and right which has grown substantially in the past few months. The Caramanlis Government will now come under greater pressure from the right to take some measures against the left. Caramanlis has thus far resisted such pressures, preferring instead to maintain a middle of the road policy between left and right but he may now bow to pressures and adopt a policy less tolerant of leftist activity.

59. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State¹

Athens, December 30, 1975, 1645Z.

10243. Subject: Greek Government Offers Reward for Information Leading to Solution of Murder of Richard S. Welch. Ref: (A) Athens 10187 (Notal) (B) Athens 10189 (Notal).²

1. Despite the blackout ordered over the weekend (ref A),³ the Athens press has continued to print stories on the Welch assassination based largely on foreign press reports. However, the principal story in the press on December 30 is the announcement by the Ministry of Public Order of monetary rewards for information in connection with

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 84, Athens Embassy Files: Lot 78 F 160, Box 63, POL 23-8, Assassination of Richard Welch. Limited Official Use; Immediate. Repeated Priority to Ankara, Nicosia, Thessaloniki, and DIA with a request to pass to USIA. Drafted by John Collins (POL); cleared by Stearns, Edward Alexander (PAO), and R. Estes (OSA); and approved by Barbis (POL).

² Telegram 10187 from Athens, December 29. (Ibid.) Telegram 10189 from Athens, December 29. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1975)

³ As reported in telegram 10187, the Public Prosecutor's Office in Athens ordered a press blackout of the Welch murder investigation in response to ongoing major coverage in the Greek press of the Welch murder. The stories had more speculation than facts to report about who was responsible for the murder.

the assassination. Reports also cover the shipment of the remains of the deceased to the U.S.

2. The Ministry's announcement states that the Greek Government had authorized payment of five million drachmas to anyone providing specific information on the identity of the murderers; a sum of between one and two million drachmas will be given for information which contributes to clarification of the affair. The announcement asserted that anyone providing such information could be assured that his anonymity would be protected in every way. The Ministry cited as a basis for this the justified public interest and the need to accelerate the investigation so that an early solution to the crime, which is both "hideous and unprecedented in Greek experience," can be found.

3. Press reports also covered the simple ceremony (ref B) held on December 29 at the Athenai (U.S.) Air Base when the remains of the deceased departed for the United States. Several newspapers carried a photograph of an honor guard of Marines carrying the coffin onto the aircraft.

4. There have been no leads in the investigation. The Greek press had reported earlier that two different organizations have claimed credit for the Welch murder. One called itself the "Organization of Officers of the National Idea" and the other the "November 17th" organization (after the date of the 1973 events at the Polytechnion). However, the police have apparently not taken either of these claims seriously.

5. *Comment:* In response to press queries the only replies we are making have been in connection with arrangements for the departure of the remains of the deceased and of the family, and biographic information of a general and unclassified nature. More specifically, we are making no comment in response to questions about the effect of the assassination on our bilateral relations with Greece and are of course refraining from any comment on the crime itself or the investigation.

6. Department, USIA and other Washington agencies dealing with the media should bear in mind that although a virtual blackout exists of local comment on the murder, the Greek press continues to reproduce foreign press accounts and statements. It is in fact relying on these to keep the story rolling. As usual "quotations" are frequently wrenched out of context and elaborated to suit the editorial purposes of individual Greek papers. In these circumstances it is particularly important for US spokesmen to avoid speculative comment of any kind, whether for attribution or on background, and for VOA to confine its treatment to hard news developments.

Kubisch⁴

⁴ The Ambassador initialed next to his typed signature.

60. Memorandum From A. Denis Clift of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft)¹

Washington, February 26, 1976.

SUBJECT

U.S.-Greek Bases Negotiations—Status Report

The third round in the U.S.-Greek bases negotiations ended on February 13. The following is a brief summary of developments to date and issues which remain to be negotiated. *We have made substantial progress in our bases negotiations with the Greeks. Principal problems to be ironed out are our use of the air facilities at Souda Bay, Crete [1½ lines not declassified].*

Status of Forces Agreement

Except for one relatively minor issue, agreement has been reached on a new Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA). State expects that this issue will be quickly resolved and that the new agreement will be formally implemented shortly through an exchange of notes. The new agreement will reduce somewhat the privileges accorded U.S. military personnel in Greece, but they will still enjoy rights in excess of those provided for in the basic NATO SOFA.

Telecommunications

Through the work of a special subgroup, which has met periodically over the past six months, we have concluded several agreements on ways by which the Greeks can benefit directly from our telecommunications facilities. Specifically, we have agreed to provide them training, equipment, and the use of spare circuitry.

[1 paragraph (7 lines) not declassified]

Command and Control

The Greeks are seeking the "Hellenization" of our facilities through an agreement which would define the responsibilities and duties of the American and Greek commanders of each facility, provide for the flying of the Greek flag, and call for the maintenance of external security by Greek guards, etc. DOD is preparing a draft agreement on this

¹ Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for Middle East and South Asia, Box 10, Greece 4. Secret. Sent for information. Scowcroft wrote "thanks" and initialed the memorandum.

subject, and we have offered to host at an early date a subgroup meeting to discuss it.

Hellenikon Air Base

This has been the most difficult issue in the negotiations. Last spring we agreed to close the separate U.S. Air Force Base at Athens International Airport and combine it with the adjoining Greek Air Force Base, commonly called Hellenikon. Since then, we have been battling with the Greeks over the number of U.S. military personnel who would be permitted to remain at the facility. In the last negotiating session, the Greek side finally agreed we could keep approximately 1050 personnel on the base and we could relocate a number of support activities off the base in the Athens area. (There are now about 1500 U.S. military personnel on the base.) The agreement is, however, [1 line not declassified]. In round three, we described in general terms what we could offer, and we invited a Greek team to visit the U.S. for further discussions. The team will probably come here in early April. State is reasonably optimistic that we can develop a package which will satisfy the Greeks, thus nailing down the Hellenikon issue.

Souda Bay

In the third round, we made a strong approach to the Greek side to lift the remaining restrictions on our operations at Souda Bay which were imposed during the 1974 Cyprus crisis. A special subgroup met several times to discuss these restrictions, as well as our interest in revising the existing (1959) agreement to permit expanded use by the U.S. Navy of Souda Bay airfield. State believes it will be difficult to achieve our objectives, at least in the near future, because of the Greek Government's sensitivity to the leftist campaign in Crete against foreign bases.

Umbrella Agreement

The Greek side has emphasized interest in an overall military facilities agreement which would be submitted to the Greek Parliament for approval and to which would be attached as annexes the separate agreements that we have concluded on specific subjects. In round three, we told the Greeks that we could agree in principle [2 lines not declassified]. The Greeks listened to our presentation on the Greek-NATO relationship, but gave no hint as to whether or when they would reply.

Besides the visits to the U.S. [less than 1 line not declassified] and a subgroup session on command and control, State expects that there will be subgroup meetings on Souda Bay and possibly on Hellenikon in the next two months. Depending on the progress achieved in these

meetings, a fourth negotiating round will probably be scheduled for May. Although we could conceivably conclude our bilateral negotiations in this round [*1½ lines not declassified*] State's current guess is that a fifth plenary will be needed in the summer or early fall.

61. Backchannel Message From the Ambassador to Greece (Kubisch) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft)¹

Athens, March 4, 1976, 1733Z.

399. Subj: Caramanlis Visit.

1. I am happy to tell you that Caramanlis accepts with pleasure the June 15–16 dates and is very much looking forward to his visit and meetings with the President.

2. He would like to receive a suggested program for his stay in Washington, including when he should plan to arrive and depart. He is considering spending a few additional days in the U.S. after leaving Washington and is open to suggestions as to where he should go. He anticipates many requests to meet and attend functions of Greek-American groups in the U.S.

3. He wants the visit to cap our steadily improving bilateral relationship and therefore believes it should also have at least one major substantive aspect. Since he feels a Cyprus settlement is improbable—given the situation in Turkey—he would like to see some kind of U.S.—or NATO—related plan to guarantee peace in the Aegean. This would have a tremendously favorable impact here and pave the way for a return to NATO as well.

4. Caramanlis envisages a brief one or two sentence announcement of the visit, both in Washington and Athens, but is inclined to defer it for a while longer. However, he is open to our suggestions on this.

5. I will await your guidance on how to proceed.

6. Warm regards.

¹ Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Back Channel Messages, 1974–1977, Box 4, Mideast/Africa, Incoming 3/76. Secret; Eyes Only.

62. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, March 31, 1976, 3:30 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

The Secretary
Under Secretary Sisco
Mr. Eagleton, EUR/SE, (notetaker)
Ambassador Alexandrakis
Mr. Loukas Tsilis

Secretary: It is always a pleasure to see someone who controls more votes in the Congress than I do. (laughter)

Alexandrakis: I am always impressed by your speeches.

Secretary: With the friendship of Greece my career will be complete. But frankly, all of my life has been more associated with Greece than with Turkey. It was our strategy during the first week of the Cyprus crisis to protect Greece. Everyone wanted me to condemn Greece but I thought that to do so would only encourage the Turks. In the second round there was entirely too much confusion. We were going through a Presidential transition. Callaghan was getting emotional. Mavros was no help, if you don't mind my saying so. We really had no great strategy, we lost control of events.

Sisco: We have often discussed this. I believe if we had been more involved at Geneva the outcome might have been different.

Secretary: The fact is that the Turkish proposal at Geneva² you would accept now, but if we had pressed it at that time it would have produced anti-American riots in Athens. Were it not for the Presidential crisis at that time we might have been able to do more.

Alexandrakis: Yes, I have a message from Foreign Minister Bitsios (hands the Secretary a letter (attached) which he reads).³

Secretary: What are your oral remarks?

¹ Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 275, Memoranda of Conversations, Chronological File. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Eagleton and approved in S on July 13. The meeting was held in the Secretary's office.

² Reference is to the Turkish proposal for an autonomous Turkish Cypriot administration. See Document 126.

³ In the March 31 letter, attached but not printed, Bitsios characterized the U.S. decision for restoring a defense cooperation agreement with Turkey as "massive military aid to the wrongdoer," not because Greece opposed a U.S.-Turkish agreement to consolidate allied defense but because the particulars of the agreement would weaken that defense. Any aid to Turkey would push two NATO allies closer to the brink of disaster. Greece viewed the current situation as a failure of the Greek decision to exercise moderation in negotiation while enabling Turkey to gain a military advantage over Greece.

Alexandrakis: We are faced with Turkish expansion and aggression, statements by Turkish officials are there to prove it. Turkey will be carrying out petroleum research in the Aegean in May and Greece will have to take counter-action. Vice President Turkes said recently that all islands within 50 kilometers should be Turkish.

On a personal basis I would like to make some additional comments. I would ask for your attention in this delicate situation to make something clear. It is my duty to call your attention to the danger of a lack of US understanding of our views on these issues. This is not a threat, but there are developments that ensue that would be unfortunate.

Secretary: Do you mean inside Greece?

Alexandrakis: Inside Greece and in the area.

Secretary: I have difficulty evaluating what you are saying. We have made clear that we were negotiating with Turkey. We have explained that the agreement provides a level comparable, or a little above, what we have always given Turkey—the same level considering inflation. This has been presented in a manner that allows Turkey to present this to its people. The ExIm Bank loans also are similar to those of recent years. I cannot accept the proposition that this constitutes anything new. Delivery of major military items will mostly be in the period 1978–79, so this cannot affect the immediate situation.

As for provocative acts by Turkey against Greece, we would strongly oppose this. If you mean military force we would oppose it and support you against it.

As for provision for a Greek agreement, this should be comparable. I have not studied this, but we want to strengthen Greece and the present Government of Greece. We cannot change the fact that our affection is unrequited. Really this has been a tragedy. You have been a chief actor in using pressure to get us to do things. Normally when a foreign government comes to us as a friend we don't fail it.

In Cyprus the objective is to get back territory. There are two ways to do this. You chose Congress' way. We had our own way. We want the friendship and cooperation of Greece and are prepared to show great friendship and cooperation ourselves. You should have a comparable agreement. You can assure your minister that we will make every effort to respond to your needs.

Alexandrakis: There are two things: Aid and security. A Turkish agreement will enhance Turkey's aggression.

Secretary: We made it clear to the Turks that our relationship will depend on progress on Cyprus. Furthermore, we have to get appropriations from Congress every year. Congress will not be receptive if there is any Turkish aggression. It has been our assumption that Cyprus will be settled. We will do our utmost to promote this.

Alexandrakis: I don't really have any control over the Greek-Americans.

Secretary: Mr. Ambassador, your Israeli colleague tells me he has no control.

Alexandrakis: We don't have such control as they have.

Secretary: Some of your people are influenced from the Cypriots. I genuinely believe that if two things had not happened, if Ecevit had not resigned and the Congress had not passed the embargo, we would have settled Cyprus in early 1975. It is not right for the Greeks and Americans to be estranged.

Alexandrakis: I agree, we suffer from this.

Secretary: I never joined the harassment of your previous government. I was neutral; but now I have great admiration for your prime minister—and your foreign minister. We should try to calm the situation. As for provocative Turkish military action, we will oppose it.

Alexandrakis: A public statement would be helpful.

Secretary: Can we do this?

Sisco: Perhaps we can when we go to the Congress with the Turkish Agreement.

Secretary: Let's see about this. We could say that we want things settled peacefully and would oppose any military action. Let's try a formula such as "assistance to Turkey is for NATO defense." Of course this is in the agreement.

Alexandrakis: Yes, this is nothing new.

Secretary: Then we could say we would oppose a military move against a NATO ally.

Alexandrakis: You were kind to say you envisage a similar agreement for Greece. If this could be said publicly—

Secretary: Why don't you get instructions to this effect and we will let you know what we can say by Friday.⁴

Alexandrakis: If you could say it would be the same level.

Secretary: We can't say that, but we can say that we are prepared in principle to make a multi-year agreement with Greece.

I want you to know I understand your domestic problems. We feel Caramanlis should be strong domestically. We should be able to say we are making a multi-year agreement with you. Tell Bitsios I think of him with great respect.

⁴ During the noon briefing on April 2, Kissinger remarked: "Greece will, of course, continue to be able to obtain military equipment from the United States during the period of the proposed agreement with Turkey." (Telegram 080223 to Athens, April 2; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1976)

Alexandrakis: I know he feels the same way.

Secretary: We will do our utmost to be helpful.

(On the way to the door)

Secretary: There was really nothing in the agreement that should cause you problems. In it the Turks encompass a number of things we had been discussing with them for some time. The planes will not arrive until 1978–79.

Alexandrakis: Caglayangil said there would be F–4's in the interim.

Secretary: Yes, there will be 14 F–4's over a period of 15 months.

Alexandrakis: What about the ships?

Secretary: There will be a thirty year old destroyer and two old submarines.

63. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft) to President Ford¹

Washington, April 8, 1976.

SUBJECT

Reply to Prime Minister Constantine Caramanlis of Greece

Following the signing of the US-Turkish Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA),² Prime Minister Constantine Caramanlis of Greece sent you the following message:

“April 1, 1976

Dear Mr. President:

I am convinced that the recent United States-Turkish agreement raises most serious problems for Greece and dangers for the peace of this region.

Our two foreign ministers have already exchanged views on the situation and I have the feeling that these problems can be resolved to the benefit of the United States, Greece, Turkey and the Free World.

¹ Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Correspondence with Foreign Leaders, 1974–1977, Box 2, Greece, Karamanlis. Secret. Sent for action. A notation on the memorandum indicates the President saw it.

² The agreement was signed on March 26, but Congress did not act upon it because of the embargo, which was not lifted until 1978. See Document 247.

Knowing your statesmanship and your personal interest in settling the tragic situation obtaining in this area of the world, I would be obliged if you would give your full support to the arrangements now being discussed.

Warm regards,

Sincerely,

Constantine Caramanlis”

The Prime Minister’s message reflects the Greek government’s concern that the new US-Turkish defense agreement favors Turkey over Greece and may serve to destabilize the delicate balance of power in the Eastern Mediterranean area. In this connection, the Greek government “suspended” talks with the United States on the future of U.S. bases in Greece and asked for assurances of U.S. support for Greece in the event of a Greek-Turkish confrontation in the Aegean, together with a level of U.S. aid for Greece equal to that assured Turkey in the new DCA. Additionally, Prime Minister Caramanlis has contacted the heads of government of the EC-9 asking that they express Greece’s concerns to the United States.

As you know, Secretary Kissinger has been giving the Greek request careful study and has been in close and continuing contact with Greek Foreign Minister Bitsios on this matter. They are currently working to reach agreement on an exchange of letters for public release, stating U.S. support for assistance levels for Greece comparable with Turkey while avoiding an explicit commitment on our part to intervene in any Greek-Turkish dispute in the Mediterranean or Aegean.

The message for your approval to Prime Minister Caramanlis at Tab A³ would thank him for his letter of April 1, note the continuing contacts between the Secretary of State and the Greek Foreign Minister, and express your confidence that the present concern of the Greek government over the US-Turkish defense agreement can be resolved in a way which will benefit both countries and help preserve and strengthen the peace and stability of the Eastern Mediterranean area.

The text of your message has been cleared with Douglas Smith of Robert Hartmann’s office.

Recommendation

That you approve the message to Prime Minister Caramanlis at Tab A for immediate dispatch to Athens.⁴

³ Not attached; the letter was transmitted to Athens in telegram 086496, April 9. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1976)

⁴ Ford initialed the approve option.

64. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, April 14, 1976, 4 p.m.

SUBJECT

Secretary's Meeting with Greek Foreign Minister Dimitri Bitsios

PARTICIPANTS

Greece

Foreign Minister Dimitri Bitsios
 Ambassador John Tzounis, Director General, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
 Ambassador Menelas Alexandrakis, Greek Ambassador to the United States
 Anthony Nomikos, Minister, Greek Embassy
 Loukas Tsilas, Counselor, Greek Embassy
 Panayotis Vlassopoulos, Aide to Minister Bitsios

United States

The Secretary
 Under Secretary Sisco
 Monroe Leigh, Legal Adviser
 Assistant Secretary Hartman
 William Eagleton, EUR/SE (notetaker)

The Secretary: As I understand it, we have settled everything on the exchanges?² Could I have your reaction?

Bitsios: I would like to have Mr. Hartman's interpretation of your message.

The Secretary: We have changed it to "actively and unequivocally" and removed the part in the first paragraph.

Bitsios: The formula regarding your position in case we ask for credits and loans. Your position is definitely that the sums should be omitted.

The Secretary: Yes.

Bitsios: Paragraph four of the principles. How does it read?

The Secretary: "Security assistance."

Bitsios: That is difficult for us.

¹ Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 275, Memoranda of Conversations, Chronological File. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Eagleton on April 16 and approved in S on July 7. The meeting was held in the Secretary's office. Several meetings took place in preparation for this 4 p.m. meeting. Kissinger, Sisco, and Hartman met with Alexandrakis on April 1. (Memorandum of conversation; *ibid.*) Internal State meetings were held on April 2, 5, and 14 (9:45 a.m. and 1:15 p.m.). (Memoranda of conversations; *ibid.*)

² Kissinger's reference is to a proposed exchange of letters between himself and Bitsios regarding further discussions of issues of interest between Greece and the United States.

The Secretary: Why?

Bitsios: My Government needs military assistance. The price of new weapons is increasing all the time.

The Secretary: [1 line not declassified] This does not change the fact. Such aid is guaranteed under our "Security Assistance Act."

Tzounis: Why can't we call it military assistance?

The Secretary: [4 lines not declassified]

Bitsios: What is the problem with Turkey?

The Secretary: We have given them a rough idea of our planning, and we have had an outraged reaction from Caglayangil no less strong than yours was. They say that this might jeopardize their agreement, and they are worried that we might be exchanging letters on the Eastern Mediterranean. They would certainly react. We have not given them the exchange or the figure. They would consider about \$400 million appropriate. Their argument is related to the size of population and military forces. [5 lines not declassified] This is the fact, but our advice from Ankara is that we are going to have a violent reaction even if the documents are unchanged.

Bitsios: We have all tried to be careful not to raise sensitive issues. I suppose removing part of the first sentence was related to this problem. For me it was embarrassing since it had been agreed to. But it was understandable. However, I don't think we should go so far as to ask the Turks how to describe the \$700 million.

The Secretary: We have not given them figures or formulations. Security Assistance is the name of the Act under which our military assistance is given.

Bitsios: We discussed this with the Prime Minister, and my mandate is to stand by the term military.

The Secretary: If I threw in my pants, would it work?

(Laughter)

(To Hartman) Did we accept the word military?

Hartman: I said I would convey it to you.

Alexandrakis: You said you accepted it.

The Secretary: He said he would accept it but that the son of a bitch in charge may not go along, or something to that effect.

Hartman: Not really.

The Secretary: Let me discuss this with my colleagues. I will call you back on it this evening.

Tzounis: This is an important point for us.

The Secretary: We will call you before 7 p.m. We can still work on the text tonight.

What are we signing?

Hartman: The document of principles. The letters will already be signed and they will be released tomorrow.³ Hamilton is releasing your exchange today.⁴

The Secretary: Is this on his initiative?

Hartman: Yes.

The Secretary: We will make it available in our Press Office.

Tzounis: The economic assurance is an oral one.

The Secretary: You can use it, however, and I will confirm it. We can refer to it in general terms.

(To Hartman) When is your backgrounder?

Hartman: Tomorrow afternoon.

The Secretary: The only thing remaining is that you (Hartman) should make it clear in the briefing [*8 lines not declassified*]. You had better explain this.

Tzounis: [*less than 1 line not declassified*] It will be signed at the time of the US-Greek agreement?

Hartman: Yes, but we will sign the proces verbal now (tomorrow).

The Secretary: Should we talk about Cyprus? I had thought it might be useful for an American to be engaged, since neither side seems to be able to come forward with realistic proposals. An American could explore the possibilities with both sides and perhaps introduce some ideas of his own. This might open things up. This would help avoid the debate on who puts forward the first proposals. As it is now, the Greek side will propose very little and then the Turks will come back with little. It might save some of the steps if an American put forward something to which the parties could react.

We have discussed this with the Turks, who were at first reluctant. They now agree, however, if it is done in the context of other Greek-Turkish problems. I have asked David Bruce, but he won't do it. Perhaps Tyler or someone else.

³ Kissinger and Bitsios signed "Principles to Guide Future U.S.-Greek Defense Cooperation" on April 15 at 12:30 p.m. The text of the agreement was reported in telegram 90619 to NATO and related military commands on April 16. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1976)

⁴ Telegram 90622 to NATO and related military commands, April 16, relayed the exchange of letters between Representative Lee Hamilton (D-Indiana) and Kissinger on April 8 and 13, regarding the U.S.-Turkish Defense Cooperation Agreement of March 26. While Hamilton supported strengthening the U.S.-Turkish relationship, he wanted assurances from Kissinger that the agreement would not raise the level of tension between Greece and Turkey in the eastern Mediterranean. (Ibid.)

Bitsios: The difficulty is the linkage between Cyprus and other difficulties we have with the Turks. Have you discussed this with the Cypriots?

The Secretary: No, we have discussed this only with Caglayangil.

Bitsios: The position of the Cypriots is that they refuse the direct involvement of the Greek Government in seeking terms of a solution. They do not want the Greek Government discussing terms. They want this to be done between the communities. Secondly, they are convinced that they have fulfilled their obligations by putting forward proposals suggesting a 20% basis and leaving open the door to a bizonal arrangement. In their proposal there is nothing to exclude a bizonal system, and they suggest 20% and they suggest using some maps that have already been discussed as a starting point.

The Cypriots are convinced that Denktash should now be making his own proposals. So this is what is in the minds of the Cypriots.

It will be a political impossibility for the Government of Greece to discuss behind the backs of the Cypriots any concrete suggestions. In Brussels we discussed procedural questions. I don't think they will accept that we discuss solutions.

The Secretary: I don't exclude that—it does not need to be exclusively with your government. We could say we were concerned with Greece and Turkish questions, including Cyprus.

Bitsios: If he could go to Cyprus and put his suggestions to the two sides, it would be different.

Hartman: The trouble is there will be two proposals, and both will be bad. There is even a question whether the two sides will meet. The first thing is to get them back to meeting.

Bitsios: I hope that if Denktash puts forward proposals, we will be back in business. I did not expect Denktash to like the Cyprus proposals.

The Secretary: We can do our utmost to produce a Turkish counter-proposal.

Bitsios: Our differences with Turkey are as follows: one, the continental shelf; two, air space. We have made some concrete proposals and had four rounds on air space. We have exhausted the subject. We said they could consider our proposals open.

On the continental shelf, we have proposed taking the matter to the International Court. They accepted this but have been reluctant to proceed. Tzounis had a meeting with them in Bern, with legal experts on both sides. Unfortunately the difference between us is so far apart that our proposal to send the question to the Court was clearly justified.

The Secretary: You don't see too much of a problem with our designating an American. We know the Cypriots' first proposals are far less than what the Archbishop has told me he would be prepared to do. I am not eager to have the United States put forward proposals.

Tzounis: How do you envisage an American initiative? Would it be related to the intercommunal talks?

The Secretary: Yes. We would have to work this out with Waldheim beforehand.

Bitsios: You know Makarios' position regarding a solution.

The Secretary: I even have the suspicion that the Archbishop might not have told me everything he is prepared to do.

Bitsios: What did he tell you?

The Secretary: He said 25%.

Bitsios: That is correct. Caramanlis came to you and said he was backing this position.

The Secretary: I have not told the Turks about it. Don't you think if the United States put forward 25% all hell would break loose?

Bitsios: I have the impression Makarios thought you would bargain with the Turks on this basis. You do not really need the Government of Greece involved in this. You could bargain directly with the Turks.

The Secretary: First of all, I think we should try to elicit a Turkish proposal before we address the question of whether there is to be an American emissary. I would recommend that we make an urgent approach to the Turks asking them to put forward their proposals.

Tzounis: There was an understanding in Vienna that proposals would be exchanged in six weeks, then that there would be a meeting in May and if a basis were found that the subject would be referred to subcommittees.

Hartman: The resignation of Clerides has made the question of their talking more difficult.

Bitsios: I have received a report that the Turks will be appointing another man to talk with Papadopoulos. They, of course, say there will not be the same personal relationship. Apparently Clerides made a commitment in Vienna but did not inform Makarios when he got back. He went to Denktash on the 25th of March and gave him the Greek proposals. Denktash then called his Assembly and said he had the proposals. This ruined Clerides.

The Secretary: In my study of the Cypriot mentality I have some problem in understanding his not telling Makarios. He must have discussed it with the Archbishop.

Hartman: What did you agree to in Brussels?

Bitsios: That the territorial issue was to be discussed first. Caglayangil said yes, but the Cypriot proposal must be put forward first. We agreed.

Hartman: Clerides was carrying out this agreement.

Bitsios: In Vienna he agreed on the exchange.

The Secretary: In my view Clerides is not as skillful as the Archbishop.

Bitsios: Denktash did not respect the agreement.

Tzounis: Clerides made a mistake in not informing Makarios.

The Secretary: It is almost inconceivable in Cyprus that he would make such a proposal to Denktash and not tell the Archbishop.

Alexandrakis: Clerides has this personal weakness.

The Secretary: What do you think we can do? We can encourage the Turkish proposal. It is now premature for an American to go out. If you say 20% and the Turks say 38%, then the United States cannot say 28%—the gap is too wide. You have to narrow it more.

Bitsios: They can't say 38%, since they have that much now.

The Secretary: I would not have wanted to be a Turk and be governing in Greece during the occupation.

Bitsios: What are the prospects if you ask the Turks for their proposal?

The Secretary: Their Government is weak and is getting weaker. I have told the Turks that now is the time for them to make a deal. Carmanlis has been a real statesman. You have gone about this in a far-sighted way.

I would like to have the Turks put forward some proposals no matter how bad they are, but on a continuing basis. The new agreement with them gives us some handle because of the Congressional problem. I think we can get them to put forward a proposal. I personally believe once they begin to talk about percentages they should look at specific areas and then figure out what percentage it is. Suppose you agree on 26-1/2%. How do you compose it? My advice would be—if I were a mediator in this negotiation—get both of them to put forward proposals, then forget about the proposals and talk about areas. The Germans had an idea of three zones, Greek, Turkish and Federal.

Bitsios: This wouldn't work.

The Secretary: That was my view. I think our major effort is to elicit a Turkish proposal as a next step. Then Waldheim would have to follow up. Then we will be meeting at NATO and can discuss the next step. We are prepared to be active. An American emissary is now premature.

Bitsios: Yes.

The Secretary: We can be helpful after proposals have been set out. There has been no disagreement between us and our allies on how to handle this.

Bitsios: Regarding the Aegean, there is a problem with the seismic ship that the Turks intend to send out. It is called *The Hora*. They have said that in May they will send it into unspecified areas of the Aegean. This will create great problems. Is there anything you can do?

The Secretary: I will look into it.

Bitsios: I have sent a message to Caglayanil regarding this problem and about the Turkes statement. The answer was that the Foreign Minister speaks for the Government and we should not consider Turkes. But Ecevit is prompting the Government.

Hartman: Do you understand that the ship is to take soundings?

The Secretary: Are you saying they cannot do seismic research?

Tzounis: We say they cannot on our continental shelf.

Bitsios: International law requires them to ask permission of the government and to share the information. If it is purely scientific you can do seismic research.

Tzounis: We are relying on the Continental Shelf Convention. In the first three articles it says that islands do have their own continental shelf.

Bitsios: I don't see why they don't want to send this matter to the International Court.

The Secretary: They perhaps think they will lose.

Leigh: No one can predict the outcome of the Court.

Bitsios: We have taken a risk in suggesting it.

Tzounis: We have said ahead of time that our position to some extent will be eroded—we will not get 100% of what we want, but politically it is easier to follow the decision of the Court.

The Secretary: We have favored going to the International Court.

Tzounis: The Turks agree in principle but won't discuss the arrangements.

Hartman: They want to negotiate it first.

The Secretary: I had a student who was hanged in Burundi. According to the law he was allowed to have a Belgian lawyer, but not an interpreter, so he could not communicate with the Court.

We will have to take this up with the Turks. We are eager to have an easing of the situation. It is not tolerable to have two of our close allies in an attitude of hostility toward each other.

We will make a significant effort to bring about progress on Cyprus, and we will make an effort to get the Aegean problem to the International Court.

I have to meet now with the Black Caucus. I suggest we meet tomorrow at 11:30.⁵

Bitsios: What about the military matters we raised.

The Secretary: We will discuss that tomorrow. I believe we will be able to make some progress on some of it.

⁵ The meeting was held on April 15 at 11:45 a.m. in the Secretary's office. In this final negotiating session with Bitsios, Kissinger asked that Greece discuss with the United States any plans to declare a 12-mile limit on territorial waters. The Secretary also offered U.S. help with expediting weapons deliveries to Greece. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 275, Memoranda of Conversations, Chronological File)

65. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft) to President Ford¹

Washington, May 20, 1976.

Secretary Kissinger has asked that I pass to you the following message.

"When I saw Greek Foreign Minister Bitsios this morning² I told him that the cancellation of Caramanlis' visit³ had not been well received in Washington and that your reaction, as well as mine, was the the Greeks were not the only ones to have political problems. I observed that they must understand that a substitution of President Tsatsos for Prime Minister Caramanlis would not be appropriate. Bitsios defended

¹ Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 276, Memoranda of Conversations, Chronological File. Secret; Sensitive; Nodis. A notation on the memorandum indicates the President saw it.

² The conversation took place at 8 a.m. in the SAS Hotel while Kissinger was at a meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Oslo. (Memorandum of conversation, May 20; *ibid.*)

³ After meeting with Karamanlis on May 17, Kubisch reported from Athens that the Greek Prime Minister had decided that a visit to the United States would be harmful to him, President Ford, and U.S.-Greek relations, and create a political mess for both countries. (Telegram 4767 from Athens, May 17; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1976)

Caramanlis' decision as having been made to avoid his having embarrassing confrontations with the Greek-American community, members of Congress and the press which might have damaged US-Greek relations.

"When I told Bitsios that it might be difficult to schedule a visit by either Caramanlis or Tsatsos later this year he replied that Greece would want its Chief of State to pay his respects to you during the Bicentennial Year. I told him that we would see what could be done, but reiterated that we would not want a visit by Tsatsos to be considered a substitute for the Caramanlis visit.

"Our meeting, aside from expressing this disappointment, was positive. I assured Bitsios that we are prepared to be as helpful as possible in moving the Cyprus negotiation ahead. I told him of my message to Genscher which I was asked by the Greek Government to send. In it, I urged Genscher to press the Turkish Cypriot leader (on a visit to Bonn) to be more flexible. Genscher did so and I was able to tell Bitsios that a major effort was made, but that the Turkish Cypriots had made no promises. I will urge Schmidt to take an equally firm line when he visits Ankara next week. I also told Bitsios that I had urged Waldheim to take a more active role in bringing the two Cypriot groups together, and that you had sent a message to Demirel. I said I would encourage the Turks tomorrow to get into the substance of the problem.

"Finally, I urged early conclusion of our bilateral negotiation—not to help us with the Turkish Agreement—but to respond to our common desire to restore our traditional close relationship. He agreed that these should move forward and said that the Greek negotiator had reported good progress thus far."

66. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft) to President Ford¹

Washington, August 2, 1976.

SUBJECT

Status Report on United States-Greek Base Negotiations

Background

In late March, the Greek Government interrupted the renegotiation of the U.S.-Greek security relationship which had been underway at Greek initiative since early 1975, and asked that we conclude an agreement with Athens similar in tone and form to the Defense Cooperation Agreement we had just signed with Turkey. The United States accepted this request and began developing with the Greek Government a statement of "Principles," designed to cover the future negotiation of a U.S.-Greek Defense Cooperation Agreement. This statement of "Principles" was signed in Washington by Secretary Kissinger and Greek Foreign Minister Bitsios on April 15, 1976.²

By June, negotiators had completed the texts on the basic Defense Cooperation Agreement and two appendices concerning Status of Forces and Command and Control, but negotiation of four appendices concerning major U.S. facilities in Greece (Nea Makri, Souda Bay, Iraklion, and Hellenikon) remained at an impasse. Unlike the Turks, the Greeks refused to decouple the basic agreement from detailed annexes regarding the facilities, thus making impossible early submission to the Congress of the Greek agreement. The State Department believes the Greeks were probably dragging their feet to obstruct movement of the companion Turkish agreement through Congress.

To break the logjam, Ambassador Kubisch met on July 17 with Foreign Minister Bitsios to stress the firmness of our position and note that it was in Greece's interest to settle these major negotiating issues.³

Current Status

Foreign Minister Bitsios has responded somewhat positively to this latest approach by Kubisch by indicating Greek acceptance of some

¹ Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for Middle East and South Asia, Box 10, Greece 6. Secret. Sent for information. A notation on the memorandum indicates the President saw it.

² See footnote 3, Document 64.

³ Kubisch reported from Athens on his meeting with Bitsios in telegrams 7240, July 17, and 7268, July 19. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1976)

U.S. positions and by suggesting that compromise is possible on others. The Greeks have agreed:

—not to press for U.S. funding of any projects outside the basic \$700 million, four-year ceiling agreed upon in April by Secretary Kissinger and Bitsios; and

—[2½ lines not declassified]

However, the Greeks still:

—resist the U.S. request for expanded U.S. utilization of Souda Air Field in Crete;

—insist on sizeable manpower reductions and relocation of dependent support facilities from Hellenikon; and

—request assistance in expanding their Defense Communication System into portions of the Aegean militarized in contravention of the 1947 Treaty of Peace with Italy.

Future Prospects

Negotiations resumed in Athens on July 26 with U.S. negotiators instructed to test the Greek willingness to solve remaining issues quickly. If agreement is not reached by mid-August, it will be clear that the Greeks are again deliberately dragging their feet.

67. Memorandum of Conversation¹

New York, August 14, 1976, 8:30 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

US

The Secretary

Under Secretary Habib

Ambassador Bennett

Mr. Laingen, Notetaker

Greece

Foreign Minister Bitsios

Amb. Alexandrakis

SUBJECT

The Aegean Crisis

¹ Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 344, Department of State, Memoranda of Conversations, External. Confidential; Nodis. The meeting was held in the Waldorf Towers, where Kissinger stayed while attending a UN Security Council session. He met with Foreign Minister Caglayangil later that morning; see Document 245.

Kissinger: Habib thought I couldn't see you without first getting a briefing from him!

Bitsios: Go ahead and brief him.

Kissinger: No, that won't be necessary. I am pleased to see you again, as I always am, although I regret the circumstances that bring you here. I have been following the debate closely, as well as the events that led up to the debate.

We have great sympathy for the problem this presents your government. We have no interest in seeing this turn into a conflict. We have no desire to see it end in humiliation for Greece or indeed for either side.

How long will you be here?

Bitsios: Until the resolution is adopted.

Kissinger: How does it look? Do you have the European draft? I saw what is said to be a European draft only late last night and have not had a chance to study it.²

Bitsios: (after some hesitation) This *Sismik* incident came upon us in an already overcharged atmosphere, thanks to Cyprus and other problems.

Moreover this was not necessary. To send out the *Sismik* did not help the atmosphere or contribute to the delimitation of the continental shelf. On the contrary, we were in the midst of negotiations when this happened.

Kissinger: I thought there were no negotiations at present?

Bitsios: There were indeed.

Kissinger: But hadn't they been interrupted for almost a year?

Bitsios: No, they were adjourned temporarily; each side was to study the proposals of the other side. During the last round in Bern, the head of our delegation gave a fair warning to the Turks of the implications were the *Sismik* to sail. We said don't do it. We said it would be unwarranted, unnecessary and unhelpful.

Kissinger: I suspect their action is a product of the Turkish domestic situation.

² Habib gave Kissinger a copy of the draft resolution on August 13, which the British had given to USUN. It did not call for the Turkish ship to stay out of the disputed waters but asked the two sides to refrain from action that would increase tension and to resume negotiations. The draft also referred to the ICJ and its jurisdiction over such matters. (Ibid., Box CL 149, Geopolitical File, Greece) As part of the ongoing dispute between Greece and Turkey over the status of the Aegean waters, Turkey announced on August 5 that its seismic survey ship, *Sismik*, would conduct operations August 5–16 in the disputed waters around the Greek island of Lesbos. (Telegram 6034 from Ankara, August 6; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1976)

Bitsios: I don't know. The third point is that even when the ship was ready to sail, we twice attempted some kind of discussions. But these failed. The Turks were determined to sail it—as necessary, as many Turkish politicians urged all over the Aegean.

Even when we handed over our second note of protest we urged that the ship's itinerary be stopped and that we go to negotiations. The answer was no.

To make a long story short, it is clear that if this doesn't stop, we will soon have a situation of really extreme danger to say the least. And the prospect for negotiations will be totally disrupted. So my coming here was to ask that the ship's movements be stopped and that we resume negotiations.

I have seen the draft resolution. I am not sure it covers the needs I have expressed but we need to study it further.

Kissinger: What do you say about the argument of our legal people that if the ship makes no contact with the ocean floor in its research, your rights are not endangered?³

Bitsios: Kubisch explained that position to us. But we have consulted with American and other international lawyers and don't see it that way.

Kissinger: If those lawyers are Greek-American lawyers I am not so sure about that advice!

Bitsios: No, these are pure American, Harvard professors! They all agree that with modern technology, contact with the ocean floor is not necessary.

If they were prepared to negotiate in Bern why are they doing and saying the things that they are now?

Kissinger: I have not seen Caglayangil's statement of yesterday; the Department feels that if I see things like that within 12 hours, I might become operational!

Bitsios: Well I leave that problem to Ambassador Bennett.

Kissinger: What did Caglayangil say?

Habib: He made essentially three points. The first that they were already in a state of negotiations with Greece when the Greeks already knew about the ship and that was sufficient Greek acceptance of it in itself. The second point was that the Aegean is clearly not yet delimited in its continental shelf so that Turkey has a right to do research.

³ C. Arthur Borg, Executive Secretary of the Department of State, sent a memorandum summarizing the legal issues to Scowcroft on August 13. (Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for Middle East and South Asia, Box 10, Greece 6)

The Secretary: That point seems understandable to me.

Habib: The third point was that the Turks have always felt that bilateral negotiations were necessary before going to the ICJ. These were the main points: there was also criticism of Greek militarization of certain Aegean islands.

Bitsios: Oh yes! That is what is described as the chauvinism of Greece.

Bennett: Much was also made of the obligations of Greece under the Lausanne Treaty.

Bitsios: The point is that there is no question of legal arguments. The legal issue can be resolved by the Court. I must say, I would like to ask Caglayangil why not go to the Court if he is so certain of his case. The real problem is that an atmosphere has been created by Turkish actions bringing us very near to war. All it would take is a small incident; indeed we depend for peace on the sang froid of the mere captain of some small ship somewhere.

A number of things were underway. Another meeting was planned on air rights; another one was expected on the continental shelf problem. But all of this has been blown up out of proportion because of their insistence on this ship.

Kissinger: Are you meeting Caglayangil here?

Bitsios: I might but I don't know.

Kissinger: What is the sequence in the Council now?

Bennett: The next meeting is on Tuesday morning.

Kissinger: When do we speak? I prefer that we speak among the last.

Bennett: That depends on how things go but it could be something like Thursday. However, if a resolution can be put together by Tuesday morning, the debate could be finished that day. The practice is for everyone on the Council to speak at some point, either before or after the resolution is adopted.

Kissinger: I didn't like at all what the Department drafted for your speech so I have sent them back to the drawing board. What that draft contained couldn't possibly offend anyone, which of course would be totally uncharacteristic for us.

Bitsios: My concern is that Caglayangil will start the usual bazaar leak process. I am not going along with that game. I have one or two points on which I will want clarification.

Kissinger: Let's look at the text. I would like to get Caglayangil's reaction. What is yours? I assume it is not 100% acceptable but I assume neither side will get everything it wants.

Bitsios: I am not sure the present draft will give a sufficiently strong message to the Turkish politicians that the Security Council won't condone further research by their ship.

Kissinger: Well, I should think the language in the first operative paragraph about refraining from acts contributing to tension does that and so I doubt that this will be acceptable to the Turks.

Bitsios: That language is fine with us. But what is necessary here at the outset of the text is that the whole process concerns the delimitation of the continental shelf. It is dangerous to leave that issue vague.

Kissinger: What other things are involved?

Bitsios: If the language in paragraph 6 could be put at the beginning of the text the whole thing would be more clear.⁴

Kissinger: You understand that this is not our draft?

Bitsios: Yes, I could start asking for various clarifications of the text but beyond what I have indicated, I think I should best take the approach that this is a resolution directed at the Greek Government from the Council and we accept it. If I did this, this would hopefully stop a bargaining process from beginning. I think it is correct of the Council to take the approach with the parties of saying here is our resolution and how we feel about it and you can take it or leave it.

Kissinger: Have we talked to the Europeans who are drafting this?

Bennett: Yes.

Kissinger: What is the Turkish reaction? Do they have the text?

Bennett: Yes, they do but I don't know how they feel about it since they only got it last night from the British. The British also gave a copy to the Japanese President of the Council as a courtesy.

Kissinger: Suppose it is accepted by both sides as it now reads and the *Sismik* then proceeds to continue its sailings?

Bitsios: Then we will all know that the Turks are deliberately provoking to the extreme.

Kissinger: How do you answer the argument made by the Turks that if they don't send their ship, they are in effect giving up their legal arguments?

Bitsios: This issue does not have merits on the basis of law. It does not depend on the sailing of the ship. On the other hand, according to the international law, if the ship is sent and the other side doesn't react, then the other side loses its rights.

Kissinger: Not if you protest it.

⁴ Paragraph 6 noted a May 31, 1975, joint communiqué by Greece and Turkey to resolve the continental shelf dispute in the ICJ. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 149, Geopolitical File, Greece) See footnote 3, Document 246.

Bitsios: The Turks claim that our islands are mere protuberances of the Anatolian mainland and that the Greeks have no rights in that area.

Kissinger: I understand what they say but they also say that their legal claims need to be enhanced by research of the kind done by the ship.

Bitsios: If they go West of our islands with the ship that in effect establishes rights that we cannot allow.

Kissinger: But again, not if you protest. The question is whether force should be used. There is no question that you should acquiesce to the Turkish claims. The question is how you react and with what means.

Bitsios: The choice in this situation for Caramanlis was very difficult. He chose this course of going to the Council. Public opinion and our military were very aroused. It took Caramanlis' prestige and willpower to say; no, we will first try the peaceful procedures.

But we risk over-taxing Caramanlis' prestige and ability, particularly when Cyprus remains unresolved.

Do you really doubt Turkey's ultimate intentions and the philosophical attitude behind their basic foreign policy? All of this is consistent with the ambition of Attaturk.

Kissinger: I think their domestic situation is so paralyzed that both major parties there are competing to see who can be most nationalistic. But I don't have the impression of some master plan. The only Turkish politician smart enough to have a master plan of that kind would be Ecevit. Demirel's approach is purely political. I have never heard him express a conceptual phrase. Caglayangil is probably capable of a conceptual approach.

Bitsios: But Caglayangil has no power.

Kissinger: Exactly.

Bitsios: He is difficult to deal with; he often denies what he says earlier.

Kissinger: This may reflect his domestic situation. Basically I have a rather high opinion of Caglayangil as a human being. But I agree he doesn't have much power. I don't think he has a conceptual plan to humiliate Greece.

I remember the first time I talked with a Turkish Foreign Minister. That was Gunes. He spoke with great passion about Turkey's position. I didn't know anything much of the problem then; I was in my phase of not understanding the intensity of Greek-Turkish hatred.

Then there was the situation at the time of the Cyprus invasion. There was an Aegean crisis then too and they had troops in the Aegean technically ready to move on that issue; they facilitated their invasion of Cyprus.

Someone told me that the Turkish press is publishing texts of my telephone conversations at the time with Ecevit. I haven't seen them but this may mean my reputation in Greece will be at stake.

Bitsios: No, your reputation in Greece will not be damaged by a leaked telephone conversation!

Kissinger: I would think my reputation in Greece is probably already beyond repair. I suspect that even if I could restore Syracuse to Greek control and reestablished the Athenian Empire, I would still be accused in Greece of being anti-Hellenic. I have reconciled myself to my fate as far as Greek public opinion is concerned.

Bitsios: On the contrary! There are ways and means to rectify that. Indeed the television cameras are available out in the hall.

Kissinger: I will have to talk to Caglayangil. I see nothing the US needs to object to in this resolution. But our concern is to prevent the intensification of tensions so I want to see Caglayangil before giving you a definitive judgment. I will be in touch with you through your mission later today.

Bitsios: I understand your position. But if Caglayangil starts watering down each paragraph that will put us out of business.

Kissinger: I agree, but I would at least like to get his opinion.

Bitsios: Our dilemma is very clear. Either the Council lets things drag on and allows the Turks to continue their operations which will mean we reach a point of no return, or the Council urges the Turks to discontinue what they are doing and enter into negotiations.

Kissinger: Would you be prepared to avoid any activity on your part in that area?

Bitsios: Yes.

Kissinger: I am thinking out loud here; if we say that both sides have made their position clear, could you acquiesce in some Turkish activity?

Bitsios: That depends on where it is.

Kissinger: No one challenges your rights beyond the median line drawn with the mainlands as base points. There is the further problem of activity between that line and the Western edge of the islands. Is it possible that you would agree that there would be no activity in that area?

Bitsios: It depends on what kind of activity. We haven't done any research of this kind in some time. What they say about our earlier research is a half-truth, reflecting the fact of some research on our part in the early 60's.

Kissinger: The task is to find a formula that clearly defines the disputed zone and that will note that Greece has conducted research in these areas and that Turkey has now also done so. That doesn't make

that area less disputed, but it could be agreed that for the present, in those areas, no one shall conduct further research.

Bitsios: Don't introduce that idea in the Council. I cannot accept that their claim is equal to ours. Our claim is based on international law, on the 1958 Convention.⁵ Their claim is based on nothing.

Kissinger: Our lawyers in the Department claim there is a good basis for use of the median line between main lands.

Bitsios: On what grounds?

Kissinger: I have not gone into that in any detail. The point is that this will not be settled on the basis of US legal views or indeed on purely legal grounds of any kind.

Bitsios: Before we made our decision we had made our legal study.

Kissinger: Look, I have never questioned Greek intelligence! So I assumed you had made a good study.

Bitsios: Basically your idea is already contained in operative paragraph one.

Kissinger: What if we said something like this after the resolution was adopted.

Bitsios: We believe they have violated our continental shelf many times. We don't say that they should take the ship back to Istanbul. They can continue sailing it, so long as it is not in their territorial waters.

Kissinger: It seems to me that there are two issues involved. The first is to determine what kind of resolution is acceptable. Certainly there is no reason why the US should object to this draft. If Caglayangil wants to make basic changes that is another matter. I don't want to get into the dispute.

But this is only the first step. Suppose the Turks say, if the resolution is adopted, that the ship doesn't increase tensions and off they go again? Then we have the problem all over again. So how do we stop another exploratory voyage of this kind? It is in this connection that a US statement might play a role. I am not insisting that *we* do it but someone needs to. If we are to move from the resolution to talks that are not complicated by sailings of the ship we cannot rely on an automatic effect of the resolution. My question is how we avoid Turkey ignoring a resolution.

⁵ The 1958 Continental Shelf Convention established the exclusive right of the coastal country to exercise sovereignty over its continental shelf for the purpose of exploration and exploitation of natural resources. Signed at Geneva on April 29, 1958 and entered into force on June 10, 1964. (*UN Treaty Series*, vol. 499, p. 311)

What if the US and the Nine made separate statements appealing to both sides.

Bitsios: But we cannot go along with the median line.

Kissinger: I am not saying you should accept the median line as a final settlement. There clearly is still a disputed area.

But we can't just let things drift. We cannot have another war in the Aegean.

Bitsios: We need a moratorium of some kind. Operative paragraph one can be interpreted as such.

Kissinger: By both sides?

This is not just a legal matter. There are high political risks and in that situation we are not going to be dragged step by step into it.

Bitsios: But if we begin talking of median lines in the Council we will have a debate on that.

Kissinger: But if we have this resolution and then in two or three weeks there is more of the same kind of tension then where are we?

Bitsios: Ambassador Bennett could stand up in the Council next week and point out that operative paragraph one amounts to a moratorium. You could assure Caglayangil when you see him today that we have no intention to follow him with any provocative actions on our part.

Kissinger: I realize there are no reasons for the US to try to define the disputed area. But supposing we simply say that neither side should engage in provocative acts in the disputed area . . . after all that is what the first operative paragraph really says.

Bitsios: (draws a rough map of the Aegean)

Kissinger: Look, I have looked at the maps and we are not going to try to draw new lines or take new legal positions on our part. That would be absurd. We are engaged with Canada now and we know what the problem is like so we are not going to go into the Aegean and take on the responsibility of drawing new lines. But the point is that there are disputed areas . . .

Bitsios: Not in a legal sense but I agree there are such areas in a political sense.

Kissinger: Look, if I were to get any further into the legal arguments I would have to get you together with Monroe Leigh. But I am not eager to do this; to inject our legal position could only complicate the problem. We have not taken a formal legal position; what you have seen from us are only internal papers that have no formal status.

Well, I will be seeing Caglayangil later this morning. Let's decide what we say to the press.

Bitsios: Before we do that I have a message for you from Caramanlis that I want to convey.

Kissinger: Should we meet alone?

Bitsios: Yes, then we can come back and resume talking about how we deal with the press.

(Secretary and Bitsios leave the room)

Alexandrakis: I hope any statement to the press by you avoids the traditional expression of calling for restraint on both sides. You could say we are studying the positions of both sides and seeking the views of both so you could better understand the respective positions.

Bennett: We could also note that working drafts of a resolution are circulating.

Habib: Do I understand your Minister has said that you are inclined to let the Security Council take its position and then you would live with it?

Alexandrakis: Yes, we are prepared to accept it as it is.

Habib: In other words you would leave it to the Council. You would accept Caglayangil's latest statement for the record and then go on from there. Obviously any resolution has to be generally acceptable to both sides.

I hope the Minister understood what the Secretary was saying about disputed areas. Obviously there is *a* disputed area. That does not mean that everyone agrees exactly where that disputed area is.

(Secretary and Bitsios return)

Kissinger: We left it that I will call the Foreign Minister after I have seen Caglayangil. Meanwhile I will go out and express my appreciation that Greece has initiated the process of peaceful procedures looking toward a settlement, which is what we all believe should happen, and that we believe in the meantime that neither side should resort to actions that would jeopardize the atmosphere of these negotiations. And I hope the next time, Mr. Minister, you come to the US for a calm visit.

(Secretary and Minister meet with the Press in the hall)

68. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft) to President Ford¹

Washington, undated.

SUBJECT

Status of US-Greek Defense Cooperation Negotiations

When the Greek base negotiations resumed in Athens on September 1, three basic documents were virtually complete—the Defense Cooperation Agreement text, the Status of Forces Agreement and the Command and Control appendix. Negotiations on the supplementary documents had reached an advanced stage, but issues which we had considered resolved have now been reopened by the Greek side.

Based on sensitive reports from sources close to Greek Prime Minister Caramanlis, we believe that the Greeks have been stalling to prevent progress in Congressional passage to the Turkish Defense Cooperation Agreement. They have been successful in this. While hearings on the Turkish DCA were finally held on September 15 by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, further Congressional action this year is unlikely. Additionally, sensitive sources indicate that Caramanlis is stalling until after the U.S. elections.

The State Department reports that the following specific problems are holding up progress in the negotiations:

- [1 line not declassified];
- disagreement over cost estimates for construction by the U.S. of Greek communication facilities;
- Greek insistence on limiting U.S. air operations at Hellenikon; and
- a Greek reversal concerning a U.S. proposed periodic review provision for the use of Souda Bay.

U.S. negotiators believe it is unlikely that this issue will be satisfactorily resolved before the end of the month.

¹ Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for Middle East and South Asia, Box 10, Greece 6. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information.

69. Memorandum of Conversation¹

New York, September 29, 1976, 11:30 a.m.

SUBJECT

Secretary's Meeting with Greek Foreign Minister Bitsios

PARTICIPANTS

Greece

Foreign Minister Dimitry S. Bitsios
Director General for Political Affairs John Tzounis
Chef de Cabinet Cleom Catsambis

US

The Secretary
Under Secretary Habib
Assistant Secretary Hartman, EUR
Nelson C. Ledsky, Director, EUR/SE (notetaker)

The Secretary greets Bitsios and photographs are taken.

Foreign Minister Bitsios: How have you been?

The Secretary: Thank you, quite well. I appreciated very much all the courtesies extended to me in Greece during my recent stop.² As you know, I had a very good meeting with John Tzounis there.

You have a beautiful country. I was much impressed by the countryside in Crete.

Foreign Minister Bitsios: Yes, Crete is a lovely part of our country. We were happy you were able to stop at Souda Bay.

The Secretary: What part of Greece are you from?

Foreign Minister Bitsios: From an area further north on the mainland.

The Secretary: From what I could see, it is simply a lovely country to vacation in, but of course I can't go to Greece on a vacation.

Foreign Minister Bitsios: Why not, I think you would be well received.

Tzounis: Well, of course there are many other places north of Greece that are equally beautiful.

The Secretary: Where?

¹ Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 276, Memoranda of Conversations, Chronological File. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Ledsky on September 30 and approved in S on October 13. The meeting was held in the Secretary's suite at the Waldorf Towers Hotel. Kissinger met with Turkish Foreign Minister Caglayangil earlier that morning; see Document 246.

² Kissinger stopped in Crete the previous week.

Tzounis: Well, I know Bucharest and Rumania quite well. That country is equally beautiful.

The Secretary: I suppose Eastern Europe is beautiful, but the Communist system everywhere has destroyed the cities and made everything excruciatingly dull.

Foreign Minister Bitsios: You have traveled extensively in Eastern Europe, haven't you?

The Secretary: Yes, I think I have been in every Eastern European capital except Sofia. East Berlin, Warsaw, Prague, Moscow, they are all incredibly gray and dull. Belgrade is just a little better.

Tzounis: You are correct. It is as if all development stopped when the Communists arrived. Those countries that were taken over later are a little better. Bucharest, for example, is twenty years ahead of Moscow.

The Secretary: It is fascinating to me how frozen in their development Eastern European countries are. The Nazis at least had popular support. I don't know any country in Eastern Europe where the regime enjoys any popularity. What they have done is to try to seek support through appeals to the petty bourgeois. I have a friend from Hamburg who says when he wants to see what Germany looked like in the Twenties and Thirties, he goes east to the GDR. But Communism has helped prevent some people from moving too fast. If the Chinese, for example, had a free enterprise system, they would probably take over the world.

What should we discuss this morning? Can we settle Cyprus and the Aegean before our elections?

Foreign Minister Bitsios: I had a long conversation with Caglayan-gil on Monday afternoon. Tzounis has already briefed Hartman on the details. We agreed with the Turks to proceed to negotiations. I will meet Caglayan-gil again on Friday and see if we can go deeper into the Aegean questions, but when I read his speech yesterday at the UNGA, I became terribly discouraged again. Quite frankly, I think Caglayan-gil has already ruined the spirit necessary for any meaningful negotiating process, and he has done so just prior to what he knew was to be a crucial discussion with me. Already on Tuesday, I read a report from Ankara in which the Energy Minister talked about the possibility of a further sailing of the *Sismik* in April.

The Secretary: We have made an analysis of the *Sismik* and have concluded that unless it accidentally scraped the bottom and hit oil, it couldn't possibly find anything.

Foreign Minister Bitsios: That may be so, but the sailing of the vessel has a nuisance value. It churns up political difficulties.

The Secretary: I find the whole thing pointless. The sailing of the *Sismik* doesn't mean a thing. It could sail for twenty years and find nothing.

Foreign Minister Bitsios: But let me return to what I was saying. Following up on the Minister of Energy's speech, Caglayangil spoke yesterday about the Aegean islands. Like the Prime Minister, he refrained from calling them Greek islands. It was a violent speech in my judgment, talking about demographic factors in connection with the future delimitation of the continental shelf. The Turks are simply trying to capitalize on every aspect of the Security Council resolution.³

Then, finally, there is this information about a U.S. company which may begin drilling for oil in the Aegean in the near future, if the Turks have their way. We gave this information to Hartman yesterday.

Hartman: Yes, Mr. Secretary, we are checking on this report.

Tzounis: This latter element is most distressing. Even the Court says that drilling would constitute a serious matter.

Foreign Minister Bitsios: But the most worrisome aspect is the fact that I already spotted on Monday a certain aloofness in Caglayangil's attitude. Then, instead of scheduling a second meeting some time in the middle of this week, he suggested we meet again only on Friday,⁴ the day before my scheduled departure from New York. I simply don't know what they have in mind. There seems to be a new element in their position, but what it is, I am not sure.

For example, when I raised Cyprus with Caglayangil, he asked me if Greece was not losing interest in this subject. I told him it was not up to us to negotiate. The two communities have their own forum for conducting the negotiations, but two years have gone by without results, and it was time to produce something concrete. Caglayangil admitted Cyprus was the key to the relationship between Greece and Turkey, but he then turned around and said that all that Turkey could offer was "modest border rectifications." I said that we would have to negotiate on the Aegean for the moment and not Cyprus, but I made clear that the Turks would have to make more meaningful concessions on Cyprus if there was ever to be an understanding. We will see what will happen on Friday, but frankly I am not optimistic.

The Secretary: Are the Turks more flexible in the exchanges of letters I understand have occurred between the two Prime Ministers?

Foreign Minister Bitsios: There has been no recent exchange of letters. I know of none.

The Secretary: Well, with respect to the Aegean what can be done now? Can you give me some idea of how you perceive a settlement's

³ See footnote 2, Document 246.

⁴ October 1.

being worked out? Tzounis, for example, when I spoke to him at Souda Bay, talked about some form of joint exploration and exploitation.

Foreign Minister Bitsios: I think any kind of joint exploration would be premature. First we must tackle the delimitation question. On this we cannot allow the Turks to have anything West of the Aegean Islands. That would be contrary to anything done anywhere else in the world. With this single reservation, we can probably then proceed to accommodate the Turks in some fashion with respect to the area east of the Greek Islands. Once delimitation is settled, there can be joint ventures in the areas adjacent to the delimited line. But the joint ventures cannot be in the whole Aegean as the Turks seem to want. The whole area is simply not open for joint ventures. As I said before, they are now advancing demographic arguments contrasting their 40 million to our 9 million as criteria to be used in the delimitation question. That is sheer nonsense. We have repeatedly said that the Aegean is not a Greek lake. But Greece is made up of islands and the mainland. In fact, our territory is half islands. So this is a major matter with us.

The Secretary: You have, as I understand it, 3,000 islands. If one figures six miles around each island, what does that do? What would be left for the Turks? The Turks claim they would be enclosed.

Foreign Minister Bitsios: Those statistics mean nothing in terms of navigation. They can sail anywhere and even with respect to the continental shelf, there would be much remaining open to them. If we were to declare a twelve-mile limit, that would involve, as I understand it, 80% of the continental shelf, but, Mr. Secretary, let me point out that we have not claimed the twelve-mile limit.

Tzounis: According to our calculations, on the basis of the six-mile limit, there are 92,600 kilometers of the Aegean open outside territorial waters.

The Secretary: If there were no islands, the median line between Greece and Turkey would be easily definable. It also seems to me that whatever is west of the median line cannot be laid claim to by Turkey.

Foreign Minister Bitsios: Right. Exactly our position.

The Secretary: It seems to me desirable to define the disputed zone. Nothing west of the median line would be in that zone.

Foreign Minister Bitsios: That is certainly so. But you can draw many other lines and therefore it is important to know just what the Turks are claiming. The sailing of their *Sismik* has alarmed us in this regard.

The Secretary: I am trying to restore some balance. The Turks have implied that anything surrounding the six-mile limit is open for discussion, but in my view they shouldn't be able to claim anything west of the median line.

Tzounis: Exactly right. Based on our own calculations, Mr. Secretary there would then be approximately 25% of the Aegean open for discussion.

The Secretary: I am not making any proposals. I just want to restore sanity.

Tzounis: Let me give you some technical details. There have been anywhere from 27 to 30 Court decisions on matters of this kind. Seven involved islands. On no occasion were islands enclaved within the territorial sphere of a second country.

Foreign Minister Bitsios: Just before we entered this room we received a telephone call from Athens. It was from Prime Minister Caramanlis. He wanted me to tell you that he had read Caglayangil's speech before the UNGA yesterday, and that he was aware of the information concerning possible US involvement in Turkish drilling in the Aegean, information which we have already passed to Hartman. The Prime Minister believes it is imperative that Turkey understand that they must cease trying the patience of Greece and the Greek people. The Prime Minister is simply not prepared to accept any new provocations. Either he will quit his position, or there will be a violent reaction.

The Secretary: Will you tell this to Caglayangil when you see him on Friday? Would you prefer that I pass this message to Caglayangil? Would you object if I did so?

Foreign Minister Bitsios: No, to the contrary. I think it would be very useful if you could emphasize this point. The point should be made that not only would future unilateral actions on their part blow up whatever chance there is for a negotiated settlement, but that Greece will have to react directly to any new provocation.

The Secretary: What can we do at this time to be of assistance?

Foreign Minister Bitsios: It seems to me that it would be useful if you could ask them to be moderate in the negotiations. If they want more than 50% of the Aegean, there can simply be no negotiation. There also must be no new initiatives on their part while the negotiations are in progress.

The Secretary: Can you give them some idea of what part of the Aegean you are prepared to discuss? That is what they asked me this morning. What proposals are you prepared to make?

Foreign Minister Bitsios: We will give them on Friday some idea of the area open for negotiation.

The Secretary: When I saw them this morning, I asked that they not push their old notion of your withdrawing your case before the International Court of Justice.

Foreign Minister Bitsios: I think they have accepted the idea of a long delay, six months or longer.

The Secretary: (to Tzounis) When we spoke in Souda Bay last week,⁵ I think you referred to the possibility of a nine-month delay on each side.

Tzounis: Yes. I outlined then that we would ask for a six-month delay in responding to the Court's request for a memorandum, and that we might then ask for a ninety-day extension on the six months. The Turks would have the same opportunity, so that if all the delays were added up together, there would be a total of perhaps eighteen months.

Foreign Minister Bitsios: Returning to the question of your possible role, I simply don't see what else you can do but to urge moderation upon the Turks at this point. The situation is serious. I know the Turks always say that war is unthinkable, but then they turn around and do exactly what they want to without regard for the consequences in the area.

The Secretary: We will talk to Caglayangil again. If after your own talk with him on Friday you think of any other way in which we can be helpful, I would appreciate your telling me, and I will do everything I can to assist.

Foreign Minister Bitsios: We will contact you after our meeting on Friday.

The Secretary: I did want to say that in my speech tomorrow in the General Assembly,⁶ I intend to mention the need for movement on the Cyprus question. I will refer again to the idea of principles. You will recall that I spoke along similar lines in my speech last year, and we have now fixed up my points a bit. I think it would be useful if both sides could look at them and consider them further. Of course we recognize that it is up to the two communities to decide whether they want to make progress. I would appreciate it if you would also take a look at these principles. I hope you will not find them too painful.

Foreign Minister Bitsios: The key point is that they (the Turks) occupy the key territory on Cyprus.

The Secretary: Well, you will note that one of our principles talks about the necessity of a return of territory.

Foreign Minister Bitsios: In ending, Mr. Secretary, I must say again that we see things as drifting. What is required is that this drift be checked and that the situation in the Aegean not proceed to deteriorate in the step-by-step fashion it has over the past few months.

⁵ Kissinger and Tzounis met at Souda Bay Air Force Base on September 23 from 6:35 to 7:21 p.m. They primarily discussed the Greek-Turkish Aegean dispute and Greek-U.S. base negotiations. (Memorandum of conversation; Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 277, Memoranda of Conversations, Chronological File)

⁶ The address is published in the Department of State *Newsletter*, No. 183, October 1976, pp. 2-5, 36-39.

The Secretary: One of our problems is that we have never had a coherent strategy. Maybe after the elections, assuming that the Republicans win, we should see if we can get together and take a look six to twelve months ahead.

Foreign Minister Bitsios: I am ready to sit down for a discussion of this kind at any time. We could even do it before the elections.

The Secretary: The issues in the Eastern Mediterranean must be settled peacefully. We simply cannot allow the situation to drift into war.

Foreign Minister Bitsios: Even a brief encounter between the two sides would be catastrophic. The consequences could not be calculated, but I do not see how either party could survive in the Western camp after such a collision. This is not because the two Governments would want to leave the West, but because the internal forces brought into play by such a cataclysmic event would overwhelm the present regimes.

The Secretary: You are right. I agree that both the parties would probably be lost to the West. What is important is that we stay in touch to make sure that the drift is halted and that the process of negotiation is begun.

70. Memorandum From A. Denis Clift of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft)¹

Washington, October 1, 1976.

The CIA has submitted at our request an assessment of recent reports of coup plotting in Greece (Tab A).² The assessment concludes that:

—coup plotting against Caramanlis has been endemic since 1974 but must now be taken more seriously because Caramanlis' Aegean policy is seen by many as being too soft on Turkey;

—two normally disparate factions—the monarchists and junta loyalists—may be conspiring together;

¹ Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for Middle East and South Asia, Box 10, Greece 6. Secret. Sent for information. A notation on the memorandum indicates Scowcroft saw it.

² Dated September 30; attached but not printed.

—leftists under Papandreou have contacted the plotters but of the three factions Papandreou's group represents the least threat;

—King Constantine has been contacted by the monarchists and apparently has approved a plot tentatively set for October or November;

—the Caramanlis government in general is alert to coup possibilities, does not believe an attempt is likely soon, [2 lines not declassified];

—the plotters do not appear to have the capability, organization, coordination, or proper political circumstances to attempt a coup now and the odds appear against such action;³

—the chances of success for an attempted coup now would be minimal because plotters lack the support of the rest of the officer corps; and

—Caramanlis is sensitive to the danger and will avoid extreme concessions to the Turks.

³ Scowcroft underlined and highlighted this section.

71. Memorandum From A. Denis Clift of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft)¹

Washington, October 19, 1976.

SUBJECT

Coup Plotting in Greece

[less than 1 line not declassified] Greece's former King Constantine may be having second thoughts about throwing his support to three groups in Greece planning to overthrow Prime Minister Caramanlis' government (Tab A).²

An earlier September report³ stated that Constantine had directed his choice for prime minister, Spyros Theotokis, to make contact with the plotters—the royalists, former junta sympathizers and followers of

¹ Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for Middle East and South Asia, Box 10, Greece 6. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information.

² Intelligence Report, October 13; attached but not printed.

³ Summarized in Document 70.

George Papadopoulos—and indicate the King’s support for the coup. While in Athens, Theotokis was unable to meet with key plotters or discover more about their plans. Theotokis’ contact in Athens stated that he was being closely watched.

After returning from Athens, Theotokis reported this to Constantine who stated: “At least we have a Prime Minister in Greece who is respected in Europe and a democratic government which is recognized by the world. I wonder if I should have got mixed up with plotters of whose integrity and seriousness of purpose I am ignorant.” Constantine continued that he fears the plotters will either act successfully without his knowledge and undercut his position or create prolonged violence that the Turks could use to their advantage. Theotokis then tried to strengthen Constantine’s resolve.

This report tends to reinforce the CIA analysis we forwarded to you on October 1⁴ which stated that the plotters are not well organized and that the Caramanlis government is closely watching the situation.

⁴ Document 70.